If Bush Sr. formed the first international coalition to liberate Kuwait in 1990, and slapped Saddam Hussein with his warning through James Baker before liberating Kuwait, telling him that Kuwait will be liberated, but your decision to withdraw from it without restrictions will determine the future of Iraq;

And if Bush Jr. had slapped Saddam Hussein with his statement 48 hours ago, Hussein was warning him to step down and leave Baghdad with his two sons within 48 hours, or declare war, then formed the second to invade Iraq.

And if Obama had slapped them when he was late in responding to al-Maliki’s request after the emergence of ISIS, as a punishment for the terms of the 2011 withdrawal and for his alliance with Iran, and to impose new conditions for his return, before he expelled al-Maliki and brought al-Abadi and the third international coalition was formed in September 2014.

The fourth of them, Trump, has slapped them twice. He is quick to announce a new Middle Eastern alliance and says, “We did not go to Iraq, and lose thousands of Americans and thousands and hundreds of billions in order to hand it over to Iran.”

Trump's visit to Ain Al-Assad Air Base, in which he did not meet with any of the Iraqis, is consistent with the terms of the American return in 2014, which the Pentagon leaders indicated more than once by saying that they would not withdraw after the end of ISIS from Iraq.

This American approach to dealing with Iraq before and after 2003 indicates that Iraq is the task of American presidents before and after Trump, as General Petraeus, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said in July 2016 in a televised interview on ABC News, saying that Iraq is the task of the next president. And after him and after him.”

What is the American code for Iraq that made Iraq at the heart of the region vital to American interests, as Rumsfeld says, and from its tributaries are the Gardens of Eden, as Eisenhower says, and made Trump decide to withdraw from the wings of Syria and Afghanistan to the heart of the region?

The Code Brief, as the Ryan Crocker Working Report states, is that "Iraq becomes independent, stable, and prosperous, at peace within its borders and with its neighbors, reflects legitimate and effective governance, and is strongly inclined to close cooperation with the United States." “.

To achieve this, the report issued in May 2017, adds, “US interests in Iraq must be strengthened by depriving terrorist groups of a safe haven and reducing Iraq’s exposure to Iranian influence.”

The best way to do this is to support the development of an effective, responsive, and legitimate Iraqi government and publicly commit to long-term U.S. engagement in Iraq, as ISIS and Iran reinforce the notion that the United States cannot be relied upon in a long-term partnership.

It is necessary, then, as the Ryan Crocker report says, that President Trump and his National Security Adviser be fully concerned with a strategy focused on governance in Iraq, and the White House should remain a direct partner to Iraq, with the goal of protecting American security interests.

It is also necessary to “build on the strength of European engagement and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Success will take years, but it will be a serious success.”

And if this is the summary of the code, then the detail of the code says that America has gone through stations in Iraq, which began in 1922 with the concession of the oil monopoly until the end of the twentieth century, then bent by the Baghdad Pact, then third by occupying it in 2003, withdrawing from it and returning.

Between the oil concession in 1922 and the return, the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1931 built the Kirkuk (K) - Haifa (H) - Tripoli (T) oil pipeline, and despite the collapse of this line, the future may be waiting for it.

And America's control of Iraq's oil, as Trump says, will give it control over its prices on the one hand, as well as competition with the Russians, at a time when Iran is being written off from the oil-exporting countries.

From the oil station to the Al-Ahlat station, the American train passed and linked Iraq to the Baghdad Pact (SENTO) 1955, which was absent when Wilayat al-Faqih appeared in 1979, and at the gates of its entry into an era of unprecedented siege, there is talk again about the emergence of a Sunni Arab NATO to confront Iran.

Linking Iraq to the Mutual Security Agreements from 1955 to the Al-Safa Strategic Agreement of 2008, is linked to an Iraqi expectation of the new American return, from Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, unlike previous times.

It is welcomed with the exception of Iran's militias, which made Iraq a part of the American national security, which drove a wedge between Iraq and Russia on the one hand, and between Iraq and Iran on the other hand, and between Iraq and Syria on the third.

This comes after the gap widened between the Shiites of Iraq and Iran and between the Iranian regime and the peoples of Iran, and the people returned welcoming Uncle Sam's return.

In Iran after they hated him, and in Iraq after they resisted him in 2008.

