Causes, repercussions and consequences of instability in Iraq 2003-2018

Introduction

If we follow the reality of Iraq (with the exception of the Kurdistan Region), it will turn out that it has not known stability since the entry of US forces into Iraq on April 10, 2003.

If his regime was toppled and his army and institutions dissolved, pushing Iraq's dissolved apparatus into armies that were unemployed or turned to resist the political process, it became blown away by the wind of creative chaos, from the Governing Council, which granted the Shiites 60% and the rest of the Iraqis 40%, amid an internal division, based on the firm conviction that the resolution of the battles on the model of the new Iraq, will be resolved only on the basis of external support.

The creative chaos has put Iraq and the Middle East in the eye of the storm of the new unilateral international order led by the United States after the end of the Cold War, which brought about a deliberate radical change in Iraq and the region, which it moved after 2003, and the region after it in 2011, from a state of stability imposed by force by Saddam Hussein's regime, to a state of creative chaos (internationally controlled) that continues to hit the abyss of Iraq and the region.

In order for the creative chaos to achieve its goals in Iraq and regionally, and to restore the strategic balance locally and regionally, it is not easy to isolate the unstable Iraqi environment from the regional and international strategic environment, and the American one in particular, which invented the tactic of "creative chaos" and made Iraq its theater after its occupation in 2003, and succeeded in overthrowing its state and trying to reshape it, until the change that took place in Iraq after 2003 overthrew four Arab regimes after 2011, and the change is expected to affect Iran as well.

Theoretical framework

The main research problem is the instability due to the dysfunctional local balance in favor of the Shiite house after the experience of creative chaos, and the dysfunctional regional balance in favor of Iran that has made Iraq a battlefield, worried about the arrival of the spiral of creative chaos inside Iran.

The paper assumes that without Iran entering the spiral of creative chaos, Iraq's exit from the spiral of instability is unlikely.

Iraq is the independent hypothesis variable that entered the experience of creative chaos before everyone, and the variable of the hypothesis is the countries that entered chaos (the Arab Spring) after Iraq, and Iran that has entered or is almost entered creative chaos after the Iranian uprising at the end of 2017.

Because Iraq is an independent variable, in the course of the experience of creative chaos, its stability is inevitably linked to Iran's passage through the spiral of its creative chaos in any form, after the passage of the spiral of the Arab Spring 2011.

The paper attempts to prove or deny the validity of this hypothesis by answering the causes of instability, its repercussions and the possibility of getting out of the spiral of instability.

Section I

Political stability in Iraq

Its concept and obstacles to its presence in Iraq

Preface

Before delving into what chaos Iraq has been subjected to from the occupation and to this day and addressing ways to achieve stability in it, it was important to familiarize yourself with some of the terms dealt with in the research, such as political science and stability as the most important elements of the research to introduce them and delve into what they are as a starting point for writing this section.

يعد علم السياسة أحد فروع العلوم الاجتماعية، ونظرا لأهمية علم السياسة ودور الاستقرار السياسي في تقدم وتطور الشعوب لذلك كانت السياسة أهم علم من العلوم الاجتماعية، وتضم العلوم السياسية تخصصات مختلفة تتناول هذا العلم من زوايا متعددة، فهناك النظرية السياسية والفلسفة السياسية، وعلم السياسةالمقارن. (1)

The concept of political stability does not differ from many concepts in the humanities and political sciences in particular in terms of its ambiguity, complexity and the absence of an agreed comprehensive definition of it, and this concept is normative, what may cause the stability of one group may be a cause of the instability of another group at the same time, and the importance of the concept of political stability is concentrated as it constitutes a collective demand, whatever the type and type of political system existing in any country of the world, whether the system is democratic or Dictatorial, the goal and purpose of this or that regime is to have a stable rule in order to continue and survive. (2) It is the year of life, stability is the supreme goal that, if achieved, achieves a complete matrix such as reconstruction, investment, development, advancement and everything that man creates needs stability, even freedom and the possession of the will to continue the movement of life based on stability.

The concept of stability

Stability Language: Settled / Settled B / Settled on / Settled in Settles, Stabilized / Stabilized, Stabilized, It is Settled, The Effect Stabilized By It Settled The inhabitants of the Sahara: Fixed in Their Place After Departure It Does Not Settle Anyway: It Does Not Prove on the Face nor on the Decision Settled His Opinion on Travel: He Approved His Opinion, His Satisfaction, Spent It Settled In The Place: He Managed and Lived. (3)

Stability in the social sciences has been termed the stability of the social situation, which does not undergo a sudden or radical change, in the sense that there is no deliberate change by the society itself or from outside it, which changes the pattern and balance, which loses its state and goes beyond the state of stability or stability that it was to the state of instability. (4)

The state's enjoyment of internal stability leads to giving it more opportunities to serve its strategic interests, in its internal relationship with society in all its colors and in external relations, thus playing a stronger strategic role, and enjoying greater weight within regional calculations. Although there is a clear and specific general theoretical definition of internal stability, which is what has been introduced, the practical criteria for the study of the internal stability of a state, and the measures that can be adopted to judge the internal reality of this state as a stable reality or not, are in fact numerous, saturated and overlapping, indicating the stability of both society and state institutions and the stability of the relationship between them. (4)

Political stability

Professor of Political Science Mohamed Al-Saleh Bouafia (5) says; Perhaps one of the most prominent types of stability for societies is political stability, which is one of the most prominent political phenomena with multiple dimensions and intertwined that change with the change of time, place and people, and among the most ambiguous and complex political concepts, due to the great controversy he has witnessed in order to bring it to a specific and precise meaning, and is also one of the most urgent forms of stability for the continuation and superiority of societies, because it includes the formulation of A system of policies that take on all forms of change, for progress that does not affect the essence of stability in general.

The importance of the concept of political stability lies in the fact that it is a collective demand, whatever the type of political system that exists in any country of the world, the common factor is always the hope of the ruling regime that its rule will be stable so that it can continue and continue to serve the common good.

This issue has captured the thinking of many political thinkers and analysts since the real beginning of Western political thought, as it is one of the old and familiar topics in political science, as it has been known by political thought through its various stages of development, and has been addressed by political thinkers and exposed to it since the era of Greek civilization.

Definition of Political Stability

Political stability, despite the many definitions circulating, can be defined as:( The process of gradual and disciplined change that increases the legitimacy and efficiency of the political system (as defined procedurally as: (the ability of the institutions of the political system to respond to the demands made to it and stemming from the internal and external environment of the regime). (6)

Political stability "is the result or outcome of the functioning of the political system when it operates efficiently and effectively in the areas of political and economic development, political legitimacy and effectiveness." This means that the process of stability in the system depends on the effectiveness of the political system and on economic development. (7) Dr. Bahaa al-Din Makkawi (8) says that the term political stability refers to the ability of the political system to carry out its functions, respond to the demands of the masses, and adapt to the variables of the internal and external environment surrounding it, in a way that gives it the necessary political legitimacy for its continuation, and prevents it from being subjected to any acts of violence or conflicts that are difficult to control by peaceful means and within the framework of adherence to constitutional rules.

Indicators of political stability.

