Popular Mobilization is a local and regional threat

Nissan Joint Discussion of the New Iraq Center

Dr. Abd El , Nasser Al , Mahdawi

Mr. Shahu Al-Qardaghi

Dr. Omar Abd El , Sattar Mahmoud

index

Introduction

Theoretical framework

Iraq's Sunnis in the Circle of Targeting

Iraqi Kurds in the Targeting Department

Popular Mobilization Forces Regional Threat

The Popular Mobilization is an Iranian model

Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia

In the targeting circle

American Role

The end

Sources

Introduction

Arming, financing, mobilizing, and reviving the alliance of minorities in the Middle East, which Iran has been practicing since 1979 to balance the power of the Sunni majority in this region, may be behind the threat posed by the Popular Mobilization Forces, which is Iran's last experiment in the alliance of minorities and is approaching to be an Iraqi revolutionary guard.

The British were the first to use the coalition of minorities, when they armed the Armenian minority and made it a striking force in Iraq, which they used to suppress the 20th Revolution of 1920, in the coup d'état of Bakr Sedky in 1936, and in the elimination of the Mays Rashid Ali al-Kilani Revolution of 1941.

The influence of the Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces is linked to a movement of religious revolutionary lawlessness outside the framework of the state linked to Iran, transboundary, and a means of demonstrating subnational Shiite identity, as a result of sectarian mobilization according to feelings of oppression and extravagance in social differentiation with a set of behaviors that move society locally and regionally from coexistence to polarization.

The organization, training, and funding carried out by Iranian authorities and Najafi thresholds and references make them, as they used to be, alternative institutions to the various state institutions, whether educational, cultural, social or even religious.

America had hoped for a Shia Shia split between Najaf and Qom, but Najaf has failed to do so so far, and perhaps the plurality of Shiite power centers is in the interest of the Shiites, rather than the dominant centralization, and if this is true, the Shia Shia split may be security, although the violence of the bloody Shiite religious project led by Qom may push the Shiites of Iraq towards the national state.

The Shia community has begun to avoid dealing with the Sunni majority in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon, to achieve discrimination from the rest of the different categories of people, which leads to the creation of potentially aggressive behaviors that threaten Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, especially since the borders of these countries are surrounded by the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Differentiation, non-coexistence and then discrimination create an economy parallel to the state economy and armies parallel to the state army, linking the ruling authorities to sect and sectarianism, and raising the issue of the absolute majority and the disadvantaged and oppressed minority.

The Shia security, economic, and cultural system's association with cross-border militias linked to the IRGC makes it a local, regional, and international threat that may one day make it confrontational with the international system.

The hundreds of shrines that Iran erects or claims to exist across the border have become a means of expansion and influence behind which camps, militias, money and mobilization stand around the clock, stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean and Red Coasts.

The masses flock at a high pace in the seasons of Hajj and periodic religious rallies such as the killing of Hussein, or with the birth or death of each of their twelve imams, in which sectarianism is deepened in a provocative manner that pushes revenge on Sunnis, without criticism, guidance or reform in order to raise the element of provocation.

The geographical territories open today between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are not only used for direct military confrontation as a battleground, but also as training areas, logistical support, and advanced military and intellectual mobilization of the Shiites of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and Turkey, waiting for the next onslaught.

Theoretical framework

The main research problem is that the Popular Mobilization Forces are the last, largest, mature, broadest and closest armed religious revolutionary episode in a series of Iranian religious revolutionary episodes, issued by Wilayat al-Faqih during 39 years, starting with Hezbollah and ending with the Popular Mobilization, and may be on the way other Iranian religious revolutionary experiences waiting for export.

This comes at a time when fifteen of Iraq's eighteen provinces have been affected after ISIS and after the failure of the Kurdistan Region referendum, under the control of the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces, in light of unprecedented Sunni and Korean fragmentation.

The upcoming parliamentary elections in May 2018 and local elections in December 2018 could give a Kurdish and Sunni majority loyal to the PMF in Sunni provinces and disputed areas, both in provincial councils and in the Iraqi parliament.

Thus, the Iraqi-Turkish, Iraqi-Syrian, Iraqi-Jordanian and Iraqi-Saudi borders are under the control of the Popular Mobilization Forces for the next four years, in light of the tension prevailing in the relationship between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region, with the presence of pro-Iranian Kurdistan Workers' Party militants and their mobilization on Iraq's border with Turkey.

Despite the Saudi, Turkish and Jordanian openness to Baghdad, the paper assumes that this opening came late, after Iran managed to Iraq, but the paper assumes that there is a great opportunity for Iran and its mobilization to target Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the next stage, if Trump withdraws from Syria and does not withdraw from the nuclear agreement.

If he does Trump that, in light of a Syrian-Iranian-Russian alliance, a worsening Gulf crisis and a tense Turkish-Gulf relationship, he could add a fifth capital to the IRGC after dominating four capitals, and Jordan could be a victim of the upcoming Iranian targeting.

This means that the region may witness the birth of a new Iran-affiliated religious revolutionary model in Jordan/Gulf/Turkey, unless there is a surprise that would mitigate it if it were to be curbed, at the gates of a possible American exit or not to exit from the nuclear.

The premise of the paper states that the Iranian religious revolutionary popular mobilization in Iraq is the appropriate ground to export a possible religious revolutionary experience to Jordan, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, in light of an American role that advances again and again for American strategic reasons, so that Iran benefits in cases of progress and delay.

This may require the three countries to prepare for this upcoming eventuality, not only by resolving the Gulf crisis and easing Gulf-Turkish tensions, but also by intervening in Syria, as indicated by the Riyadh summit in May 2017, and taking the battle into Iran as well.

The research plan after this general introduction will be in four chapters and a conclusion, the first chapter talks about the Sunni Arabs of Iraq in the circle of targeting the Shiite Hashd, and the second chapter will talk about the Kurds and the threat posed by the Popular Mobilization Forces to them.

The third chapter will talk about the Hashd as an Iranian revolutionary model, and will address the security threat posed by the PMF to Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and the American role in the region, and then the conclusion.

