It is impossible to replace one political elite with another and change the compass of direction in Iraq, without replacing the old by the new elite in the structure, extent, and levels of the executive, legislative and judicial authorities. But this replacement may require a revolution, a bloody coup, or a structural war that Iraq's local, regional and international scene no longer allows. Also, this replacement, which has become a necessary need for Iraq, should not also be similar to the scene of the wars of the owners of power from the Governing Council until Adel Abdul-Mahdi, as they exchange power with the continuation of their approach, which is no longer accepted by the scene as well.

Only what is called in international relations (power wars) or (technical reformist coups) is left to replace the ruling authority gradually, as in James Rosenau’s classification of revolutions (angel wars: power wars: structural wars). But these (technical) coups may lead to (opposite coups) carried out by the ruling power elite, so the country enters the battlefield of rounds (power wars), one succeeds and another fails, or vice versa, until the structure of the ruling power is disrupted by internal and external pressure.

It seems that Al-Kazemi's arrival to the position of the prime minister and commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Iraq on 5-7-2020 has opened the door to the first round of wars (technical coups) on power in Iraq. Also, the armed storming of Al-Khadra by the Hezbollah Brigades on the night of the twenty-sixth of June 2020, after storming one of its headquarters, which they reinforced with the assassination of the martyr Hisham Al-Hashemi, was the opposite technical coup or the response to the war of the first round. We can also describe the unusual visit of Muhammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, to Baghdad, accompanied by his unusual schedule as well, as an artistic reversal of the schedule of Al-Kazemi's visit to Riyadh and Washington, which is a second round of the war on power in Iraq.

A member of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Mukhtar al-Moussawi, stated that Zarif’s visit changed the program of the two parties in Baghdad and Riyadh, and the Atlantic Council had stated that Zarif’s visit to Baghdad took place at an inappropriate time and aimed to sabotage the rapprochement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Also, Khamenei’s words in his meeting with Al-Kazemi carried multiple messages. He said: “Iran does not interfere in Iraq’s relations with America, but the Islamic Republic expects from Iraqi friends to know America and realize that the American presence in any country is a source of corruption and destruction.”

Khamenei added, “Iran expects to follow up the implementation of the decision of the government, the people, and parliament (although the parliament’s decision was issued by Iran’s parties only, and if the October uprising echoed Iran’s outrage) to expel the Americans, as their presence undermines security and stability. These words, of course, carried important connotations as they were orders for the supporters of Wilayat al-Faqih in Iraq in the first place, who mobilized them to talk about Soleimani's killing, accompanied by revenge against the United States. Khamenei said: The crime of America’s assassination of General Soleimani and the engineer is an example of the results of the Americans’ presence in the region. They killed (your guest) in your home (Soleimani was not a guest) and they openly admitted this crime.

If Zarif's visit may have indirectly disrupted, postponed or canceled Al-Kazemi's visit to Riyadh, Khamenei's messages may have disrupted, postponed or possibly canceled Washington's visit. Or at least made it fraught with stimulating a series of coups and counter-coups, or facing the challenges of escalating armed attacks against American forces that continued; It continued and entered Iraq into the battle of war over the reins of power without witnessing this battle, at least in its infancy, the scene of military coups, structural wars or major revolutions, and without being similar to the exchange of positions between the leaders of Shiite political Islam (the owners of power).

Accordingly, Al-Kazemi’s continuation in power after two rounds of the war on power over the first hundred days, without overthrowing him, without submitting his resignation, or without complete acquiescence to the previous elite, may be considered an acceptable indication, although some or all of these possibilities may be present. . And perhaps Al-Kazemi (spark) launched a third technical coup by announcing the date of the early elections on the sixth of next June, which may mean his approval to dissolve Parliament in accordance with Article 64 of the Constitution and throw the ball into the court of Parliament and Shiite political Islam parties to cause repercussions and responses, including a coup (opposite). ) as it sees fit.

The opposite coup may be to withdraw confidence from Al-Kazemi or push him to resign without dissolving a parliament dominated by Shiite political Islam parties, so Al-Kazemi’s government turns into a caretaker government without holding early elections, so Al-Kazemi gets out of the equation and we return to Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s square. This counter-revolution may be possible, despite the welcome by Jenin Plasschaert, the UNAMI official in Iraq, about the date of the early elections, and the quick reaction of the Speaker of the Council, who called for an earlier date and the implementation of Article 64 of the Constitution. It appears from Al-Halbousi’s quick response and Naim Al-Aboudi, the representative of Asa’ib Al-Khazali, who agreed to Al-Kazemi’s move, that the opposite team had prepared for this step, especially since it was after Zarif’s visit and after Al-Kazemi returned from Tehran, angry at him from Tehran.

Before waiting for the repercussions of Al-Kazemi's third artistic coup, we need to ask, is Al-Kazemi's arrival to power considered an artistic coup or a first round of wars on power? And was the storming of Al-Khadra a coup opposite to that of Al-Kazemi, and was Zarif’s visit another regional coup, and was what happened and is happening wars of owners or wars of authority? People differ in Al-Kazemi’s assessment, some of them criticize excessively, and some of them praise negligently, such as the nature of the Iraqis and their (coup) psyche, and some of them are inflicted by poverty and no longer care about blasphemy or praise or wait for joy and a way out from Kazemi or others, as the high rate of poverty in Iraq may lead to upcoming violence.