Some of the most important indicators of political stability in countries are:

– National unity and the absence or limitations of autonomy and separatist tendencies and sectarian, racial and ethnic conflicts, this does not necessarily mean sectarian and national homogeneity, but rather the existence of a clear vision and strategy to deal with sectarian, ethnic and cultural diversity that will achieve national integration in the state, resolve disputes and eliminate separatist tendencies. Societies that do not know the phenomenon of pluralism whether at the ethnic, religious, linguistic or sectarian level are often closer to political stability than those that define pluralism.

Separation of the three powers: The separation between the executive and the legislative and judicial branches should be a real separation at all levels, as the legislative branch's fulfilment of its legislative and oversight role away from the domination and threat of the executive branch consecrates stability. The independence of the judiciary is a necessity necessitated by the interest of the country and all that the judiciary has been professional and independent that establishes and sustains stability.

– The legitimacy of the political system, and legitimacy means that the executive branch is born of the free will of the elected parliament that expresses the collective will, this is in parliamentary systems and the case is true with the choice of the president in the presidential systems, that is, the acceptance of the people to the ruling authority and their submission to it voluntarily, and legitimacy comes from direct response and response to the needs of the people and the pursuit of national aspirations.

– The free will of the state and its non-subordination to the other enshrines the strength of the political system and its ability to protect society and the state against any potential external dangers, and the question of the ability of the political system to face external threats is the most important function of the political system at all as it relates to the survival of the state itself and establishes stability.

– The absence of governmental and societal violence and the disappearance of civil wars, separatist movements and rebellions: This is through an integrated strategy that enables the elimination of all causes of conflict and discord in the state, and each individual feels fully equal with others, and with it everyone in the state feels that he is an integral part of it, has loyalty and appreciation, and is ready to sacrifice for it, thus stopping wars and conflicts and citizens are heading towards development and reconstruction. Not to use the political violence of the ruling regime through the actual use of physical force to harm and harm others, in order to achieve political or economic and social goals that have political connotations.

The success of the economic policies of the government and the ability of the authority to provide for the needs of the people and enable them to live in dignity. Providing for people's basic needs and supporting the poor classes is what consumes the most effort of Western governments today, and the first to top the platforms of political parties in Western countries in election seasons.

– Peaceful transfer of power: It means the existence of mechanisms for the transfer of power and leadership from one person to another in a smooth, legal and legitimate manner, and the possibility of exchanging leadership positions and replacing people with each other peacefully, especially after the end of the legal term of the parliament and the government elected by it, and the roads should be impassable and open to rise and fall in accordance with the criteria and mechanisms stipulated in the Constitution and the laws emanating from it.

– Good management of the foreign relations of the state: One of the indicators of the political instability of the state is its poor external relations with neighbors or with the international community, or with international and regional organizations, either because of its mismanagement of the foreign policy file due to the incompetence of those in charge of it, or because of the conflictual nature of the ruling regime

Institutionalism; The closer the system of government in a society to institutionalization, the more this is an indicator of political stability, and vice versa. Institutionalism means: that political decision-making in a society is governed by institutional mechanisms that adopt the system of separation of powers, respect for the rule of law and distance from the personalization of the decision-making process whenever that political system approaches a state of stability, even if it is not democratic. (9)

Instability indicators in Iraq;

Political sectarianism is the transition of sectarianism, in its general sense, from its presence at the level of individuals within the same society to the political representation of the communities to which these individuals belong and its embodiment at the level of the state that incubates all. (10) In Iraq after the occupation, the first to establish political sectarianism was the civilian ruler Paul Bremer after he divided Iraqi society into components instead of citizenship after the US occupation forces dissolved the state's security and military institutions, and relied on sectarian polarization in the process of building the Iraqi state, and the formation of most of the Iraqi political forces and parties that were founded on the basis of their loyalty to the component, and these forces suffered from the absence of a clear vision of the concept of the state and the process of building it because it is a modern exercise of power and was busy clinging to power. (11)

Extremism and terrorism; violent extremism thrives in societies where state institutions are seen as repressive, corrupt, ineffective, and illegitimate. Any long-term defeat of violent extremism in Iraq therefore requires overcoming the failure of the Iraqi state to win the trust and support of large segments of the Iraqi people.

Iraq has become a destabilizing force in the Middle East, its continued volatility will have a significant impact on surrounding countries, and the presence of ungoverned spaces provides strategic depth to networks of criminals, insurgents, and extremists in neighboring countries. Armed groups in Syria, including the Islamic State, benefit from supply routes through Iraq. The export of Iraqi Shiite fighters to Syria, organized by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is also exacerbating the conflict in Syria. (12)

The absence of the principle of separation of powers in light of the dominance of the executive over the legislative and judicial branches, the executive branch has a large presence in parliament and therefore this presence hinders any real endeavor of oversight and accountability by the parliament, and often targets parliamentarians because of their good performance and proper oversight role.

The Iraqi judiciary is politicized and adjudicates sentences according to the whim of the executive government, and the evidence is innumerable, while political and repressive targeting has become judges torturing the politically targeted with their own hands, and publishing the sentences arbitrarily, until the prisons are full of their oppressed inhabitants who are victims of sectarian targeting. The codification and elaboration of article four terrorism against the Sunni Arab community in Iraq is a stain on the forehead of the judiciary and security institutions.

The loss of sovereignty and independence of Iraqi political decision-making, but the decision depends on the interests of others, and the national consensus and the interest of Iraq are not considered as much as the interests of politicians of this or that country.

In Iraq, the regional and international actor is clear between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and between these actors, the Iraqi political player is divided, between those who take into account the interest of this or that party, and this is most commonly, and we do not execute those who seek good relations with these actors, provided that their will is not dependent on one of them, but it is related to the interests of the country only, and this trend may currently be absent from influence.

The quest for national consensus at the level of the administration of the Iraqi state may prepare the Iraqi arena to find a qualitative shift in the political file and the security file and the pursuit of a stable political life, but this matter faces many challenges, the most important of which is that the ruling parties in Iraq and the programs of some of their parties are linked to an international and regional foreign agenda and are necessarily working contrary to this national consensus scenario.

Political targeting and the use of political violence, the actual use of physical force and executive power and the harnessing of the security and judicial institution to harm and harm competitors, in order to achieve political goals or economic and social objectives that have political connotations, and violence may be formal or informal, while the formal is directed by the regime against citizens or against certain groups, organizations or elements, while the informal is the fulfillment of this duty by gangs and outlaw militias.

Displacement and displacement due to the security situation; the causes of migration, both internal and external, can be summed up by the security situation associated with war operations, or by sectarian domination and political targeting; both reasons in turn indicate the phenomenon of political instability. Political stability, in its essence and content, is not the result of military and security power, with the necessity of doing so in the process of security and stability, but of political, social, economic and cultural measures.

Processes of demographic change and ethnic cleansing have witnessed mixed Iraqi provinces in order to change the demographics according to the sectarian parties that have power and decision-making, as is the case with Baghdad province, especially in the areas of the Baghdad belt, Diyala province,13 and elsewhere. As well as the demographic and post-occupation changes witnessed in Kirkuk governorate and the areas disputed by the occupation and after the occupation.

