Iran's dilemma is that it lives in a medieval regime with the hegemony of the Leader and his Revolutionary Guards, who are able so far to thwart any revolution, coup or regime change.

Also, this hegemony has made Iran not only immutable, but also vulnerable to fragmentation, with any possible attempt to change the regime, especially with the presence of religious and ethnic minorities who were suppressed by the mullahs of Iran as the Shah did before.

In addition, changing any political system may involve uncertain results, as no party can predict the results of any change, success or failure, especially if we are talking about a system such as the regime of Iran's mullahs.

Therefore, the Revolutionary Guards resist any attempt to change in defense of their authority and for fear of losing it, and the same is true of those who seek change, such as the People's Mojahedin Movement, as they fear that their attempt will not lead to achieving the expected goals.

Despite all that, change may occur in Iran. Replacing any political system with another political system requires the availability of three conditions: an alternative political system, a domestic circumstance discontent with the existing system, and an international circumstance favorable to the removal of the old regime.

And while America negotiates with the Afghanistan Taliban, we expect the White House to negotiate with the Mujahedin-e-Khalq movement, the vanguard of resistance to the Shah's regime since it was founded 53 years ago, and to the mullahs' regime since it came to power.

In its dangerous path, the movement represents a suitable alternative to the mullahs' regime, as it is aware of the rules of the political game locally and internationally, and it has lived, opposed and has rich experience in the path of resistance to the Shah's regime and Khomeini's regime.

The movement defines itself on its website and says that it is a movement that seeks to replace the ruling regime of terrorism disguised as religion in Iran with a secular, democratic, pluralistic government. It also proposes a third alternative to replace the regime away from containing the mullahs’ regime or occupying Iran, as happened in Iraq.

With this model and that option, the movement possessed the elements of international, regional and local success, in addition to its balance of being a movement centered in the main cities of Iran, including the capital, unlike the rest of the opposition movements.

This balance may give it the ability to prevent the chaos of the political transition in the event of a regime change, especially since preventing the chaos of the transition in a country like Iran, may meet the desire of the international community in this complex international and Iranian circumstance.

And if this is a brief talk about the mullahs' model, the movement's model, and the possibilities of change, here are some of the details of the path and the possibilities of the victory of the MEK movement.

Following in the footsteps of Muhammad Mosaddeq, the People’s Mojahedin Movement was launched in 1965, challenging the Shah’s rule, and became a member of the Iran Liberation Movement led by Mahmoud Taleghani and Mehdi Bazargan. The goal was to replace the Shah’s dictatorship with a national and democratic system that represented the people’s sovereignty and freedom.

When the revolution against the Shah was launched, the movement participated in it with its capabilities. When the Shah fell, the movement established its foundations as the largest Iranian political force, as the number of copies of their newspaper reached 500,000 copies.

And when Khomeini monopolized the decision of the revolution, religion and the state, the Mujahideen of Khalq demonstrated against him, so the Revolutionary Guards opened fire and hundreds of people were killed and wounded, and thousands of people were arrested and taken to prisons and detention centers.

And armed clashes began throughout the country between the movement on the one hand and the guards on the other, so it established a political coalition called the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which Bani Sadr joined, who was dismissed from his post at the time.

Massoud Rajavi arrived with Bani Sadr in Paris from Tehran on a risky flight, risking its path and fate linked to the path and fate of the Tehran mullahs' regime.

The Mojahedin-e-Khalq movement is still fueling this dangerous journey, despite the passage of 53 years since its appearance, as if it is still in its prime of youth.

Although her journey was dangerous enough, it was worth the risk of blood, sweat, and tears to make these sacrifices a great fruit.

The major fruit was that the mullahs’ regime would finally be the largest terrorist regime in the world, and the movement would be liberated on its dangerous journey from the accusation of terrorism, by British, European and American decisions issued during the period from 2008-2012.

Perhaps the MEK today has a historic opportunity to replace the velayat-e faqih system with the third alternative, which was proposed by the engineer, president-elect and Secretary-General of the MEK Maryam Rajavi in ​​2004.

After the failure of the containment of Iran by the American and European administrations, and after America’s occupation of Iraq, Maryam Rajavi said before the European Parliament, which means: We do not want an occupation as happened to Iraq, nor do we want the containment of Iran to prove its failure, but we want this regime to fall in the hands of the Iranian people , with international support for this option.

And Maryam Rajavi may have had what she wanted when Trump arrived at the White House in January 2017, and US National Security Adviser John Bolton wrote down his plan in a five-page article he published in The National Review entitled: How to Get Out of the Nuclear Deal with Iran.

The steps that Bolton has proposed to the Trump administration are being implemented in practice over the past two years, and are based on outlining a set of options very close to regime change.

John Bolton's steps include, among other things, declaring America's support for the opposition inside and outside Iran, and providing support for Iranian nationalities such as the Baluch, Ahwazi Arabs and the Kurds.

Expected US support for the Mujahedin-e-Khalq movement may be embodied on the ground by US negotiations with Maryam Rajavi's team, just as Zalmay Khalilzad's team negotiated with the Taliban (which resisted the Americans) on the verge of America's expected withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Although the White House's negotiation with the Taliban and the possibility of negotiating with the People's Mujahedeen are two sides of the coin to confront Iran, the relationship of negotiation with the relationship of national liberation movements with international law and order is worth noting.