Chapter One

Sunni Arabs

In the circle of targeting the Popular Mobilization

Dr. Abdul Nasser Al-Mahdawi

1.1 What is the Popular Mobilization and the Iranian Role

The Popular Mobilization Forces are the most important achievements of the exclusionary sectarian project in Iraq, considering the dominance of the "Shiite Arabs" component over the reins of government and all security institutions, including the Iraqi army and more than fourteen security and military institutions, and this is known to all, the establishment of the Iraqi army and all institutions was in the hands of the sectarian parties that led Iraq, in addition to the law on the integration of militias that contributed to the liberation of Iraq, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is the Prime Minister and the candidate of the "Arab" component Shiites" from the occupation and to this day.

With the military and security establishment representing the sectarian parties that ruled Iraq, the obsession with approaching the professionalism of these institutions continues to threaten the exclusionary sectarian project sponsored by Iran, which in turn contributed with Maliki to the fall of more than a third of the area of Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), in a dangerous precedent, and this event is exploited and employed by accusing the military institution of weakness and defeat, and the street is mobilized with the fatwa of Mr. Sistani, known as the Kafa'i jihad, on the basis of which armed militias were attracted in the Iraqi arena. All of the Popular Mobilization Forces shall be codified in contravention of the Iraqi Constitution and the laws emanating from it.1

Who does the Popular Mobilization Forces consist of and what are the most important militias that establish it? Rashid al-Khyoun (2) says that the Hashd has about 66 Shiite formations, 36 of which are based on Khamenei, in addition to those of their reference to al-Haeri (from Iran) and those affiliated with Kawtharani (a leader in the Lebanese Hezbollah and influential in Iraqi affairs), which are under Khamenei's control, compared to 14 formations whose reference is Sistani. From the foregoing, it is possible to classify the crowd in terms of loyalty into three sections; the first, which is the largest loyal to Khamenei, i.e. to the velayat-e faqih, the second is loyal to Mr. Sistani, and the third is to Muqtada al-Sadr.

Apart from describing the nature and structure of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which has been accomplished in previous studies and referred to in advance, it must be stated that this step is an Iranian will par excellence, as a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in the Iranian parliament, Mohammad Saleh Jokar,3 called for the formation of the Iraqi Revolutionary Guards, similar to those in Iran, by integrating Shiite militias in Iraq and making Saraya al-Khorasani a nucleus of it. Iranian MP Mohammad Saleh Jokar said the IRGC's experience had become a success and a pioneer for the countries of the region. The Iranian MP nominated the Iraqi militia "Saraya al-Khorasan" to be the first nucleus of the formation of the Iraqi Revolutionary Guards, noting that it supported the idea from the first day of talking about it. The IRGC's record has become "replete with achievements", he said. "If any country in the region wants to form similar forces similar to the IRGC, we are ready in Iran to provide our experience and advice in this regard," he said. He said that Iraq should apply the Iranian experience regarding "the Revolutionary Guards and we are fully prepared to provide Iraqis with the pattern and structure of these forces, so that Iraq can form its guard forces".Jokar claimed that the experience of the Revolutionary Guards succeeded in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, and said: "The experience of mobilizing people to form popular forces in charge of things was one of the most important achievements of the Basij forces in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and this pattern of street mobilization is a special experience for the Basij." He added: "Iran had a prominent role in the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and the formation of the forces of the so-called (national defense) in Syria, and in the experience of the Houthis in the occupation of Sanaa."

In line with this approach put forward by Mohammad Saleh Jokar, former IRGC commander Mohsen Rafik Dost had earlier declared that Iran was fully prepared to help Iraq if it considered establishing a IRGC. He explained that his country has "good experiences" in this regard, and can help Baghdad, and he saw that the model of the guard can be good to emulate, especially since it has fought important battles at the internal and external level and can serve the countries of the region with its expertise.

Dr. Karim Abdian (4) says Iran is currently making huge sums of money in order to promote the crowd and pave its way to win the necessary political positions in the near future, the most important of which is winning the upcoming parliamentary elections. What Iran wants is to create a militia atmosphere on the eve of the elections and deliver loyalists of the crowd to parliament under this artificial atmosphere. Iran is now besieging Iraq from three sides; eastern, western and southern, and reports confirm the PMF's connection to the IRGC, as there have been many indications about the PMF's association with Iran.5 Among them are the multiple meetings that took place between two commanders of these forces and Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force within the IRGC, as well as the continued praise of the PMF leaders for Iranian support, and several media reports indicated that many of the PMF's weapons came from Iran, which poses several problems about The possible role of the PMF in the map of Iraq, and whether it repeats the same experience of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, namely the acquisition of an important aspect of the joints of the state.

1.2 Position of Sunni Arabs on the Popular Mobilization Forces

When we address the general position of the "Sunni Arabs" in Iraq, we are necessarily talking about a large component that rewards the "Arab Shia" component in terms of number and diverges from it in terms of influence, as the "Sunni Arabs" bore the burdens of the former regime in all its details, whether they were satisfied or not, and it became known to everyone that they were the most affected after the occupation. Given the divergence of Sunni Arab positions on the large and influential files in the Iraqi scene, it was necessary to note that the general description of the positions is taken from a specific perspective angle and does not necessarily reflect the entire positions of the "Sunni Arabs", they are different in terms of political action between a participant and a boycotter, they are different about the constitution between supporters and opponents, and they are different in large basic files and are united only by public order or the state.

Therefore, we find that a segment of Sunni Arabs dealt pragmatically with the issue of the Popular Mobilization and joined tribal groups and gatherings of some factions of the Popular Mobilization to benefit from government support for them, and others of them formed on the ground in the face of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant "Daesh" and did not initially surrender its leadership to the Hashd but faced the terrorist organization alone fiercely and with the timid support of the Iraqi government, and perhaps the most visible example of what the tribes of "Albu Issa" did in the vicinity of Fallujah, especially in Ameriya Fallujah, a clan confronted Albu Issa (6) for ISIS and militias and maintained the city with little real support from the federal government.

