Where is Iraq heading after August 30?

Since the uprising of October 1-10-2019, Iraq has turned to a strategic turning point away from the mantle of Iran, established by the killing of Soleimani and Muhandis on 3-1-2020, with which Iran lost the leadership platform for its axis, which includes Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and then the resignation of Adel Abdul Mahdi, this trilogy was a key pillar in this turning point.

This means that if Iraq returns to a pro-Iranian government or Iran replaces its axis leadership with the equivalent of Soleimani and manages to defeat the Shiite revolt against it, it will have achieved what it calls (Iran) course correction, i.e. a return to the pre-10-2019 era.

Iran has tried this since Kadhimi assumed the premiership and is outside the pillars of the Shiite house, Iraq has witnessed and continues to witness (counter-waves of coup and coup) between the pillars of the triple turning point and the mobilization of (Iran) rejecting the pillars of this transformation, and although the pillars of transformation are still active, but the mobilization of (Iran) has become a parallel and balanced force.

After the elections of 10-10-2021 achieved the second stage of the turning point, with the victory of the Sadrist Movement in the largest bloc and the formation of the tripartite alliance with Sunni sovereignty and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (which is a fourth pillar of the turning point), the insistence on getting out of the mantle of Iran represented by the governments of consensus from Ibrahim Jaafari to Adel Abdul Mahdi, at Sadr is inevitable or almost inevitable, that is, Iran may no longer be able to return to the pre-1-10-2019 era.

But Sadr's bloc withdrew from the parliament altogether on 12-6-2022, despite the success in the session of 9-1-2022 in electing the Presidency of the Parliament, which has been more than eight months without the formation of a majority government today following the decisions of the Federal Court that disrupted the election of the President of the Republic in what it called the guarantor third (counter-coup waves).

The opposite wave would have replaced the Sadrist seats with a majority of the deputies of the Coordination Framework, nominated Mohammed Shia al-Sudani for the premiership, Sadr responded with a sit-in in the parliament and then around it and then in front of the Judicial Council, and the speaker of the House of Representatives suspended the sessions of the Council in a counter-coup wave until things reached a bloody peak on August 29-30 inside Al-Khadra in which more than 50 people were killed and more than 600 injured in a similar repetition to face (Tishreen uprising) three years later, and we are on The doors of her third anniversary.

It coincided with the August 30 military strike and was supported by a series of various strikes against Sadr, represented by the retirement of al-Haeri (a severe religious blow to Sadr) and a judicial strike against him by dismissing the case for the dissolution of parliament, in addition to the political blow that was represented by his push to withdraw from parliament, in addition to the insistence of the framework on his Sudanese candidate so far.

In continuation of the wave of coups and counter-coups, the Minister of Sadr then tweeted his call on his allies and independents to withdraw from the parliament, which the court considered unable to perform its role, and the Sovereignty Alliance or the Kurdistan Democratic Party has not yet responded to the tweet of the Minister of Sadr officially.

At the heart of this scene was the US Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Leaf visited the four presidencies, and the summary of the visit was that Iraqis should resort to dialogue away from distinguishing one party from another, which is in its entirety a kind of American abandonment of support for Sadr's path to reform from outside the parliament, as if to say that reform is carried out from the breach of institutions and not from outside them and this may be in favor of the coordination framework.

While Sadr rejects the dialogue that held two sessions chaired by Kadhimi, the Speaker of the House of Representatives put forward a ten-point paper for the national dialogue that may be similar if agreed upon to the Erbil agreement in 2010, and we would have faced a repeat of the scenario of 2010 for the second time, especially since the framework talks about the return of the framework to sessions after the end of the Arbaeen visit.

Just as the faltering Iraqi scene between the possibility of a return to the scenario of 2010 and the possibility of the withdrawal of Sadr's allies from the parliament and the continuation of Kadhimi and Barham Salih until the next elections, and the possibility of a return to the October uprising and its third anniversary at the doors, the Iranian-American negotiation file is also faltering and has been postponed until after the midterm elections next November.

In conclusion, the wave of coups that began on the first of October 2019 on the one hand and the opposite coups that faced it killing a thousand and wounding thirty thousand continues, and repeated it on August 30 with fifty dead and 600 wounded, and is a candidate for similar explosions whenever the scene reaches its peak, under an international and regional compass that may be working to postpone the out-of-control explosions in the region, including Iraq, until the file of dealing with Iran is resolved.

The file of dealing with Iran as is the file of dealing with Iraq are two sides of the same coin, if the first moves from plan A to plan B, the second may move in the same direction, and if the period between A and B is prolonged, we are in the path of preventing Iraq from chaos, and this may be in favor of an equation that says that Kabul and Baghdad are two sides of the same coin, as the era of 11-9 began in Afghanistan and Iraq may end with them as well, that is, the Taliban returned, so why not return (Baath) again.

Author Dr.Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud