The revolution is a temporary break in the state’s monopoly on power, but if it is prolonged, it may resemble the rebellion of the sailors against the captain, which ends in a catastrophe, as Plato says.

“The sailors claim that each of them has the right to lead without learning this art, and this is accompanied by wrestling and fighting, and then after their success the supplies run out and the ship’s course is deviated.”

“And Aristotle inherited this attitude towards revolution from his teacher Plato, so he concluded the methods of preventing revolution and the need to preserve the entity of the state.”

“The revolution against Aristotle is nothing more than an evil that must be guarded from its beginnings, for mistakes always lie in the beginnings with which negligence leads to the unraveling of matters.”

“Hence, the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle stresses the existence of a distance between the theoretical ideal and the practical reality,” that is, between motives and interests, for motives cannot be measured in contrast to interests.

But Marx, like Khomeini, tried to “bridge the distance between ideal and reality,” but they failed, so their ideas before and after the revolution remained characterized by (conceptual ambiguity), so the process of combining the ideal with reality failed, so the Soviets and the Wilayat al-Faqih fell on his path.

Just as Gorbachev, after failing to combine the example with reality, reconstructed (perestroika and glasnocent) and turned Russia into a state, but after the fall of the Soviets, the Iranian leader’s house today is carrying out a similar Iranian perestroika that may end in the same way.

After Iran entered the era of Trump sanctions on 11-5-2018, the House of the Leader planned for the post-Khamenei era, and prepared for the formation of a leadership council of five individuals.

On the eve of the Warsaw summit, and with the Iranian revolution entering its fortieth year, the Iranian parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, announced during a session of the Qom Provincial Council, that Khamenei recommended structural reforms in the country during the next four months.

This trend may represent a soft internal revolution, taking the form of structural reforms, but it will remove the head of the regime and change the shape of the Iranian regime upside down.

Certainly, these structural changes will touch the core of the dual cross-border system, making it, for the first time in forty years, a non-cross-border system.

The Revolutionary Guard realizes today that it must remove Khamenei and change the nature of the regime, in order to absorb internal and external discontent, in order to remain and continue to rule in light of the major international campaign against him.

The international community is also aware that the regime has many dilemmas, including repressed identities, depleted resources, a wide gap between it and its popular base, and armed rebellions;

These are reasons that made this regime a time bomb that might explode in light of international sanctions and escalation. A worse scenario would be repeated in Iran than Syria, which shook the international system, and this is what the international community is trying to avoid.

The interest of the Revolutionary Guard, which seeks structural reforms from top to bottom, may converge with the interest of the international community, which seeks to change from the bottom up, in the Iranian regime not imploding, in the removal of Khamenei, and in Iran’s transition from revolution to state.

But the cost of the regime not exploding is also high, as it may require the confluence of the Iranian path from top to bottom with the path from the bottom up international, to bring together the two extremes, and to bring together the two extremes of the natures of politics that may transform the revolution into a state.

And, paradoxically, bringing together the two extremes to stop the chaos taking place in full swing in the countries that are witnessing chaos in the region.

From Iran, in which pre- and post-1979 may meet, to Afghanistan, which may reunite the Taliban after 2001, to Iraq, which may combine pre- and post-2003, to Syria also with pre- and post-2011.

The thread that organizes the two extremes is, first, the abandonment by the regimes and oppositions of these countries of the transnational revolutionary religious mentalities and systems;

And secondly, in the international community’s abandonment of dealing with Iran’s parallel apparatus of guards, guides, leadership experts and others, which were among the reasons for the continuation of the Iranian regime until today, and pushed these regimes to dismantle themselves and catch up with the state.

The question is, is there a state that can be returned to in Iran, and if there is a state, how can the parallel apparatuses of the state return and they are an enemy of the state, and will the Revolutionary Guards, which is the most important organ parallel to the state, abandon themselves?

And the answer may be (yes), because the turban of the guardian jurist who has reached a very old age, and the authorities of this country belong to him, is only one of the sides of the personality of the guardian jurist, which combined the turban and the Shahansha and the personality of a businessman.

In light of the international community’s rejection of this turban and its cross-border revolution, and the avoidance of an implosion of Iran’s regime from within, the Revolutionary Guards can abandon the turban of the Wali al-Faqih;

He abandons the turban, and the Revolutionary Guard remains content with the Shahanshahi and the businessman's suit, which may open the way for a meeting with the Iranian opposition with the support of the international community.

And the Revolutionary Guards’ abandonment of the Wali al-Faqih, an internal coup that may open the gates of hell from the groups inside Iran that believe in Iran’s revolution.

But the Guards have experienced creative chaos since 9-11, and may be able to deal with it, or get involved in it and enter Iran into an era of creative chaos.

Someone might say that the Wali al-Faqih is the head of the state, the supreme commander of the armed forces, and he is the one who appoints the heads of the judiciary and chooses half of the officials who decide to contest the elections;

And that he has the last word on all important matters of the state, domestic and international, where his influence exceeds the powers of the president or parliament, so how will the Revolutionary Guards remove him?

The answer is that the Revolutionary Guards are the pillar of the Guardian Jurist, who holds all the joints, and the Guard is the only one capable of removing the Guardian Jurist in a leadership council or otherwise, in response to Trump’s pressure or the pressure of the people.

Especially after the world and the peoples of Iran were fed up with religious revolutions such as the revolution of Iran, the turban of the guardian jurist transgressed the religion and the state, it leads in the name of the absent imam and increases the prophecy, because the prophecy ended but the Imamate called.

The rule of the Wali al-Faqih is “my God,” until Blair said, “Iran is not a country that has a doctrine, but a doctrine that has a state,” and it has led to chaos and wars since the Wali al-Faqih came to power until this day of people.

There is no longer a solution before the international system, except with the demise of the deputy Wali al-Faqih (the absent imam), and from here came the direction of Iran’s leaders to a leadership council to replace Khamenei, after Trump put his gun to Khamenei’s head.

Iran is one of the oldest nation-states in the world, and it is a geopolitically important country in the region and the world, and the international coalition is interested today in the return of Iran to the state, which had no problems with all countries in the world before 1979.

The international community has diagnosed today what it failed to diagnose for forty years, that Iran's dilemma in its foreign policy is caused by its internal system, which must change, so that Iran's foreign policy can change.

Just as the world failed to diagnose Iran's dilemma, the Iranian revolution failed to erase Iran's national identity, and to dismantle the state of Iran before 1979, and today it is experiencing a historical schizophrenia between its religious revolution and its national identity.

In addition, the Iranian revolution also failed to build its revolutionary model, as its edifice is now crumbling, and it is poorer today than it was forty years ago, and it has problems with most countries of the world.

The revolutionary Iran was not able to respond to the demands of its people as a state authority because it is not a nation state, and it was not able to deal with the international community for the same reason, and it must return as a nation state.

All of this calls for Iran to revolution and calls for the international community to close the model of the dual system of revolution and open the model of the state.

And a thousand greetings and salutations to the Syrian revolution, which exposed the falsity of the turban revolution of Iran’s jurist ruler to far and near, and turned it back on its heels in disappointment, even after the destruction of Basra.

Writer Dr. Omar Abdel Sattar Mahmoud