Where is Iraq heading after August 30?

Since the uprising of October 1-10-2019, Iraq has turned to a strategic turning point away from the mantle of Iran, established by the killing of Soleimani and Muhandis on 3-1-2020, with which Iran lost the leadership platform for its axis, which includes Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and then the resignation of Adel Abdul Mahdi, this trilogy was a key pillar in this turning point.

This means that if Iraq returns to a pro-Iranian government or Iran replaces its axis leadership with the equivalent of Soleimani and manages to defeat the Shiite revolt against it, it will have achieved what it calls (Iran) course correction, i.e. a return to the pre-10-2019 era.

Although Khamenei preaches to himself and those with him on his Twitter account that America is unable to do anything against Iran, because it is no longer the America we knew 40 years ago, he ignores the truth.

It ignores the fact that America, which brought Khomeini to power 40 years ago for factual reasons, and if it differs from America 40 years ago, today wants to remove his revolution from power for factual reasons as well.

Khamenei ignores the Iranian reality, which is now pregnant with Iran other than Iran, which, after it rose up against his revolution, wants most of Iran's cities at the end of 2017, and Iran is waiting for a wave of protests to come after November 5, 2018.

Iran entered the era of major sanctions on 5-11-2018, and after that America entered the midterm congressional elections on 6-11-2018, the results of which Iran and with it America, Europe and the world are eagerly awaiting their results.

They are midterm elections that usually go without much media attention, but they have captured unprecedented American, Middle Eastern and international attention as if they were presidential elections, perhaps for two reasons, a sharp global polarization between Yemen and the left, against and with globalization, and the international Trump agenda against Iran.

Because it is the context of the international polarization factor between the right and the left that is still active, that brought Trump, and because Iran has persisted in its terrorism after the nuclear Lausanne, as it was further exacerbated by Hitler at the gates of World War II, America after 6-11-2018 may be the same America that brought Trump after 6-11-2016.

The new era of international Trump "Trump vs the Rest" is similar to the era before the Second World War, and it is heading to leave it for a new international era.

This is not only a conclusion or a foresight, but what Western academic, media and political periodicals say and emphasize, including French President Macron and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who have recently referred to this.

If we want to define the code of the Trump era precisely, we say that it is a five-pillar code, starting with the concept and model of the clash of civilizations said by Bernard Lewis and Hengtington, and with it the emblem of Bush Jr. who is with us and against us, and the conditions Trump that "push and ride with us", "strike hard or step aside", and end with "Deja Vu".

Saudi Arabia and Iran are geopolitical couples, adjacent in geography and capabilities, different in their model of governance, will, attitudes, and interests, and in their respective relationships with the international community.

Their relationship with each other has been governed by the rule of no conflict without change and no strategy without conflict, since the model of governance in Iran has changed from a traditional monarchy model that believes in the nation-state, to a religious, revolutionary model that transcends borders.

This strategic conflict has been, and continues to be, an indirect conflict that is simultaneously managed by the cross-border factors of armed and unarmed religious statelessness employed by Iran against Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia confronts it with its international alliances.

When we compare the world of 1918 and 2018, we find that there are some similarities and irregularities in the Arab, Middle Eastern and international scenes.

When the leaders of the world of 2018 celebrated the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, they celebrated as they lived the signs of an end to the world between the two wars, perhaps interested in entering a new international era, in which they might leave the post-World War II world.

The presence of Putin, who cunningly stole the celebration spotlight from Macron, demonstrated this potential transition, reinforced the Trump with his tweet against Macron on this day of celebration, Putin stole the limelight, and confirmed the series of possible transitions from the 2018 era when he linked to a single tweet the world of 1918, 1939 and 2018.

Finland, the daughter of the Baltic Sea and known as the neutral land, its capital Helsinki, was granted self-determination by the Bolsheviks in 1917 and did not belong to NATO, and the United States and Russia were brought together with the Cold War détente document.

Helsinki's interest in the transformations and turmoil of the Middle East has increased in recent years, reflected in the inauguration of its own academic institutes, arranging visits by diplomatic and parliamentary delegations, organizing activities with research centers, putting forward documents to resolve crises and deepening cooperation with Arab intelligence services.

From the end of World War II until the Syrian war, the Middle East is a convenient place for Helsinki as the worst hotbed of instability in the world, as it is the only geopolitical region in the world that does not have a system of security and regional cooperation.

Four terms are mentioned in the above title, each of which defines, explains and analyzes the course and destiny of the Middle East intended under this article.

This article talks about the conflicts of the parties of the Middle East and their rivalry, and looks for the opportunity to move the conflict with each other to the stage of competition, and compete with each other to the era of integration.

The major periphery of the Middle East is Iran, Velayat-e Faqih, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia, to which Egypt and its Arab counterparts are included.

Iraq is located north of the Gulf, Iran to its east and the Gulf Cooperation Council to its west, and is the only country adjacent to the two parties, and the only point of contact between the Arabs and Iran.

Therefore, the conflict between the two shores of the Gulf with Iraq went through three international alliances and four Gulf wars, and a fifth Gulf war may break out, before the conflict ended.

The equations of the conflict between the two sides over Iraq deserve attention, and among them, they wrestled with it when its political system differed from them.

For thousands of years, humans have observed that small causes can produce large, unexpected results.

What can a human being, or a president like Trump, do when he suddenly finds himself faced with so many problems in which to make a decision?

This is what Trump faces today and is at the head of the international system that is under threat, and just as human relations have interactions, theories, decisions and repercussions, international relations have interactions, theories, decisions and repercussions.