The nature of international relations during and after the Cold War determined which of the national liberation movements was closer to achieving its national destiny than the others.

The field and diplomatic activity of the national liberation movements on the one hand, and the patterns of international relations on the other hand, affected their relationship with each other, so that liberation movements became among the internationally recognized factors, in return for adopting less fundamentalist methods.

Although the discussion here is about the Mujahedin-e-Khalq movement, the discussion of the Taliban in Afghanistan, even if it comes in its context, requires a short pause.

Like the Mujahedin-e-Khalq movement, the Taliban considers itself a “national, local liberation movement that arose during the conflict between the so-called warlords in 1996,” and despite its ambiguous relationship with Al-Qaeda after 9/11, the past seven years have witnessed wide differences between them.

The nationalist Pashtun Taliban, the Debondian of the Hanafi school, considers itself a national liberation movement and is committed to working only inside Afghanistan and accepting political settlements with governments, and perhaps the killing of Hamza bin Laden has corrected and ended a mistake and the Taliban’s relationship with Al-Qaeda after 9/11.

Accordingly, Rajavi’s team’s expected meeting with Trump’s team is closer to reality and international law than the Trump team’s meeting with the Taliban team, which resisted the Americans and had relations with al-Qaeda, unlike the Mujahedin-e-Khalq movement.

Just as some might think that Rajavi's team meeting with Trump's team is a fantasy, some have thought that the establishment of an international alliance against Iran is a fiction or a political joke!

And here it is being formed under the American leadership of the European allies, China, Israel and the Arab Gulf states to confront Iran, which is what we see today in Hormuz and other than Hormuz.

The Camp Ashraf 3 conference, which the Mujahedin-e-Khalq held this year in Albania, may be an unprecedented step that meets, coincides, and coincides with John Bolton's international steps in surrounding and overthrowing the mullahs' regime in Tehran.

The movement demonstrated its strength in Camp Ashraf 3, at the organizational and media level, and drew the attention of the international community and the US administration in particular, in light of its confrontation with the Wilayat al-Faqih regime.

Camp Ashraf 2019 has become a major center for all the political, organizational and media operations of the MEK in the next stage, as most of its elements have been transferred to Europe to reside in the camp, which has become an icon of the Iranian popular struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the mullahs’ regime.

The movement succeeded in exercising a new role in the Ashraf Camp Conference 3--2019, which was represented in reviewing the crimes of the mullahs’ regime against members of the resistance through a huge exhibition of the victims of the political regime, containing thousands of pictures and footage of the regime’s crimes against its opponents.

At the Ashraf 3 conference, the movement focused clearly on attracting Western powers at all levels, after it had been seeking over the past years to attract Arab forces opposed to the Iranian project in the region.

In Ashraf 3, the movement revealed its capabilities inside Iran, and its actual impact on the popular protests in Iran through dozens of video clips of popular crowds that raised slogans of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq in many cities and regions in Iran.

The movement’s proving its role on the ground, and its penetration of the regime, made it a major source for exposing the mullahs’ regime’s programs that violate international law, such as nuclear and missile projects, as it was the first to announce the reality of those programs through a press conference near the White House in August 2002.

It is clear that the movement, after years of concentrating its demonstrations in Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam, is working to create manifestations of pressure in the capitals of Western decision-making, the most important of which are Washington, London and Berlin.

The presence of Giuliani, President Trump's lawyer, in all conference events and sessions was remarkable. He was ahead of all the guests, and his speech was clear that the regime must be overthrown, and I think that is an important indicator.

At the Ashraf 3 conference, the movement did not fail to focus on striking aspects that it opposed to the Shah and Khomeini from the first day, such as sectarian issues and issues of nationalities and regions.

Among its latest remarkable activities, at the end of June, the regime published an audio recording, claiming that it belonged to two leaders of the Mujahideen Khalq, and held the movement responsible for the Fujairah attacks!

I imagine that this is due to a good reason, which is that the movement has penetrated the system and revealed the details of this operation and the executives responsible for it, which shocked the system.

The movement astonished the regime's leaders again, when the movement published a detailed report condemning the Revolutionary Guards and holding them responsible for the attack on the Japanese ship.

It is striking that the Mujahideen movement enjoys remarkable Arab acceptance, in addition to Western acceptance, albeit unofficially.

Saudi Arabia, for example, had a remarkable presence, and the speech of its representative, Salman Al-Ansari, was striking and received warm applause and wide spread.

In addition, many parliamentarians, media professionals and members of civil society organizations, from Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Algeria, Bahrain and Morocco were present in a remarkable way.

Perhaps the movement, with the Ashraf Three Conference, has taken a great step forward in its path to the birth of an Iran other than that of the Shah and Iran of Khomeini, which has fled its people and the international system since 1979 and has finally reached a dead end.

A dead end came to a fate with the open road of Camp Ashraf 3, and with a new international era that was opened with the end of ISIS, coupled with international and regional alliances to confront the influence and regime of Iran in the region.

Writer Dr. Omar Abdel Sattar Mahmoud