The experience of the Nineveh Guard is one of the leading experiences in the city of Mosul, and although the number of Nineveh Guards is estimated at about three thousand fighters, but its impact on the conduct of battles with the terrorist organization was great and considering the fact that its members are from the city of Mosul, his knowledge of the city and its people qualified him to be a great actor on the ground despite the pressures he faces, the leader and former governor of Nineveh Atheel Nujeifi, who heads the guard, faces the same fate as the leaders of the "Sunni Arabs" influential in the political arena such as Mr. Tariq Al-Hashimi, Dr. Rafi al-Issawi and many others, as well as the pressures faced by the members of the Guards, including that they were trained by Turkish forces in the camp of Bashiqa.

As a result, the failure of earlier Sunni deputies to pass the National Guard Law in Parliament,7 which would have subordinated fighters to local military units, led to a lack of official forces capable of absorbing Sunni Arab volunteers, prompting those who wanted to fight ISIS to initially join the PMF, later called the Mustad of Tribes. The Sunni Awakening Movement, formed from a group of Sunni tribes that in 2008 reconnected with the central government and received money from it, also directed it at the Popular Mobilization Forces for money and support. The only exception here was the Sunnis of Mosul, including the Shammar tribe, who worked closely with the Kurdish Peshmerga. However, before the end of 2016, even the former governor of Nineveh, Atheel Nujeifi, had resorted to the crowd to fund and arm his own paramilitary group. But the relationship between tribal and political leaders is merely a marriage of interests based on the common need to fight.

1.3 Violations by the Popular Mobilization Forces in Sunni Arab Governorates

The military and humanitarian performance of the Popular Mobilization Forces varies in its formations and factions, and it is not correct to generalize in a balanced scientific speech, but generalization is a scourge, so individual actions and factional actions damage the reputation of the Popular Mobilization in aspects of human rights violations, and the Popular Mobilization Forces bear their burden because of its failure to reject these crimes on the one hand and on the other hand the failure to hold the perpetrators accountable, The BBC Arabic website published earlier (8) that Human Rights Watch has documented and published in numerous reports Testimonies of citizens of violence attributed to members of the Popular Mobilization Forces after extending their influence over areas that were under the control of the organization, stressing the importance of the commitment of both parties to the conflict to the laws of war and maintaining the safety of civilians, residents or displaced persons, adding that government forces and those supporting them and conferencing their order should transfer prisoners to official facilities belonging to the Ministry of Justice, in order to protect them from reprisals and other violations that may be committed against them by army soldiers or members of the Popular Mobilization.

"Iraq cannot win the battle against ISIS atrocities through attacks on civilians that violate the laws of war, oppose righteous humanitarian behavior, bring destruction to some of the most vulnerable Iraqis and exacerbate sectarian hostilities," said Joe Stork,9 deputy director of Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division.

The Belgian International Organization for Development and Human Rights (BAMRO) accused the Popular Mobilization Units (PMF) militias of committing serious violations, involvement in mass killings, and the forced disappearance of residents of areas where battles have taken place between Iraqi security forces and ISIL.10

Amnesty International – in a brief report – (11) accuses the PMF militias of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, horrific human rights violations and the killing of thousands of men, boys and women in Iraq. "Arms exporters from the US, European countries and Iran must wake up to the fact that there is a risk that weapons exported to Iraq could fall into the hands of militias known for their long history of human rights abuse," said Amnesty International researcher Patrick Wilkin.

According to CNN, Amnesty International for Human Rights12 accused the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Iraqi government forces of committing what it described as "war crimes" and "brutal revenge attacks" against Sunnis fleeing ISIS in Mosul during the battle to rid the city of ISIS control. Philip Luther, director of research and lobbying activities at the organization's Middle East and North Africa program, said that "Sunni Arabs in Iraq, having survived the horrors of war and the tyranny of the Islamic State, face brutal revenge attacks at the hands of militias and government forces, where they are punished for the crimes committed by the group," he said.

There are factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces that after liberation provided assistance and assistance to the people of Mosul, especially on the left coast, after they entered the city of Mosul without participating in the battle, there were frequent reports of great humanitarian practices provided by the elements of the Hashd and financial and moral assistance to the people of Mosul strikingly, the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces launched - earlier - the humanitarian initiative "For You" to support the displaced in the city of Mosul, in response to the call of the religious authority, said one of the leaders of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis" in a press conference that the Popular Mobilization Forces, just as it answered the call of the religious authority in order to save Iraq, today it responds to the call again, but this time through a campaign for you to support the displaced, and the engineer added that (13) the Popular Mobilization Forces provided blood in order to liberate the territory of Iraq, and will work to liberate man through his campaign to help his displaced brothers, and the engineer explained that the initiative "For You" will include the delivery of aid from all provinces to the displaced through the offices of the Hashd as well as the organization of Campaigns and volunteers to receive support, donate and deliver it urgently to civilians, noting that the PMF Media Directorate will have a major role in mobilizing for the "For You" initiative (14).

1.4 Popular Mobilization and the 2018 Elections

One of the most important concerns of Iraq's "Sunni Arabs" after the PMF extended its influence over their provinces is the possibility of subjecting the provinces to arms intimidation in the upcoming elections in May 2018. When we talk about the Popular Mobilization Forces and its various factions, we necessarily talk about Iran's dominance over most of its factions after it dominated Iraq, says the researcher Ali al-Kash(15); the Iranian regime thinks that Iraq is its mandate, and it represents its first line of defense, and this is what the officials of the regime have stated explicitly to the media, and they stressed that the Popular Mobilization will be their first shield in repelling any attack on their regime, and it is unfortunate that the leaders of the Popular Mobilization confirm the validity of these statements that Bloodshed in favor of the Iranian regime.