Ways to support stability in Iraq;

In order to stabilize Iraq and enhance its viability, it is necessary to address all the indicators that led to the instability of Iraq after the occupation and to this day, and in order to establish stability and enhance the possibility of its sustainability, the first step in recognizing that it is a specific political class that bears the greatest responsibility for the instability because of its actions and actions that have been devoted to political sectarianism in Iraq. In the first step, the "National Alliance" must bear responsibility before the Iraqi people for what happened in Iraq for fourteen lean years that have hurt Iraqis, and the talk about failure was spoken by leaders from the component of the National Alliance, in a televised meeting of the politician Ezzat al-Shabandar,14 Maliki and the security leaders are responsible for the arbitrary arrests, and states in his statement when the leaders report to Maliki about the arrest of 200 terrorists, Shabandar declares that the real terrorist detainees do not exceed 10 people and the rest Innocent people when they are subjected to injustice and persecution without offense, they will necessarily turn into terrorists, in this way the National Coalition bears the ability to strengthen the capabilities of terrorism, and perhaps the fall of Mosul to the hands of terrorism was on the highest orders of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, after the security forces paved the way and with orders to release the leaders of terrorism from the prisons of Basra and Abu Ghraib.15 This is a sample of the political and security action that caused the devastation of Iraq at the hands of the leaders of the National Coalition, which requires them after recognition to apologize to the Iraqi people, and to confess and apologize To detract from or disapprove of anyone, it is necessary to accurately diagnose to build a vision of the solution.

Our vision for getting out of the state of chaos to stability after these steps is that there must be political and societal reconciliation under regional and international auspices between the components of the Iraqi people through those who represent them and those who trust them, and then there must be a clear vision of the final exit from chaos to stability, and perhaps we will not be safe from the truth if we adopt Mr. Abadi's "theoretical" vision of a post-ISIS Iraq as a starting point for a new reality that will return the country to a state of stability that the parasites cannot prepare.

Taking into account some amendments to them and involving the components in reconciliation to build on them and provide them with the vision of each component to be a starting point for change after reform.

Abadi's vision (15) for post-victory and liberation is a set of steps that boil down to seven interrelated points that do not advance or separate from each other, and must go together in the shadow of serious dialogue and societal reconciliation that turns the page on terrorism and the destruction, displacement and crimes against humanity that it has become.

The entrance to this vision is to restore security, stability and basic services through what he called the restoration of stability and enable the displaced to return to their homes and participate in the construction and reconstruction of what was destroyed by ISIS.

Addressing the negative effects of martyrs, victims, wounded and the destruction of governorates on public and private property. The commitment to peaceful coexistence with all partners in the homeland, respect for the human person, preservation of the freedoms of those religiously, sectarianly and intellectually different, respect for their sanctities, protection of minorities and the sanctity of places of worship for all religions and sects, and this represents the basis for societal reconciliation.

Not to allow incitement, tension and hateful sectarian and nationalist entrenchment at the expense of the supreme interests of the country, so it is necessary to adhere to the discourse that enshrines the spirit of citizenship and urges unity and cooperation,

The importance of establishing good-neighbourly relations based on common interests with neighboring countries and the region, working with our national will and our independent Iraqi decision and not depending on our will and positions abroad regarding our issues and national interest.

Restricting weapons to the hands of the state, abolishing armed manifestations once and for all, and ending the presence of militias and gangs that carry weapons and invoke abhorrent sectarian pretexts.

Respect for the rulings of the judiciary with regard to reforming the judiciary, supporting its professionalism, non-interference in its competencies by the government, and the rule of law in all joints of the state and society.

To continue with all the strength and determination and with the cooperation of all to fight corruption in all its forms and manifestations because it is the largest incubator of terrorism and crime. Keeping State institutions and departments away from political interference and quotas and not monopolizing positions of responsibility and public functions in order to achieve justice.

Sources

Sanhouri Academic Blog, Political Stability, 18/1/2008, https://khaleifa.wordpress.com/2008/01/15/ Political Stability.

Majid Ahmed Al-Zamili, The Future of Security Stability and Community Peace in Iraq after the Liberation of the Earth, Katibat website, 14/12/2017,

https://kitabat.com/2017/12/14/ Future-Stability-Security-and Peace-Society/

3. Dictionary of Inclusive Meanings, Stabilize Material.

4. Dr. Shaher Al-Shaher, Political Stability... Calibrations and Indicators, Dam Press Media Foundation, 31/8/2016,

http://www.dampress.net/mobile/?page=show_det&category_id=48&id=73497 .

5. Mohamed Saleh Bouafia, Political Stability... Readers in Concept and Ends, 21/9/2016,

https://revues.univ-ouargla.dz/index.php/acceill/revue-calliers-de-politique-et-droi/198-dafatir-droit-et-politique/numero-15-2016-dafatir/3161-2016-09-21-11-12-08 .

6. Mohammed bin Saeed Al-Futaisi, Political Stability and its Role in Enhancing National Security, Al-Watan, 4/12/2017, http://alwatan.com/details/213398.

7. Mohammed Al-Saleh Bouafia, previous source.

8. Dr. Bahaa El-Din Makawi, Political Stability Its Concept, Manifestations and Indicators of Measurement, Press Website, http://alsahafasd.com/10089100.

9. See both the previous source, and d. Shaher Al-Shaher Political Stability Its Criteria and Indicators (previous source).

10. Badreddine Shawati, Implications of Political Sectarianism on Political Stability, 2/12/2017, http://www.mominoun.com/articles/ Reflections-Sectarianism-Political-on-Stability-Political-4338.

11. Arab Democratic Center, The State of Components in Iraq After 2003 Reality and Future, 2/12/2016, http://democraticac.de/?p=36858.

12. Report of the Future of Iraq Working Group, chaired by U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and a group of advisers, p. 4 http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ Report-Set-Action-Future-Iraq.pdf

13. See; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2015/11/6/ Diyala-Iraqiya-pay-price-change-demographic-killing-kidnapping-and displacement. See: https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2015/03/13/ Demographic change-threatening-stability-Iraq-after-defeat-ISIS.html

14. See; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2BTljSa8mlg.

15. See a study entitled "The War of Extermination of Sunni Arabs", Center for the New Iraq, by the author of the article https://www.newiraqcenter.com/ / .

16. See http://www.nrttv.com/AR/birura-details.aspx?Jimare=8212 . http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/57033 is seen.

The second section

Disputed areas of impediments to stability in Iraq

Shahu Al-Qaradaghi / Advisor to the Center for the New Iraq

Introduction

The problem of "disputed areas" between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi government has been one of the most important axes of disagreement between the two parties since 2003, and despite the success of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in April 2003 from crossing into these areas during the US war on Iraq and trying to create a new reality by bringing administrative staff and staff to these areas in addition to the military presence, the decline of sectarian fighting at the end of 2007 restored the file of the disputed areas To the forefront again when the then Iraqi Prime Minister "Nouri al-Maliki" tried to send military units to these areas and assert the authority of the center, which created a crisis between the region and the center and an unstable environment in these areas that can explode at any moment, and despite the departure of "Maliki" and the coming of "Abadi" in 2014, the weakening of ISIS opened the door to the focus of the center on these areas, which led to the exploitation of the "referendum" process carried out by Erbil on 25/09/2017 as a justification To enter the disputed areas by the Iraqi government, expel the Peshmerga forces and replace the Peshmerga with sectarian militias to form a new image of these areas, the most prominent features of which are the loss of security and stability and the return of kidnappings, extortion, violence and chaos that were absent during the previous period.

Hence the importance of the "disputed areas" for the new Iraq, which cannot achieve stability in light of the continuation of the problem of these areas in a suspended manner without finding a solution that satisfies all parties and offers non-unfair and applicable solutions because of the importance of this problem, which was the reason for the failure of many agreements between the region and Baghdad previously, and the continuation of this problem the conflict between Erbil and Baghdad is open at any moment, and as the French geographer Cyril Russell says, "The disputed areas" They are the main features of the dispute between the central authority and the Kurdish region."

Disputed Territories:.

The disputed areas form a strip of more than 1,000 km and extend from the border with Syria to the Iranian border and amount to 37,000 square kilometers, and this strip passes to the south of the provinces of the region (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk) and includes territory in the provinces of Nineveh, Erbil, Salah al-Din, Diyala and Kirkuk Governorate.

In the Iraqi International Administration Law for the Transitional Period of 2004, it speaks of "disputed areas" in article 58, paragraph (a), and says: The Transitional Iraqi Government, in particular the High Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes and other relevant bodies, shall urgently take measures to redress the injustice caused by the practices of the former regime of changing the population status of certain areas, including Kirkuk, through the deportation and exile of individuals from their places of residence, and through forced migration from within and outside the region. and the settlement of individuals who are alien to the region, the denial of work to the population, through the correction of nationalism, and to address this injustice" (1)

In the Permanent Iraqi Constitution of 2005, Article (140) is devoted to talking about "disputed areas", which emphasizes the need to implement the requirements of Article (58) of the Law on the Administration of the Iraqi State for the Transitional Period in all its paragraphs, the text of the article says:

First: The Executive Authority shall take the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of Article (58) of the Law on the Administration of the Iraqi State for the Transitional Period in all its paragraphs. Second: The responsibility placed on the executive branch of the transitional government and stipulated in Article (58) of the Law on the Administration of the Iraqi State for the Transitional Period extends and continues to the executive authority elected under this Constitution, provided that it is fully completed (normalization, statistics and ends with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas to determine the will of its citizens) within a maximum period of thirty-first of December in the year of two thousand and seven." (2)

Hence, we realize that the Iraqi Constitution did not define the "disputed areas" except (Kirkuk), which is mentioned in Article (136) second paragraph and Article (140) paragraph (2) and the article did not talk about the criteria under which the disputed areas can be identified and named, which opened the door for the parties to the conflict to interpret the article according to political interest.

On this ambiguity about the "disputed areas", especially after the events of (16) October 2017 and the intervention of Iraqi forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces for these areas and the exit of the Peshmerga from them, the Supreme Federal Government of Iraq issued a decision on 11/3/2018 interpreting the disputed areas as "the territories that were not managed by the Kurdistan Regional Government on (19/3/2003) located in the governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Diyala and Nineveh and that the resolution of this issue shall be by the committee formed According to Article (140) of the Constitution" (3)

In the absence of a unified vision among Iraqi political forces and parties on these areas, it is objective to rely on the identifications of the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) established to provide support and advice to Iraq, and the areas have been divided into two stages of analysis:

First: The first stage includes the following areas:.

1. Aqra District / Administratively subordinate to Nineveh Governorate.

2. Hamdaniya District / Administratively subordinate to Nineveh Governorate.

3. Makhmour district, which administratively belongs to Erbil Governorate since 1932 and Nineveh Governorate since 1991.

4. Mandali District / Baladruz District in Diyala Governorate since 1932 AD The administrative level of Mandali was reduced from district to district in 1987.

Second: The second stage includes the following districts:

1. Tal Afar District / Administratively subordinate to the Nineveh Governorate.

2. Talkiv District / Administratively subordinate to Nineveh Governorate

3. Sheikhan district / administratively subordinate to Nineveh Governorate.

4. Sinjar District / Administratively subordinate to Nineveh Governorate.

5. Khanaqin district / administratively subordinate to Diyala Governorate.

6. Kirkuk Governorate. (4)

The disputed areas are those that have been cut off from the Kurdistan Region and annexed to other administrative areas outside the borders of the Kurdistan Region and are officially defined in the Law on State Administration as the disputed areas between the KRG and the Central Government.

Features of instability in disputed areas

The dispute over the disputed areas and the demarcation of the borders of the Kurdistan region is an old dispute between the Kurdish leadership and the central governments, and this point has caused the failure of many negotiations held between the parties to end the Kurdish problem in Iraq and open a new page between the parties, successive Iraqi governments have been giving promises to the Kurds to obtain the disputed areas or reach a common formula for the management of these areas, but the failure to implement these promises was a reason for the return of disputes and conflicts between the parties.

After the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the participation of Peshmerga forces in military operations, the Kurds succeeded in entering the disputed areas and imposing a new reality on these areas, in light of the lack of experience of the Iraqi government and its preoccupation with the file of terrorism and dealing with the insurgents against the state, but once these problems were ended by the Iraqi government led by (Nouri al-Maliki) the signs of a clash between the Kurds and the center began, and the presence of the Peshmerga in the disputed areas was almost out of the line. Green to lead to a serious conflict between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army in August 2008 when the commanders of the Iraqi security forces ordered the Peshmerga to withdraw but they refused near the city of Khanaqin, and it was repeated when units of the Iraqi army tried to cross the city of "Makhmour" on their way to Mosul in June 2009 but the Peshmerga hindered the advance of these units and violence was avoided due to the American intervention, and also in February 2011 the Peshmerga were deployed on the outskirts of Kirkuk and withdrew only under pressure American.

The U.S. role has been influential and contributing to preventing friction between Peshmerga and Iraqi security forces in these areas, as the U.S. State Department expressed in a report to Congress that "while joint security mechanisms in the disputed areas seemed to have mitigated the likelihood of unintentional clashes between the Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces, in many areas adjacent to the KRG such as Nineveh, Kirkuk and to a lesser extent Diyala, the degree of tension remains. High between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces, many of these areas contain an ethnic mix that is rich in resources, and both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi government are trying to impose their security superiority in the absence of a clear political arrangement, it is currently unlikely that the Iraqi army or the Peshmerga will cause a deliberate military confrontation, they prefer to negotiate in order to reach acceptable results, yet with the departure of US forces may increase the chances of miscalculations or provocations" (5)

In 2014, after the collapse of the Iraqi security forces, the Peshmerga forces succeeded in taking control of Kirkuk and several other areas and protecting these areas from the threat of ISIS, and Masoud Barzani announced that Article (140) was completed and ended with the entry of the Peshmerga into the disputed areas" (6).