But I did not find a harsher insult than Kata’ib Hezbollah, and I did not find praise from a new Facebook generation that is actively promoting it, and there are those who stand between the two rows, following Al-Kazemi’s gray steps. But it must be said that Al-Kazemi was the first prime minister to reach power without elections (and this may be a practical (technical coup), as he is without affiliation with Shiite political Islam parties) and this is another evidence of (technical coup). The prime ministers in Iraq 2003, a camp for the fiercest militia of the Hashd militias (Hezbollah Brigades), and this may be considered tangible evidence of the course of Al-Kazemi’s artistic coup, and therefore, perhaps, the technical coup against Hezbollah Brigades was not delayed, and it was the immediate storming of Al-Khadra.

Also, the launching of the American-Iraqi dialogue with its first round on the one hand and linking Iraq’s electricity to the Gulf on the other hand, may be considered a second round of war (technical coup) against an authority that disrupted the strategic framework agreement and its deputies decided to expel the American forces, and against it was the counter technical coup by disrupting Al-Kazemi’s visit Riyadh and Washington. Iran refuses from the Baghdad governments to cross their red lines, and wants them to be their proxy, and this is what all the governments of Shiite political Islam parties have done since al-Jaafari until Adel Abdul-Mahdi. When Iran felt that Al-Kazemi might represent another line, it raised the red card.

And Iran’s red card may have come in light of an escalating context against it, punctuated by explosions that included several Iranian nuclear and missile sites, energy facilities and others, prompting Iran to respond, not only against Al-Kazemi, but against the wave aimed at increasing internal popular discontent in Iran. Also, the storming of one of the Hezbollah Brigades camps on the night of June 26, 2020, coincided with the Israeli bombing of Iranian sites in Syria on the one hand, and on the other hand, with the first explosion that occurred this year inside Iran. Iran International reported that a number of residents east of the Iranian capital, Tehran, saw a bright orange light that lit the sky for a few seconds, at dawn on Friday, June 26, 2020.

The Syrian and Iranian event coincided with the event of the storming of one of the camps of the Hezbollah Brigades in Baghdad, perhaps placing Al-Kazemi in the circle of those who turned against the path of the elite of the ruling Shiite political Islam parties, so the immediate storming of Al-Khadra was the response. A report by the Iranian Fars Agency revealed what we called the wars on power and the coup against it. He said that there is a plan for a coup in Iraq (with the help of the Zionists and with the blessing of Saudi Arabia) to overthrow the political and religious regimes alike,” according to the report. And if this theorization of the era of wars over power in Iraq (technical coups) is correct to replace one elite with another, and away from Al-Kazemi’s gray steps, then this era may move him to the stage of a possible (revolutionary coup) in the next stage.

In order for the (technical) palace coup that brought Al-Kazemi to succeed, Al-Kazemi may need to be in some stages revolutionary, especially as he faces armed cross-border religious parties and militias acting on behalf of Iran, and the intensity of fluctuations in the local and regional scene that has increased opens a door for a revolutionary coup. Without a revolutionary coup supported by the October uprising, Al-Kazemi may not be able to occupy the structure of the basic structure of power, and if he fought a series of wars of power against the ruling elite and its militias.

Here, the Sudanese scene may be repeated in Iraq, or rather the Turkish scene 100 years ago (although this scene in Turkey is more suitable for Iran), because Iran and Turkey are medium-power countries, unlike Iraq, in addition to the leadership of both sides of religious empires that cross borders. In Sudan, as in Turkey, an era (technical coups and wars for power) took place in Sudan, as in Turkey, and turned into a revolutionary coup that achieved a complete review of political power and the replacement of an elite instead of the Islamist elite. And Iraq has entered the era of the war on power with a coup and a counter-coup, which may need a stage (a revolutionary coup), perhaps Al-Kazemi is preparing himself for it. Since he was director of the intelligence service, Al-Kazemi has benefited from the opportunity to deal with the international arena in the era of fighting ISIS, and he has prepared himself since he came to power by structuring the security services.

And the benefits of international security communication against ISIS is a basic rule for Al-Kazemi to enter cautiously and deliberately into the era of fighting the escalating international militias since the assassination of Soleimani and Al-Muhandis. The liquidation of Soleimani Al-Muhandis, which Hezbollah Brigades accuses him of today, with the October uprising led to Al-Kazemi’s arrival to power in an artistic coup, but he may need the militias’ oppressed October Intifada belt to move from the era of a technical coup to an era of revolutionary coup. The degree of public participation, its duration, and the number of deaths of the uprising may give Al-Kazemi, perhaps, the opportunity to succeed, with a high ability to hold on to the transition from the artistic coup to the revolutionary.

A revolutionary coup in which Al-Kazemi achieves his goals of replacing the elite of the Shiite political Islam parties by an Iraqi elite, as happened in Sudan or Turkey 100 years ago. The time required for the success or failure of one of the opposing sides remains subject to several factors, such as the relationship of the ruling elite to the uprising and the increase in polarization between the two parties. By increasing the polarization between the two parties, the state of hostility may increase, and this hostility may prevent the two parties from entering into settlement negotiations, and if they occur, it may end in the failure of Al-Kazemi.

Its failure is possible if we realize the ruling elite’s control on the one hand, and the penetration of the intifada on the other, and its goals are different from one governorate to another, which may make it prey to killing, arresting, disappearing and dispersing the ruling elite, as it happened to it since October 2019. But the volatile circumstances locally, regionally and internationally may keep him away from failure and give him a chance of relative success or vice versa (in light of the reshaping of the region after ISIS, according to Olbright Hadley’s report). The US presidential elections, he may be a suitable local ally for the international coalition to get Iraq out of the crucible of Shiite political Islam parties, otherwise, the opposite coups may bring him out of coverage.

Writer Dr. Omar Abdel Sattar Mahmoud