In a previous article by the author of this section (16) I mentioned how each armed party that dominates a city, a province or a Kasbah includes directing the general population of these cities or regions to its own political, security and economic vision, in the political dimension ensures the loyalty and votes of the voters in this city to the side to which this militia returns, especially as we are heading for upcoming parliamentary elections, holding elections under the control of the weapons of the factions that make up the Popular Mobilization Forces necessarily means enabling these forces that carry weapons to subject voters to voting For her, and this does not only threaten the Sunni Arab voter, but also goes beyond them to compete between the alliances of the "Shiite House" if you will, as for the component of "Sunni Arabs", even if they are a majority in the province, what remains of them in the province are mostly those who affect safety, and cannot face the serious challenge of carrying weapons from these factions, so we will find the overwhelming majority of them will turn to themselves and boycott the electoral process, and you may find some will race to show their loyalty to the security authorities responsible for their areas and give them their votes To ensure his security, even if it is minimal.

In the security dimension, we find that the factions that bear responsibility for the areas in the province protect those who owe allegiance to them and target the violator, so we monitor some incidents such as kidnapping and killing at other times, and despite the identification of these armed parties as responsible for security in one of the specific and known areas, we find that the law does not affect them in the event of a security breach in their areas of responsibility, so their members dare to breach security and are reassured that they are not subject to either accountability or legal accountability, especially if The security breach serves the expansionist sectarian project, and it is also protected by the authorities responsible for the security of the provinces in fact, which may not necessarily be linked to the Iraqi armed forces or the formations of the Ministry of Interior, but to the security system of the expansionist sectarian project subject to a foreign agenda.

There is no evidence of the above-mentioned statements of the leaders of the Popular Mobilization factions; Al-Simer website (17) quoted the Secretary-General of Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, Qais al-Khazali, as saying that Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi can win a second term under certain conditions set by the Fatah alliance participating in the elections, which includes the majority of the Popular Mobilization factions.

Al-Khazali said in a televised interview that Haider al-Abadi is one of the candidates who has chances to be prime minister in the next session, indicating that Abadi can be the next prime minister but under conditions that we stipulate, and between Anhadi al-Amiri and Nouri al-Maliki can run for the post of prime minister, pointing out that it is possible to agree on the secretary-general of the Badr Organization Hadi al-Ameri and be the next prime minister, after each bloc puts forward its candidate.

The bottom line

The fear of Sunni Arabs about the influence of the Popular Mobilization Forces on the conduct of the electoral process in their provinces is legitimate and justified, and therefore it is necessary to shed more light on the possibility of electoral fraud by the bearers of arms whose security responsibility the electoral stations are subject to, and therefore the result will be according to the intention of the direction of the faction influencing the electoral station, and will deprive the Iraqi citizen in these provinces of the freedom to cast his vote freely and voluntarily, but his calculation will be according to the achievement of his security and the security of his family, and here the lessons will be poured will be The PMF is the real dominant in the conduct of the electoral process and is therefore the one who will decide who the future prime minister will be credible to what Khazali said before, and the usurped electoral process cannot be liberated unless we lift our arms from it.

Sources

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Rashid al-Khyoun, Popular Mobilization... For every time guarded, Middle East Online, 1/12/2016,

http://www.middle-east-online.com/?id=23744

Iran Post, Turning Militias into Revolutionary Guards... Iran's Vision for the Popular Mobilization Forces, 22/12/2016.http://iranpost.org/thread/

Dr. Karim Abdian Bani Said, Popular Mobilization Forces Wali al-Faqih Project in Iraq, Middle East, 12/8/2017, https://aawsat.com/home/article/.

DW website, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are forces that have obtained their rights or an Iranian tool that benefits Abadi http://www.dw.com/ar

See Faisal Al-Issawi's personal website,https://www.facebook.com/mr.faisalalisawi/

Renad Mansour, Falih Abdul Jabbar, Popular Mobilization and the Future of Iraq, Carnegie Institute, 28/4/2017.

http://carnegie-mec.org/2017/04/28/ar-pub-68812 .

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Islamist, The Truth of the Popular Mobilization Forces' Shia Violations of the Sunnis, 19/3/2015, http://www.islamist-movements.com/26535.

Ahmed al-Jumaili, Organization; Murders and Torture Committed by ISIS and the Hashd in Iraq, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed website, 13/11/2016, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/society/2016/11/13.

Karama Association for Human Rights, Amnesty International accuses PMF militias of committing crimes against humanity, 10/1/2017, https://karamabh.org/2017/01/10.

CNN, Amnesty International: Sunnis face brutal reprisals against PMF in Mosul, 18/10/2016, https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2016/10/18/amnesty-mosul-shiites-revenge-sunnis.

Al-Alam TV, Popular Mobilization Forces Launches "For You" Initiative to Support Mosul Displaced, 13/3/2017.http://www.alalam.ir/news/1937365.

The Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq are seen ... Tasks and Consequences, Previous

https://www.newiraqcenter.com .

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https://kitabat.com/2018/04/14 .

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Al-Simer, Al-Khazali: Abadi can win a second term, but on our terms. These are the fortunes of Amiri and Maliki, 24. 04 . 2018, http://saymar.org/2018/04/51381.html.

Chapter Two

The Dangers of Popular Mobilization on the Kurds in the Future

Shahu Al , Qaradaghi

After the collapse of the Iraqi security forces and the control of the (ISIS) in the city of Mosul on June 10, 2014, Nouri al-Maliki, the former Iraqi prime minister, tried to take a series of measures to rearrange the ranks within the military and security services and called for the building of a reserve army of volunteers to face the threat that surrounds Iraq" but Maliki did not succeed in achieving this goal, so came the fatwa (Jihad al-Kafa'i) issued by the religious authority in Najaf during the sermon of Friday, June 13 / June 2014, announced by the representative of the Supreme Shia Authority Ali al-Sistani in Karbala Abdul Mahdi al-Karbala'i, included "calling on citizens who are able to take up arms and fight terrorists in defense of their country, their people and their holy sites to volunteer to join the security forces and defend the homeland, its people and the symptoms of its citizens, a duty on citizens with a sufficient obligation." (1)

1.1 Features of sectarianism in the Popular Mobilization Forces

First: Linking to the Iranian sectarian project: It is clear that Iranian policy after Khomeini's revolution in (1979) became based on exporting the revolution abroad, and was based in achieving this goal on building and establishing militias outside the scope of the state that work to ignite chaos and sectarian practices to weaken societies, create unrest and ignite civil and sectarian wars to provide the appropriate environment to achieve Iranian penetration of the countries of the region, as we see from the support of the Houthis in Yemen and the support of Hezbollah in the region. Lebanon and the establishment of militias in Syria, this applies to Iraq as well, where the majority of factions and militias affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces are linked to the Iranian regime and the ruler of the jurist Sayyed Ali Khamenei.