Despite the change of the Iraqi government and the coming to power of a new prime minister (Haider al-Abadi), there was a positive expectation of a new deal with the Kurdistan region and the disputed areas and taking advantage of the mistakes made by the former prime minister (Nouri al-Maliki) and led to the spread of chaos and violence, loss of trust between components and spectrums and increased tension between the region and the center, but despite the Iraqi government's preoccupation with the war on ISIS, the leaders of the dominant militias and the owners of the Influence within the state insists on retaking the disputed areas and expelling the Peshmerga after the completion of ISIS, and this happened after the liberation of Mosul and most of the areas and territories, the Iraqi government with the help of armed militias decided to retake the disputed areas and remove the Peshmerga from these Kirkuk and the disputed areas on (October 16, 2017) under the pretext of a referendum, which led to the displacement of tens of thousands of citizens of these areas and the destruction of dozens of houses and shops and reprisals. by militias thus sowing the seeds of revenge and hatred anew in these areas.

However, despite the control of the Iraqi security forces over these areas, the region does not recognize these forces and considers them illegitimate, and the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by (Masoud Barzani) reiterated that Kirkuk and the disputed areas are occupied, because the government did not allow the joint administration of those areas and did not apply Article 140 of the Constitution. (7)

Steps on the road to a solution

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi realized that he could not manage (disputed areas) alone after the increase in terrorist acts and security penetration in these areas, which prompted him to accept a joint administration with the region of these areas, amid American fear of the return of terrorist groups to these areas due to the security vacuum and the inability of federal forces to extend security on their own, although it is necessary to find appropriate solutions to avoid clash and end security gaps in the region.

First: The Iraqi government dealt during the previous period as a party and an adversary against the region, but it is the first for the Iraqi government to deal in the next stage with a different mentality to focus on the application of the constitution in these areas in cooperation with the region, and not competition with the region for security and administrative control over the areas, which has produced a lot of problems and divisions between the components in the region, and it is also the duty of the regional government to seek to conclude a real agreement with the center and protect the diversity that exists in the regions disputed) and not allowing the repetition of some actions that disturbed some of the existing components.

Second: The return of security coordination between the central government and the Peshmerga forces of the regional government: It is important to restore security coordination and most importantly the return of trust between the two parties, because building trust between the Iraqi security forces and the Peshmerga reduces the likelihood of a future conflict between the two parties and ends the gaps and gaps exploited by terrorist and insurgent groups, and not to resort to force in the event of disagreements over operations or control of some areas. (8)

Third: The way the central government dealt with the referendum crisis and directed armed militias to the disputed areas and committed violations against citizens returned the memory of the Kurds to the former Iraqi regime, and therefore the Iraqi government should remove sectarian militias that increase tension and commit illegal actions that pave the way for igniting a new conflict in these areas, because the survival of these militias in these areas pushes citizens to rebel against the state and thus create chaos and enter the areas into a spiral of violence

Fourth: Choosing professional security forces to manage these areas in order to contribute to the process of reassuring citizens and restoring trust between citizens and security agencies, and because of the diversity that exists in these areas, they need a special way of dealing with citizens in them and managing their affairs so that the ongoing political differences are not affected on the relations between the various components.

Fifth: Abandoning the competitive and security mentality in dealing with these areas, whether in the central government or the regional government, the parties are focusing on expanding influence in these areas to occupy a higher position in the negotiations and impose conditions on the other, and the goal was not to achieve stability effectively and gain the trust and satisfaction of citizens and to accelerate the application of the constitution and laws that accelerate the end of this dilemma.

Sixth: The need for the presence of a third party to ensure that there is no fighting between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi security forces, and it is important that this party is acceptable to both parties, and the American return may be a prelude to playing this role in the future, but the American presence does not prevent the presence of international parties that help achieve stability and provide a climate of coexistence by presenting and implementing certain projects in these areas.

https://iraqja.iq/view.78 / (1)

http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=14&s=04030000&r=114&a=15833&s=010000 (2)

http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/1203201818 (3)

(4)https://www.iasj.net/iasj?func=fulltext&aId=75765

(5) Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report Submitted in accordance with the Department of Defense's 2008 Additional Appropriations Act (paragraph 9204) Public Law 252-110) Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense() Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 [Section 9204, Public Law 110-252]

(6)http://almadapress.com/ar/news/33184/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-140-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A

(7) http://www.kurdistan24.net/ar/news/f945a5c7-51e0-4027-ba0c-7cdb90b33614

(8) Management of Arab-Kurdish tension in northern Iraq after the withdrawal of US troops, Rand Center

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense( )110-252 year (Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 [Section 9204, Public Law 110-252]

Section III

Instability in Iraq

2003-2018

And the experience of creative chaos

Introduction

Stability and instability

The French dictionary of Larousse defines the adjective stability as "maintaining the status quo, or having a state of continuous equilibrium (durable equilibre)" and in fact this definition based on the state of continuous equilibrium can be largely a starting point for the definition of political stability.1

Stability in the social sciences is defined as the stability of a social situation that does not undergo a sudden or radical change, in the sense that there is no deliberate change by society itself or from outside it that changes the pattern and balance, which loses its state and thus derails the state of stability or stability that it was to a state of instability.2

In contrast to the concept of political stability, we find the concept of "political stability", which can be defined as a state of "instability or the state of rapid change that is not controlled and uncontrolled (for external and internal reasons) characterized by the increase in political violence, the inability of the state to manage conflicts within society, the loss of balance between the state and society, the use of political violence and the contradiction of the legitimacy and efficiency of the regime, so that the order to change it becomes acceptable to internal and external parties" (3).

Causes of instability

Iraq's Experience of Creative Chaos

The choice of Iraq by the United States as a testing ground for creative chaos was not in vain, as it became a station of local and regional competition for its model, which is close to being a regional equivalent at the expense of security and stability, which could return to "better condition" after the controlled creative chaos achieves its goals, dismantling and reshaping the region according to the vision of the United States, which is a stakeholder in change.4

Its ethnicity, sectarian and ethnic demographics, geographical surroundings, and geopolitical location helped America choose Iraq as the first experimental field for creative chaos and a regional equivalent to the region's central governance models, whether traditional (Saudi), nationalist (Turkish) or religious (Iran).

Although the creative chaos that prevailed in Iraq after 2003 is attributed to former British Prime Minister Markert Thatcher, or Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. national security adviser, Iraqis have long seen the universe as a system rather than chaos, but in its convolutions a crowd of conflicting individual wills filled with the potential for chaos they entered through the ages and their last reign was after 2003.

The Assyrian scholar Turkld Jacobsen says that "if the ancient Iraqi had come back to life, he would not have been so disturbed to see his relics, which are wreckage, because he always knew deeply (that man's days are numbered and whatever he does is only a wind that blows.5]

Whether it was the vision of the old Iraqis that prompted America in 2003 to choose Iraq as the first model for the experience of creative chaos, or Iraq's geopolitical location, heritage and veins, that called on the Batnagun to remove the State Department's project of building Iraq after its occupation, to bring it into creative chaos, it is the same.

In their important book American Exclusivity-Neoconservatives and World Order 2004, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clark pointed to how neoconservatives took over decision-making on Iraq that led to the State Department's project ruling out Iraq's future and plunging Iraq into a creative chaos experience.