And the roaming of the American forces led by Austin Reinfort with the Baghdad Operations Command, led by Jalil Al-Rubaie, at the gates of January 6, 2019 carrying the insignia of imposing the law, and the treatment of the Iraqi citizens who surrounded them on Al-Mutanabi Street, which is one of the most important and crowded streets of Baghdad, is evidence.

The insistence of the United States on Iraq is evident after the oil station and the Baghdad Pact in four Gulf wars and three international alliances, all against Iraq since 1979 until today.

The first and second wars ended with an armistice agreement, and the third and fourth ended with a change in the Iraqi, regional and international scene.

And when he entered Iraq after the liberation of Kuwait on the way he had gone, Iran may turn after the fourth Gulf War, to the same path as Saddam after the liberation of Kuwait, “Saeed trained the path of his brother,” as the Iraqi proverb says.

Even at the height of the Iranian rise during the Fourth Gulf War, and Lausanne signed with the 5 + 1 group, Iran had relinquished its nuclear sovereignty, and had not gained any Gulf capital, but rather the Gulf began targeting Iran in the four capitals, and it did not happen. Iran has a seat in the international coalition;

Iran did not guarantee that its regime would not be targeted, then Trump withdrew from Lausanne, and imposed 12 conditions on it. If it agrees or refuses, it is a loser.

Just as the deal presented to Iran now by Trump, it may resemble the deal that Iran offered to America after the occupation of Iraq, with the difference that Iran today is not Iran in 2003, as it has entered into unprecedented sanctions, in a changing international circumstance.

This happens at a time when Iran is heading to resist America in Iraq through its proxies after Iran rejected America’s offered deal, as it did after America rejected Iran’s deal in 2003.

This happens after America informed Iran that its agents' targeting of American forces in Iraq is a green light for targeting Iran itself, just as Iran has reached America by burning Baghdad if its influence in Iraq has been reduced.

Trump is no longer enough for an Iraqi government that has a hand with America and another with Iran. Rather, he wants an Iraqi leadership that is ready to cooperate with him against Iran after the time of enemies is over.

The year 2019 has become crucial not only for Iraq, but for Trump himself in his new international strategy, which will land in Warsaw next February.

And the Warsaw Summit, which became one of the capitals of NATO after it was the seat of the Warsaw Pact in the righteous party, Washington invited 50 ministers from different countries, according to Lavrov, that will discuss the file of Syria and Yemen and the Iranian missile program and Iran's activity in the region.

As if Washington's message to Iran from the Warsaw summit is, "We are able to make the fortresses of our former opponents bases for targeting other opponents."

This is why Zarif, who visited Najaf and Karbala, was upset after Pompeo’s visit, who warned Baghdad that Tel Aviv might bomb the headquarters of Iraqi factions fighting in Syria. Zarif said from Najaf to Washington, threatening: “Get out of the region, we are the people of the land.”

Pompeo's threat to Abdul-Mahdi that America is no longer able to prevent Tel Aviv from bombing militia sites in Iraq, indicates the extension of the Israeli hand from Syria to Iraq.

It also indicates Iran's rejection of Pompeo's conditions to withdraw from the region without restriction, and Iran's rejection of this is similar to Saddam's refusal to withdraw from Kuwait without restriction, which may lead to Iran losing its axis and its regime, as Saddam's refusal led to the liberation of Kuwait and the fall of Saddam's regime after that.

This comes at a time when Israel removed Iraq from the list of enemy countries, opened the way for trade relations with Iraq, and unannounced Iraqi figures visited Israel in 2018.

The extension of Israel's military, commercial and diplomatic hand to Iraq, may be considered one of the last stations of America's code in Iraq.

The Israeli hand extending to Iraq after Syria may reopen the Kirkuk-Haifa line, which was established in 1931, open the way for Iraq's membership in the upcoming Arab (Sunni) NATO, end Iraq's connection with Iran's regional axis, and distance Iraq from Russia.

Thus, the Iraqi American code of the past hundred years has become clear and is still in the conflict with Iraq and over Iraq, and it has stipulated that there is no neutrality in this conflict, and that there is no end to it unless any non-American hand is lifted from it.

Writer Dr. Omar Abdel Sattar Mahmoud