Although some Iraqi circles have tried to portray the militias as an independent entity linked only to the Iraqi state, Iranian support and reality prove that the militias are closely linked to Iran, and former Iraqi Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi has acknowledged that "Iran provides significant support to the Popular Mobilization Units allied with Iraqi forces," as Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari stated on June 6, 2016, that Qassem Soleimani is practicing his activities in Iraqi territory with the knowledge and full knowledge of the government as an adviser to the government. Iraqi."

Second: Names of sectarian militias: It is normal that all components of the Popular Mobilization militias are from the Shiite community, except for the Christian "Babylonian" faction and some armed factions founded by the Hashd for the rest of the components to mix the cards, and this poses a danger to the rest of the components, especially since these militias have not undergone the training and rules of regular military behavior to deal with citizens and do not have a national military doctrine, but rather carry a sectarian doctrine that tries to apply its own ideological thought in society because they are simply militias that have been mobilized with sectarian discourse from Before leaders trained in Iran and linked to the Revolutionary Guards, this is clearly embodied in the names of most of the sectarian militias affiliated with the Hashd such as (Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, Imam Ali Brigades, Jund al-Imam Brigades, Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, Ansar al-Marjaiya Brigade, Asadullah Ghalib Brigade, Jaish al-Mukhtar, Ansar al-Hijjah Brigade, Thaer al-Hussein Brigades, Ansar al-Mahdi Brigades, Saraya al-Zahra Brigades, Al-Ataba al-Husseiniya Brigades, Zainab al-Aqeela Brigade) and other names that clearly show the sectarian background And trying to highlight them on every occasion and the seriousness of this matter on the way these militias deal in the future.

Third: Sectarian slogans of the militias: One of the features of sectarianism of the Popular Mobilization militias is raising slogans and delivering sectarian speeches when attacking Kurdish or Sunni cities, and most of the military operations of the Popular Mobilization have carried names with sectarian connotations or specific to Shiites without others, and the first operations to retake cities were named (Operation Ashura) to retake the area of Jurf al-Sakhr and managed to regain control of it on October 24, 2014, after which the Popular Mobilization Forces announced the operation to regain control of Ramadi, which is It was also under the slogan (Labbek Ya Hussein) and also succeeded in controlling it on December 27, 2015, and in March 2016 the Popular Mobilization Units began another military operation entitled (Operations of Imam Hadi) to control the island of Samarra between Samarra and Fallujah, and after controlling these areas sectarian slogans are written on the walls of mosques, houses and shops as happened in Mosul, Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu.

Fourth: Sectarian discourses among militia leaders: The sectarian discourse of the militias affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces is not limited to the names of battles only or slogans of the militants, but goes beyond the speeches of the military leaders of the Hashd, Qais al-Khazali, Secretary General of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces, said, "His forces are continuing with the project of establishing the Shiite full moon in the region and not the Shiite crescent, and with the advent of the owner of the time, our strength is complemented by the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. And that the battle of Mosul will be revenge and revenge against the killers of Hussein, because these grandchildren are those ancestors" (2), and before him the leader of the Popular Mobilization Units Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who is classified as an American on the terrorist list, made sectarian statements among his followers participating in the Fallujah operation, saying, "We will continue on the path of (Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas) and this is his day, and we will continue on the path of (Ali al-Akbar), and we will continue on this path until the completion of this divine mandate." (3)

1.2 The danger of the Popular Mobilization to the components and peaceful coexistence

Iraq consists of many components, sects and nationalities, and therefore it is important that the political and security authority is aware of the importance of this point and how to deal with it, and the presence of any military force or armed militia that seeks to impose its own ideology on society will eventually lead to disruption of peaceful coexistence and the creation of unrest and conflicts between the components, and sectarian practices by the Popular Mobilization militias were not limited to the Sunni community but included All other components.

After the repercussions of the referendum on October 16 and the attack of the Popular Mobilization Units on the Peshmerga areas, especially the areas of the Nineveh Plain, where Dar Mar Matthew, the oldest, largest and oldest in Iraq, is located, the Popular Mobilization militias have harassed Christians in these areas and committed many abuses against them, and there are systematic actions and behaviors by the militias with the testimony of the people and the demographic of the Christian areas is changed by threatening and buying Christian property, provocations and payment. Citizens to give up their areas. (4)

On October 28, 2017, the Soraya Organization for Culture and Media issued a statement warning of the practices of the Popular Mobilization Units against Christians and Yazidis in the areas of Fishkhabur and the threat to the indigenous people of these areas in light of the presence of these militias (5) According to the Christian MP in the parliament of the Kurdistan Region, "Until before 2003 there were more than one million and 500 Christians living in Iraq, but due to wars, violence, terrorism, and extremist Shiite militias, he left Most of them are areas of their population in the provinces of Nineveh, Basra, Maysan and other Iraqi areas and have gone to the Kurdistan region" (6).

The practices of the Popular Mobilization Forces are not limited to violations and occupation of Christian places, but the Hashd tries to create internal strife and sow division, hostility and problems in their ranks, by forming and arming Christian militias affiliated with the Popular Mobilization, and they formed two factions (Babylonians and Syriac hawks) and this was not with the aim of protecting Christians but the aim was to sow discord and create conflicts between them as evidenced by the conflicts that took place between the two parties, where there was an infighting in the town of Baghdida In Mosul, the leader of one of the two factions was arrested by the Chaldean Rayan group, in addition to the Babylonian factions overtaking the Christian clergy, as happened with the patriarch (Louis Sako) and calling him the worst words and accusations. (7)

The formation of armed militias is not limited to Christians but there are the Yazidi Hashd, Turkmen, Shabaks and even Kurds, and it is clear that the Popular Mobilization militias are deliberately following this approach to present a non-sectarian image of itself to the Iraqi public, but the real objectives of these practices are to cover up violations and projects of demographic change against Iraqi minorities and components.