The authors stress that the Pentagon's Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Douglas Feith), a neoconservative, and his staff deliberately ignored the State Department's action plan in Iraq after the year-long war and prevented State Department chief planner Thomas and Eric from being allowed to head to Iraq.

The conflict between the Pentagon and the US State Department resulted in the dissolution of the Iraqi army and state institutions up to the zero stage, which led to the collapse of the state-building project in favor of building a qualitatively different new project called creative chaos that left its effects on the stability of Iraq, so that the demobilized armies turned into armies of the unemployed, and many of them (with their curse) joined the ranks of those conducting armed operations against the occupation forces, and Iraq became a valid ground to provide the structure of escalating violence with new fuel in light of the local, regional and international conflict over The model of Iraq and the New Middle East(6).

It is essential here to touch on the definition of creative chaos, so that we realize the objectives of its use and choose Iraq as its first arena. The U.S. Strategic Planning Centers define creative chaos as "a political philosophy that assumes that there is an imminent threat from an unknown enemy that threatens U.S. national security at every moment, without necessarily being a threat, actually from a state or a terrorist organization in order to wage a preventive war against it, but it is enough to be envisioned by the strategic planning centers of the White House and the Pentagon to initiate that war."[7]

According to Condoleezza Rice's vision, the concept of creative chaos means abandoning the concepts of security and stability, even if it leads to the overthrow of many of the regimes allied to the United States, under the pretext of reform and democracy.8

There are those who interpret the term creative chaos, which was one of the most important and prominent achievements of American strategic thought, but in fact means the proactive pursuit of the dismantling and reconfiguration of all sites and geographies that are supposed to pose sources of threat to America's security and interests in the world.9

There are those who believe that creative chaos means in its content that it is an act of change or that it is a revolution of change, or that it is "a humanitarian political situation that is expected to be comfortable after the passage of a phase of multi-event chaos",10 and not a plan to create chaos and leave things to their interactions to provoke disorder or even infighting simply to exhaust societies and let them eat themselves, but rather because this violence may turn abroad again to threaten the security and interests of the United States, even after a while.

That is, this chaos must be controlled, it is an act that has been established and is based on the shoulders of local leaders and cadres from modernist categories to lead the processes of change or revolutions of change according to this tactic (creative chaos), defend it as a progressive revolutionary act, and fully adopt it as the stakeholder of change.11

The creative chaos of theory to practice

Creative chaos theory has evolved into a model applicable to other regions of the world, says Thomas Barnett, "The response to broadening the understanding of creative chaos and popularizing future experience on a global scale is because it is no longer just a theoretical proposition, but has become part of a successful strategy in Iraq and awaits its results, the success of which has been measured relatively in the Middle East and is being fully implemented on the ground."12

On this basis, the creation and use of chaos in world affairs according to this logic is not the exclusive preserve of the United States or the globally dominant powers, but it is possible that small states or non-state entities can cause chaos, through which they can influence the global strategic balance itself, or restrain a major international power, and the events of September 11, 2001, represent in their manifestations a clear example of a non-international entity carrying out a total chaos that shook American national security and thus reached world affairs in general. 13).

But what is distinctive about the United States is that when it creates regional or global chaos in the future, the situation, although not fully controlled, can be managed by the United States and employ the variables that result from this work, while inventing more than one formula for creative chaos, which distinguishes the United States from the rest of the entities that are likely to adopt the tactic of counter-creative chaos to counter the tactic of American creative chaos.[14]

Hence, creative chaos has played more than one role in the Middle East instead of the same role, namely veto and reconfiguration, which means that the repercussions of the Iraqi experience on the countries of the Arab Spring, will not necessarily take the same formula, as the model of creative chaos that seemed to be implemented in Iraq in the form of occupation, became after 2011 in the form of an Arab Spring, and Iran may join them in another form.15

Iraq has become an independent variant of the experience of creative chaos and part of a U.S. strategy whose success can be measured relatively in the Middle East, toppling most Arab regimes opposed to the United States.

While we are talking about creative chaos that has led to instability in Iraq, we find that American think tanks talk about chaos, as a strategy to protect American national security on the one hand, and as a revolutionary act of change progressive towards democracy, described as the Arab Spring, and may also be described as the Iranian Spring, and some Western practical periodicals have even described the 2005 election as the beginning of the Arab Spring.

Redrawing the features of the strategic balance that the United States of America wants to achieve after the creative chaos in Iraq and the region is a new form of the nature of relations and their interaction in the Middle East.Therefore, the adjustment of the relationship between creative chaos as a new variable in the regional equation and its impact on the formulation of a strategic interaction of a new kind can be addressed as the regional strategic balance through the reconfiguration of political systems that have gone through three stages, the first of which is the overthrow of the regime and the second is the transition to Democracy, the third of which is the consolidation of democracy, and the fourth is the maturation of this democracy.16

According to a study conducted by the American Carnegie Endowment, it indicates that a hundred regimes from 1970 to 2000 found that 20% of them reached the stage of democratic maturity, 5% of them declined to the dictatorial regime, and 75% remained in the phase of chaos and instability due to the frequent internal and external crises due to the lack of a clear strategic vision for the post-regime change phase.

The prospects of the return of repressive regimes or their transition to the second or third phase and their entry into crises and chaos are present in Iraq and some Arab countries where change occurred in early 2011, with the possibility of transition to the fourth stage (democratic maturity) not likely in the short or medium term.17

But these possibilities depend on many internal and external factors that affect the duration of each stage of the transition from dictatorship to democracy, the most prominent internal influences or factors that affect them lie in the culture and development of peoples, the extent of their awareness, their demographic component and the ideological foundations prevailing in society.

As far as Iraq and the Middle East are concerned, its future prospects and the continued use of creative chaos in it by the US administration indicate that political systems remain in the second stage (the transition towards democracy) and therefore the regional balance actors will be the countries where there was no storm of change after 2011 (Turkey, Iran and Israel).[18]

This requires that instability in Iraq, while remaining in the transition to democracy, will continue until Iran enters the spiral of chaos, which is closer to that of Turkey, where a quiet transition is taking place from the old Turkey to the new Turkey, or Israel, which is waiting for an international political solution linked to perhaps Iran's entry into the spiral of creative chaos.

Repercussions of instability

The creative chaos that hit the tons of Iraq after its occupation led to a lack of balance between force and law in Iraq, and between power and society, as is the case of the equation of power and law internationally and regionally, so political instability was the prominent phenomenon, as the absence of the state and the disruption of the constitution prevailed and non-international factors prevailed across national borders and subnational militias, meaning that the relationship between political stability and non-national and subnational internal and transnational factors is a reciprocal relationship.

The internal division on the model of the new Iraq is one of the most important repercussions of creative chaos, and at the same time one of its most important pillars, as on this internal division the creative chaos expanded, and with this internal division the creative chaos continues.Iraqis were divided on the model of the new Iraq, and were convinced that the resolution of internal battles cannot be resolved without external support, and the division continued, and the support continued, and the creative chaos continued, despite the monopoly of power by the Shiite house from 2005 to 2018.