The science of international relations observes and predicts the course and fate of relations between states that move from one regime to another whenever an emergency occurs.

An emergency occurs if the main objectives of the units of the international system change or there is a change in the pattern of conflict between the units of the international system.

Bremer's zero-group theory of legacy argues that chaos, the absence of global leadership, and the prospect of a zero-sum clash are one of the emergencies plaguing the international system.

In order to see the direction of a compass Trump in the Middle East, it is necessary to recognize the mentality of Trump, from the time he was a man of commercial and real estate deals, before he was president of the United States of America.

He moved Trump field of international relations from the field of conflicts and alliances, to the field of international deals, and "privatized the foreign policy of the United States," once he arrived in the White House as 2 2017.

The privatization of foreign policy and the transfer of the field of international relations to the "management of international relations" may make the possibility of the transition of the relationship between America and international actors, whether ally, rival or enemy, from friendship to hostility and vice versa.

If Bush Sr. formed the first international coalition for the liberation of Kuwait in 1990, and slapped Saddam Hussein with his ultimatum through James Baker before the liberation of Kuwait, telling him, that Kuwait would be liberated, but your decision to withdraw from it without restriction, would determine the future of Iraq;

If Bush Jr. slapped Saddam Hussein with his statement 48 hours earlier Hussein by warning him to step down from power and leave Baghdad with his two sons within 48 hours, or declare war, then form the second to invade Iraq.

If Obama slapped them when he delayed responding to Maliki's request after the emergence of ISIS, a punishment for the terms of the 2011 withdrawal and his alliance with Iran, and imposed the conditions for a new return, before Maliki was expelled and brought in Abadi and the third international coalition was formed in September 2014.

The axes of conflict in international relations are the contradiction of interests or values between the parties to the conflict, and the inclusion of individuals, groups and states in the conflict.

The conflict of individuals, states and groups in the Middle East today enters a watershed moment at the gates of the fortieth of Iran's revolution, after realizing the contradiction of their interests and values with Iran, and its possible rapprochement with Israel, which seems to have become the spearhead against Iran's militias.

Spearhead against the militias of the regime and the (religious) crescent of Iran, forty years after the Iranian revolution, after Israel was the spearhead against individuals, groups and states of the Arab National Crescent.

In order to see the direction of a compass Trump in the Middle East, it is necessary to recognize the mentality of Trump, from the time he was a man of commercial and real estate deals, before he was president of the United States of America.

He moved Trump field of international relations from the field of conflicts and alliances, to the field of international deals, and "privatized the foreign policy of the United States," once he arrived in the White House as 2 2017.

The revolution is a temporary breakdown of the state's monopoly on power, but if it is prolonged, it could resemble a sailors' rebellion against the skipper that ends in disaster, Plato says.

"Seafarers claim that each of them has the right to drive without learning this art, accompanied by wrestling and fighting, and then after their success the supplies run out and the ship deviates."

"Aristotle inherited this attitude towards revolution from his professor Plato, concluding on the methods of prevention of revolution and the necessity of preserving the state entity."

This short paper excludes any possible military confrontation between Iran and America, prior to the breakup of the IRGC's contract, Iran's return to Article VII, and Iran's loss of the ability to wage foreign war.

This paper also confirms that Trump sanctions against Iran and its proxies are aimed at dismantling the infrastructure of the IRGC's arms in its regional crescent in preparation for finding local allies of the international coalition.

Damascus, the medium of the Iranian axis of resistance, may be the first of the four capitals (Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut) for the breakup of the Revolutionary Guards' contract, in preparation for a scenario similar to that of Lebanon in 1982.

Iran's dilemma lies in the fact that it lives in a medieval regime with the dominance of the Supreme Leader and his Revolutionary Guard, which has so far been able to thwart any revolution, coup d'état, or regime change.

This hegemony has also made Iran not only immutable, but also vulnerable to fragmentation, with any potential attempt at regime change, especially with religious and ethnic minorities suppressed by Iran's mullahs as the Shah has done before.

In addition, changing any political system may have uncertain consequences, as no party can predict the consequences of any change as a success or failure, especially if it is talking about a regime such as that of the mullahs of Iran.

Is he heading for the resignation of the government and early elections, or for a security solution and financial incentives? Or does it repeat the scenario of Samarra and ISIS? Or does Iraq have the rest of the army capable of taking the lead?

The Iraqi army (unlike Lebanon so far) has been unable to protect young people who demonstrated peacefully, and were killed in cold blood, and this repression may intensify after 25-10. There are many factors playing in favor of the government, which neither Iran nor even America wants to topple, and the timid global condemnations and Falih Fayyad's visit during the demonstrations to America are proof of this.

Therefore, radical change is unlikely, supported by the fact that the momentum of the demonstrations does not include the whole of Iraq, as well as a decrease in the demonstrators who do not yet have a clear leadership or a specific agenda, and are struggling in the face of bloody, heavily armed militias ready to kill. The demonstrations may last longer, until the influence of the authority and the parties in power declines, and clear demands are produced, or there are defections in power, and international condemnation escalates.

It is impossible to replace one political elite with another and change the compass of direction in Iraq, without the new elite replacing the old in the structure, extents and levels of executive, legislative and judicial powers. But this replacement may require a revolution, a bloody coup d'état, or a structural war that Iraq's local, regional and international landscape no longer allows. This replacement, which has become a necessary need for Iraq, also needs not to be similar to the scene of the wars of the owners of power from the Governing Council until Adel Abdul Mahdi, where they exchange power while continuing its approach, which the scene no longer accepts either.