1.3 The Danger of the Popular Mobilization to the Kurds

In March 2015, the head of the Security Council of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Masrour Barzani, expressed his concerns about the role played by Iranian-backed Shiite militias in fighting alongside Iraqi army forces, and considered the Popular Mobilization Units more dangerous than ISIS. (8).

A year later, Mustafa Hijri, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP), said that the Popular Mobilization Forces pose the greatest danger to the Kurds because they receive support with money and weapons from Iran, and will pose the greatest danger to the Kurds after the elimination of ISIS. (9).

After the recapture of Mosul by the security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces, the PMF's threats to retake the disputed areas and expel the Peshmerga from them increased, and these militias were seizing opportunities to intervene immediately in these areas under the direct guidance of the IRGC and the leadership of Qassem Soleimani, as happened in the events of Kirkuk on October 16 last year.

After the entry of the Popular Mobilization Units into Kirkuk and the disputed areas, crimes and violations against Kurdish citizens began, burning many houses, shops and cars, writing sectarian slogans on the walls of houses and turning many houses into headquarters for these militias, and the militias not only did not do this, but they made threats to go to Erbil, where Marwan al-Assadi, the quarter general, told the militias of Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas participating in the Popular Mobilization: The Hashd forces will not give up the unity of Iraq and if a solution is mullah, they will enter Erbil, the capital of the region! While the leader of the Assad Allah Ghalib militias, which is also part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Khaled al-Sakhani, said: "We are ready for any emergency and if we are asked to advance towards Erbil, we will be in the forefront."[10] The similarity of the speeches of the militia leaders is evidence of the doctrine of the Popular Mobilization Forces and its hostility to the Kurdish component and the Kurdistan region and its continuous attempts to undermine this experience and subjugate the Kurdish region, which has become an obstacle to Iranian projects in Iraq in its entirety.

Due to the attacks of the Popular Mobilization Units on the disputed areas on October 16 last year, more than 175,000 people were displaced from their areas due to fear the brutal and reprisals by the Popular Mobilization Forces that it had previously committed in Sunni cities and provinces, and the Kurdistan Regional Government documented illegal acts contrary to international standards, attempts at demographic change, forced displacement and preventing displaced people from returning to their areas, in addition to the bombing of 152 houses and 12 headquarters. Politically, 1,102 houses and 380 shops were burned down by the Popular Mobilization Forces.11

The Independent Commission for Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq considered that the crimes carried out by the Popular Mobilization Forces against citizens in Kirkuk and Khurmatu are considered war crimes because they were committed because of ethnic, national and sectarian differences and were against women and children" (12). To date, the PMF has prevented displaced families from returning to their areas and is practicing violence and repression against citizens living in these areas and are subjected on a daily basis to illegal attacks and abuses before. These militias.

It is worth mentioning that thousands of displaced citizens from Kirkuk and the disputed areas who were displaced to the Kurdistan region refuse to return to their areas under the security control of the Popular Mobilization Forces over their areas due to the sectarian treatment of these militias, and even the Kurds in Kirkuk and the rest of the areas have constant demands for the return of the Peshmerga to these areas, which have witnessed stability under the control of the Peshmerga, unlike the militias that brought chaos, violence and reprisals and opened loopholes for terrorist groups and organizations to emerge. Again.

1.4 Threat of the Mobilization to the Experience of the Territory

First: The entry of the Hashd into the political arena with a military mentality and the mentality of the victor while retaining its weapons will constitute an obstacle to any move by the Kurdish side towards regaining control of the disputed areas or to restore the gains lost by the region after the events of the referendum, whether within the corridors of the House of Representatives or within the next government because of the presence of a political party that owns weapons and equipment and it is possible to use this weapon in the event of any political dispute with the rest of the parties.

Second: In the event that the United States of America tries to win the Kurds of Iraq to their side in any possible conflict towards Iran in the future, especially after the official announcement of the opening of the largest American consulate in Erbil, Iran may be dragged to use the crowd again to intimidate and threaten the Kurds and prevent them from cooperating with the United States of America in this regard, especially after talking about the American intention to withdraw from the nuclear agreement and therefore the possibility of escalation with Iran, Iraq may be one of the parties or arenas of this It is certain that the upcoming elections and the entry of the leaders of the Hashd in the parliament and the state will be a test for these militias in proving their transformation into a political force that adheres to the Iraqi constitution and the decisions of the Prime Minister and is a weapon within the state and abides by the laws and is out of Iranian control, or will they remain on the sectarian approach and submit and respond to Iranian demands and deal with the rest of the political forces with a sectarian mentality without taking into account the agreements and political understandings and attempts to build The PMF is likely to maintain its sectarian rhetoric and commitment to the Iranian approach because the Iranian regime has invested a lot in these militias and relies on them to control and influence Iraq and Syria as well, and it is unlikely that the combat doctrine of these militias will change easily unless there is a deterrent force with international cover aimed at curbing Iranian influence in Iraq.

Thirdly, the success of the Hashd in including elements of some Shabak Kurds, Christians in the Nineveh Plains, Yazidis in Sinjar and Shiite Turkmen in Tal Afar and Kirkuk will pave the way for the Hashd to have a foothold within the disputed areas with the construction of headquarters and military centers affiliated with the Hashd, meaning that the Hashd will be a party to any future talks on the fate of those areas by force and imposition of a fait accompli and this creates a turbulent environment in the disputed areas, especially after the failure of the militias to control Security, stability and increased terrorist operations under the control of Hashd militias.