From the inception of the new Iraq model after the liberation of Kuwait in 1992 until the liberation of Iraq from ISIS in 2018, the new Iraq continues to experience the chaos of power grabbing, despite the change that took place after 2003, and despite the elections that are a fundamental difference, between the pre-2003 Iraq, which was nationalistic before 2003, and Shia religious after 2003, the Shiite house seized power.

Five rounds of elections were the first of which was 1992, which produced the Kurdistan Regional Parliament, and four parliamentary elections held after 2003 that won the federal parliament of Iraq, but the largest pro-Iranian Shiite House bloc controlled all political, security and judicial institutions regardless of the results of the elections.

Because the policy of seizure of power by the Shiite House has prevailed in the past fifteen years since 2003, the Kurdish-Shiite alliance, on which the political process was based, has disintegrated, and the conflict between the Kurdistan Region and the Baghdad authorities has continued, until Baghdad took control of the areas of Article 140, after the referendum of the Kurdistan Region in September 2017.19

While Baghdad was in conflict with the Kurdistan Region, the Sunni Arab Provinces Square was an arena of rebellion against the political process, as Sunnis were divided into participants and opponents in the political process and resisted the occupation.Then the Sunnis left the resistance and fought al-Qaeda in alliance with American forces, after al-Qaeda took control of their provinces after the 2006 Samarra bombings, and then after they won the 2010 elections within the Iraqi list, and the United States withdrew in 2011, Baghdad targeted them under Maliki's leadership, and their provinces fell to ISIS in 2014.

While Iraqis are waiting for the 2018 parliamentary elections after the end of ISIS, the regional and international parties were not far from the internal conflict, Iran was the most prominent present regionally, and America is the absentee of the most prominent present internationally, and the result was that Iraq was linked to Iran's regional axis on the one hand, and the international coalition on the other, while the reality of Iraq differed from its constitution.

All of Iraq's religious and national components have depleted their human and material resources in this conflict. Sunnis, Kurds, Shiites, Christians and Yazidis lost, although the loss of each Iraqi side is different from the loss of the other.

There was a massive popular discontent against the political class in Iraq today, translated by Iraqis by saying "Cable was one Saddam and hissing a thousand Saddams", and this may mean another wave of waves of creative chaos, more than it means and Trump's deadline to get out of the Iran nuclear deal if it is not amended, the end of which coincides with the day of the Iraqi elections, the instability in Iraq may continue whatever the results of the May 2018 elections, in light of America's conflict with Iran over the model of the new Iraq, and under expectations It talks about the possibility of ISIS returning if Trump leaves the nuclear deal.20

The repercussions of instability indicate that Iraq since entering the creative chaos is still living in instability, and will remain so within the second transitional period (transition to democracy) after the fall of the regime, and has not yet moved to the third stage, which is the stage (consolidation of democracy) referred to by the American Carnegie Endowment, and is still far from the fourth stage in the path of transformation, which is the stage of maturity of democracy, assuming that it will not return to the dictatorial stage that preceded the fall of the regime, in light of the internal division and intransigence of Iran, because Iran is capable of to use its creative chaos and Iraq's survival in the spiral of instability, to prevent it from entering the spiral of creative chaos(21)

Instability

The International Crisis Group went on to say that Iraq appears to be heading for a de facto partition and large-scale civil war if the United States does not sponsor a genuine settlement between Shiites, Kurds, and Sunnis.

The gateway to achieving the stability of Iraq and preventing the calamities referred to by the international crisis group lies in the balance of the Iraqi political scene, and Iran's entry into the spiral of creative chaos secondly, if not the fall of the velayat-e faqih regime, or its submission to the will of the international community on the one hand, and the Iranian society that demanded the fall of the Khamenei regime on the other.

Balancing the regional scene with the fall of the velayat-e faqih regime, or Iran's transition from revolution to state, may be enough to ensure the emergence of an Iraqi political class capable of understanding among itself on the model of the new Iraq, and achieving political and economic reforms through a multilateral and transparent process that opens the door to the reconstruction of Iraq with the participation of the international community on the one hand, and the compatibility of the new Iraqi political class on the other, with the standards of security, development and the constitution that affirm the necessary conditions to provide stability.

Emphasizing the involvement of the international community is taken for granted, because the international community is directly responsible for the creative chaos it created in Iraq with its 3003 alliance, which led to the handover of the country to Iran on a plate of gold, as Saud al-Faisal, the late Saudi foreign minister, said in 2007.

As for the compatibility of the new Iraqi political class with the standards of security, development and the constitution, Robert McNamara, a former US secretary of defense and former head of the World Bank, linked the achievement of security to the ability of the state to carry out the burdens of development, where he says in his book "The Essence of Security" that the state can achieve its security only if it guarantees a minimum level of internal stability, which can only be achieved with a minimum level of development at the national level.

McNamara defined security by saying: Security means development, security is not the accumulation of weapons and is not traditional military activity, many countries have a huge military arsenal and advanced security services, and all the manifestations of material power, but their political stability is fragile and weak, and with any pressure or transformation, we find collapse, wear and tear, weakness, and in return we find countries that do not have huge military weapons, nor a developed security institution, but their stability is solid and solid, and is able with their own capabilities to face crises and resist conspiracies, and maintain their stability and public security. 22).

Requirements for Political Stability

Assuming Iraq's exit from Iran's hegemony, Iraq's political stability depends on two elements: order (no chaos) and continuity. "No chaos" means the absence of violence, force, coercion, a break with the political system, and continuity means a relative absence of change in the components of the political system, the low level of fundamental changes to the political system and the absence of social forces and political movements seeking to introduce fundamental changes to the political system.23

Legfart confines political stability to four elements:

1. Maintain order,

2. Civil order,

3. Legality,

4. Effectiveness(24).

Others lay out three elements for the launch of a stabilization strategy, combining three complementary concepts: the first is a psychological concept (security), the second is an economic concept (development) and the third is a legal concept (legitimacy).25

Therefore, any political stability is subject to the influence of two factors, the first of which has stabilizing effects, and the second of which is its unstable effects, so that the state of the system is the product of the interaction between these two types of interaction.

Thus, each authority goes in one of two directions: either it turns into a power administration that manages the institutions of society under the authority of the state, the constitution, and the law, thus belonging to the systems of administrative political stability, or it remains an authoritarian authority that belongs to the power of coups. In other words, the existence of political stability for existing governance means that the forces of stability prevail over the forces of instability and vice versa.26

The dilemma in Iraq from 2005 to 2018 lies in the disruption of the constitution by non-state factors at the expense of the state, the loss of security because there is no single professional national security apparatus among dozens of security agencies affiliated with the authority or the Popular Mobilization Forces, with which it is not possible to determine who is responsible for the loss of security, in addition to the prevalence of administrative, financial and political corruption at the expense of development, which led to Iraq's position at the top of the countries where corruption nests in the world (167 out of 176 according to Transparency International).