It is clear that the United States of America and its allies in the region are aware of the danger of the Popular Mobilization Forces to the future of Iraq as the Kurds perceive their existence and entity, and just as Iran exploited the emergence of ISIS to build these militias, it is possible to exploit the decline of ISIS in trimming the nails of these militias, and it is certain that international parties can only move on the ground with the presence of military forces capable of confronting the Popular Mobilization, and it is clear that the Kurdish Peshmerga forces will be the first choice to reduce these militias In the future and ending its danger to all components, but because of the divisions within the Peshmerga forces that were embodied in the events of October 16, 2017, the United States of America is currently working to unite the Peshmerga on the ground to be ready for any military operation or confrontation scenario with Iranian militias, and the Kurdish leadership should realize the importance of moving towards the unification of the Peshmerga as soon as possible on reality and realize the seriousness of the future danger and overcome narrow partisan interests at this stage.

(1). Official website of the office of His Eminence the Supreme Religious Authority Sayyid Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, June 13, 2014

(2).https://www.alwatanvoice.com/Arabic/news/2017/05/13/1049045.html

(3).https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MzCirGVWSEM

(4).https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6nNIenN-Cs

(5).http://www.rudaw.net/Arabic/kurdistan/281020175

(6).http://www.basnews.com/index.php/ar/news/kurdistan/397151

(7).http://yaqein.net/reports/76761

(8).http://www.orient-news.net/ar/news_show/85943

(9).https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/iran/2016/12/19/%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8% AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82.html

(10).https://www.tahrirnews.com/posts/845844/%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A++%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A++%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7% D9%82+

(11). http://www.basnews.com/index.php/ar/opinion/388637

(12).https://www.alghadpress.com/news/%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/124112/%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF% D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%83

Chapter Three

Popular Mobilization Forces Regional Threat

Dr. Omar Abd El , Sattar Mahmoud

New Iraq Center Advisor

index

Introduction

The Hashd is the Model of an Iranian Revolution

Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia

In the targeting circle

American Role

Sources

Introduction

The current secretary-general of the Arab Mosque, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, summed up Iran's goals in the region by exporting the revolution, protecting the status quo in Tehran, claiming the right to protect Arab Shiites and its quest for the funeral of Sunni Arabs (1).

In light of the rise of Iran's star and the crystallization of several successful experiences of the Revolutionary Guards in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, the goals referred to by Abu Gheit have been achieved or almost achieved in light of the continuing chaos that requires Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to face its challenges in the next stage after the end of ISIS, and the dominance of the Popular Mobilization Forces over Iraqi decision-making.

Iran has worked to deploy the militias it established in Iraq on the borders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey as a fait accompli, through which Iran has demonstrated its ability not only to fight proxy wars with its Arab and Turkish neighbors (relying not only on sectarian, operationally trained, and unwavering loyalty) militias, but also in integrating its militias into the armies of the four Arab capitals (2).

While the dream of the return of the Persian Empire controls Iran's political imagination, Khomeini's revolution has given it an ideological dimension that it has been able to employ in mobilizing Shiites, religious and nationalist minorities, trading in the cause of Jerusalem, and fighting terrorism to serve its expansionist ambition.3

The Iranian Revolution gave a moral boost to the Shiites and added a sense of empowerment to them after Khomeini installed himself as the leader and protector of the Shiites in the world, and the victory of the revolution motivated them in rebellion against the political systems of their country.

Having found a foothold on the Mediterranean, via Tehran's Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut line, Iran aspires to extend its control over the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, and to force Turkey to neutralize its role, or tamper with its security, in order to have the lion's share in leading the Middle East, by limiting the role of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.[4]

Iran does not miss opportunities to project its power in front of its Arab and Turkish adversaries, by creating chaos to make way for its local proxies to fill the resulting vacuum, or exploiting the differences between Turkey, the Gulf States and Jordan, after it succeeded in replicating the experience of the Revolutionary Guards in four Arab capitals, in addition to the experiences of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which play their role in sabotaging the peace process, which Iran sees as an American hanger to isolate Iran.[5]

Iran's Middle East policy has not only empowered Shiites in the region, supported resistance factions, and developed their military capabilities, but has also used the need of world powers to establish security in the region to advance their expansionist agenda there.6

While logic requires that the international community put an end to Iran's contribution to destabilizing security in the region, it was the provision of significant assistance to America when it invaded Iraq and Afghanistan that enabled Tehran to re-nominate itself as the region's policeman.

The emergence of cross-border Salafi organizations has led to a decline in the priority of confronting Iran, which is disciplined in the eyes of the West in the face of the threat of jihadist terrorism.

Iran has not only managed to avoid direct confrontation with the United States, but through its regional proxies, be it the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan or the Dawa Party in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, has been able to extend its influence and fill the vacuum created by its regional adversaries.

At first glance, it may seem that Iran is the country best able to achieve achievements at the regional level, to lead it either directly or indirectly through its multiple arms and allies, and that it is closer than ever to achieving its dream of regional hegemony.

Not only has it strengthened its regional political and economic influence through its significant and direct involvement in the region's crises, but it has also worked to strengthen its national security within imagined borders deep within the territory of its neighboring countries according to a strategy that says that our presence outside our borders is an internal Iranian affair (8).

Iran exports the model of the Revolutionary Guards from Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Houthis to control the Middle East, and it started it with the war against ISIS and expanded the scope of dominance from the Gulf through Baghdad and Damascus to the Mediterranean.

If Trump does not emerge from the nuclear program and Iran does not ease sanctions, Iran will strengthen its influence deeper in the Middle East, pay direct attention to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and Jordan may be its closest target, as Iran is now in a position to exert enormous influence, throughout the Middle East and for years to come.9

Having succeeded in consolidating Assad's rule in Syria and holding pressure cards in Syria through the Astana axis, Saudi Arabia's reluctance to perpetuate tensions on its southern, eastern, and northern borders is within its reach.

Although Iran may succeed in achieving its strategic objectives for a while, but in return it has regained large segments of the population, and has put them on its arms that have invested in polishing its image, while Iran's biggest strategic mistake is its dependence on Russia at one time and on America's need at other times to consolidate its tactical gains, and is therefore subject to reversal when others decide to retreat.10

The Popular Mobilization Forces are the model of Iran's revolutionary guards

Any Iranian role in transforming the PMF militias into revolutionary guards comes to institutionalize militia rule in Baghdad, ensure its legitimacy and continuity, and ensure Iran's dominance over Iraqi decision-making, this time by force of arms, not just the loyalty of Iraqi religious parties.