In order to put the dots on the letters of stability in Iraq, according to the theoretical concept of political science, it is possible to distinguish between two schools of thought in political science, where each of them follows a certain concept of political stability, namely:

1. Behavioral School: According to this school, stability is synonymous with the absence of political violence, and a stable political system is one in which peace and obedience to the law prevail and the decision-making process is carried out according to institutional procedures and not as a result of violence.27

From this specific concept of political stability, we find that violence within the same entity of society is not valid under any circumstances in order to achieve political goals, and that reform in this case is pursued only by civil political methods.28

The systemic school: This school starts from the method of systematic analysis, and according to the school, political stability is synonymous with governing and maintaining the system, and it also means the ability to adapt to new circumstances, situations and changes.

Political stability here is the neutrality of the institution of service and production from the fluctuations of power, the separation of these institutions from the political game at home and abroad, and the failure to exploit them to gain subjective positions that make these institutions non-independent tools.29

Accordingly, political, administrative, and constitutional stability systems can be defined as "systems whose political, economic, cultural, social and military institutions enjoy political and administrative stability in their organizations, basic structures, and disciplined and administrative divisions in such a way as to achieve balance and stability in the light of any sudden political changes that may occur in society."30

If we put the reality of the political process in Iraq, under the microscope of these theoretical concepts of political stability, the achievement of any political stability in Iraq requires political participation in the process of political decision-making, that is, the involvement of citizens in the process of expressing interest or, as Lucien Bay defines it as meaning the participation of large numbers of individuals and groups in political life, which according to Samuel Huntington means that activity carried out by ordinary citizens with the intention of influencing the process of government decision-making, whether it is This activity is individual or collective, organized or spontaneous, peaceful or violent, legitimate or illegitimate, effective or ineffective.31

The importance of political participation is manifested in the fact that it is the basic mechanism in establishing the institutional building of the state, which the factors of non-state across non-national borders and subnational sectarian militias have not allowed this mechanism during the past fifteen years in Iraq.

Huntington therefore links it to political participation and stability and believes that the need to achieve political stability requires the building of political institutions that regulate political participation and prevent instability.

Accordingly, the stability of the political process in Iraq depends on the relationship between the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization, in other words the political stability in society depends on the relationship between the level of political participation on the one hand and the degree of institutionalization on the other.32

This was according to behavioral theory in political analysis, but according to systems analysis theory, political stability meant the ability of a political system to preserve itself over time, that is, to remain in a state of integration.

This can only be achieved if its various institutions perform their functions in the best way, including the function of the political structure, and this depends on the ability of the political structure to deepen respect for the rules of the constitution, the laws in force and public order among the members of society and increase their enthusiasm to participate in the life of political parties and develop their effectiveness within the framework of the mechanisms of the system, and this is what supports political stability in society, and this is what has been hindered by sectarian militias in Iraq on the one hand, and factors that cross national religious armed such as al-Qaeda and ISIS on the other.

In conclusion, as stated in the hypothesis of the research, political stability in any society is the result of a balance between the political system and its social environment through the achievement of four dimensions:

1. The political system should reflect the main cultural and social values of society.

2- The policies of the regime should reflect the interests and objectives of the influential groups and classes in society.

3. The system should create channels of communication capable of connecting all parts of the community body so that each group or group feels that it can influence the decision-making process.

4- The elite within it should reflect the different societal forces so that each force feels that the elite represents an extension of it.

Otherwise, the obstacles to political stability in Iraq will continue to dominate its security and political reality, as a result of the local, regional and international conflict, which began in Iraq after entering the experience of creative chaos, and which will not settle in any case until the creative chaos achieves its goals locally, regionally and internationally, including Iran's entry into the spiral of creative chaos, the participation of the international community in a new engineering of the political process in Iraq, and a new Iraqi political class capable of understanding among themselves on the model of the new Iraq.33

Obstacles to political stability

In addition to the direct and indirect international interventions in Iraq that have led to creative chaos, the most prominent obstacles to political stability are sectarian polarization, political violence, economic deprivation and political corruption practiced by the ruling authority against the components of Iraqi society.

Bremer, the U.S. governor after 2003, says that after Maliki's withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, decided to strike at Iraq's most prominent Sunni politician, Tariq al-Hashimi, cut off the Kurdistan Region's budget, and cleanse the Iraqi army sectarianly in favor of Shia sectarian parties.[34]

Therefore, we are faced with many manifestations, which boil down to the policies of an authority that took over the Iraqi decision regardless of the results of the elections, its policies led to the bombings of Samarra and the fall of the Sunni provinces to al-Qaeda in 2006, and then the fall of Mosul to ISIS in 2014, and unless the policies that led to it fall, the race will face another version of al-Qaeda or ISIS.

According to Nevin Abdel Moneim Massaad, political instability is a reaction to the repression of the political system.35 This is what Maliki's authority has exercised towards Sunni Arabs. Maliki's policies toward al-Kur were also to cut off the region's budget, which Abadi continued to do after him. Economic deprivation is another source of frustration, dissatisfaction and anger.

Dr. Farouk Youssef has linked economic deprivation to political instability within society, which by economic deprivation means that it is not possible for one or more groups of members of society to obtain economic benefits and resources while others do so, since the misdistribution of resources (inequity in distribution) represents a threat to political stability within society.36

Political corruption and the loss of development have led to general Shia popular discontent that today prevails on the Shia street as well as the Sunni-Korean street, considering that the Shiite street is indignant against its ruling religious political class, which has only provided it with annual slaps and cemeteries that have been exponentially more than doubled, to which the slogan and ordinary citizens always refer in their circles and forums, and here is such a thing.37

In order to solve these major problems, there must be a balance of forces on the ground locally and regionally that paves the way for a historic reconciliation that produces national parties and not transnational parties, a national Iraqi state that is not linked to Iran's regional axis, a state that carries out its national and constitutional responsibilities, is committed to transparency and is subject to popular control and accountability.

Sources

1–Dictionnaire Larousse, Paris, Larousse, 1982, p :389

2- Ibn al-Hajj Yahya, Jilani (1997) et al., Al-Alfabai Dictionary, Beirut: Al-Ahlia Publishing, p. 320

3- Malika Boudiaf, Good Governance and Political Stability, Intervention at the Forum on Good Governance and Political Stability, Chlef University, 2006, p. 7.

4-http://democraticac.de/?p=411

5-https://annabaa.org/nbahome/nba80/002.htm

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The end

After answering the causes of instability, its repercussions and the possibility of breaking the spiral of instability, it was found that the loss of the dysfunctional local balance in favor of the Shiite house in Iraq after the experience of creative chaos, and the dysfunctional regional balance in favor of Iran, has made Iraq an arena of war and instability.

Without changing the equation of power on the ground in Iraq and the region, whether by Iran entering the spiral of creative chaos or by signing a deal with the international community, Iraq's exit from the spiral of instability is unlikely.

Iraq, which entered the experience of creative chaos before everyone, has become a regional equivalent to the model of creative chaos, especially after the development of the model of Iraq, which was occupied by multiple formulas passed by the countries of the Arab Spring, and Iran has become closer to going through one of the forms of creative chaos, and perhaps the model of Egypt is the closest to Iran.

Author Dr.Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud

الكاتب د.عمر عبدالستار محمود