Iran's calls to turn the PMF into a Revolutionary Guard, similar to the Iranian experience, fall in light of the growing strength and ambition of the PMF militarily and politically, and its consolidation as an Iranian arm in the region.

Mohammad Saleh Jokar, a member of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, called for the formation of the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), similar to the one in Iran, by integrating Shiite militias in Iraq and making Saraya al-Khorasani a nucleus of it.11

The IRGC's experience has become a success and a pioneer for the countries of the region, and if any country in the region wants to form similar forces similar to the IRGC, we are ready in Iran to provide our experience and advice in this regard, he said.

Former IRGC commander Mohsen Rafik Dost said that Iraq should apply the Iranian experience regarding the IRGC and we are fully prepared to provide Iraqis with the pattern and structure of these forces, so that Iraq can form its own guard forces (12).

The Iranian proposal derives its seriousness and seriousness from the range of events and developments on the ground and political that coincided with them, perhaps the most important of which are the statements of Hadi al-Amiri, leader of the Badr Organization close to the commander of the Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Major General Qassem Soleimani, in which he accused government forces of treason.13

While Amiri sees the Iraqi government as under U.S. pressure, he claimed that the Iranians have considerable experience in fighting terrorism and that the reason for the sensitivity toward General Qassem Soleimani, who is in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi government to assist the security services, is his success.

This statement comes to consolidate the inability of the Baghdad government to control the course of Tehran's interventions, which seeks to implement the most important item of the export project of its revolution, which is the establishment of a version of the Revolutionary Guards to be its largest military, political and economic arm outside Iran, after the failure of the attempt with Hezbollah.

Taken together, these developments reflect Iran's desire to consolidate its presence in Iraq by transforming the PMF militias into a recognized military institution, in parallel with the weakening of the role of the Iraqi government, the growing ambition of the leaders of the Hashd political militias, and Iranian interventions, as the recognition of Qassem Soleimani as a government adviser has cemented this deficit.14

Therefore, Iranian offers to turn militias into revolutionary guards come in a reproduction of the experience of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, to assert its political dominance over Baghdad, to establish the legitimacy of its weapons in the Iraqi state, and for the Iraqi Revolutionary Guards to play a broader military role in the region.

Rafik Dost's statement represents the moment of the announcement of the transition from the stage of militias, which in the Iranian concept is called the stage of mobilization (Basij) to the stage of the Revolutionary Guards, which is not only a military force, but an independent military, economic and political institution, which has the final say in intervening and deciding in all the affairs of the state, government and society.15

His choice of Iraq as the nucleus for the formation of that Revolutionary Guard is not arbitrary, but as the weakest link governed by their near-absolute authority over its parties, leaders, and governments from 2003 to the present.

In this context, several questions arise: What is the Iranian regime's goal in spreading this experience and trying to revive it in a number of countries?, Third: Is the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard Corps project applicable in Iraq?

The Iranians make no secret that the IRGC has broader regional roles that the IRGC must also play. Iran, which has been active in recruiting Iraqi, Afghan, Lebanese, and Iranian militias for the Assad regime in Syria, wants to give greater legitimacy to its militias, and wants to start from Iraq.16

The call for an Iraqi Revolutionary Guard Corps is a matter that threatens Arab security in general and the Gulf in particular, and is a legitimization of the status of the Iraqi militias that will form them and means more influence that has so far exceeded the influence of the Iraqi army and government, while merging them under the name and structure of the Revolutionary Guards will mean hijacking Iraq in favor of Iran completely and tightening the security grip on the structures of the Iraqi army and security institutions, as if Iran is the one that has become on the western borders of Jordan, southern Turkey and northern Saudi Arabia.17

In doing so, the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears as a dream of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, as Tehran wants to organize a new military arm in the Arab Gulf states, directly. The leaders of the Popular Mobilization militias have never hesitated to threaten the Gulf States.18

One of the leaders of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas militia, Aws al-Khafaji, and Watheq al-Batat of Iraqi Hezbollah, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, has previously threatened the Gulf states and, specifically, Saudi Arabia has vowed to carry out attacks on their territory.

The pictures of the Saudi cleric, Nimr al-Nimr, painted on Hashd rocket launchers, were another symbolic incident, confirming that these militias have unconcealed intentions to target the Gulf countries, as the pictures of the tiger, in reference to revenge for Saudi Arabia's execution of him, were placed by bombing the Iraqi city of Fallujah.

But experts at the U.S. Stratfor Center for Security and Strategic Studies argue the opposite: Iraq is not Iran, the IRGC cannot be easily copied, and the factors that have empowered militias to emerge in Iraq are the same as those limiting Iran's ability to establish an official militia in the country.19

The political stalemate in Baghdad, the sectarianism that dominates political life, and the question of interests that may prompt today's warring parties to cooperate to repel this project, such as the fact that the Kurds and Sunnis are willing to work together in particular to prevent the emergence of a unified Iranian-backed force in the country that would give Tehran more weight in Baghdad.

It is difficult to predict the end of the experience of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, but it is certain that the dominance of these militias over Baghdad means the continuation of sectarian rule, and its transformation into a sectarian militia rule, which ends any hope of reforming the political process, integrating Sunni Arabs into the political system in Baghdad, and stopping the circle of revenge and sectarian exclusion in the country.

Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia

In the targeting circle

Jordan

Although safe zones in Syria are still a distant possibility for the time being, the establishment of a safe zone on Jordan's northern border remains dependent on what will be the strategy of US President Donald Trump in Syria, who calls for withdrawal from Syria after pledging to establish safe zones so that refugees do not have to leave their country, noting that the Gulf countries will bear the cost.[20]

But the stationing of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in southern Syria, near the Jordanian border, may represent an Iranian pressure card on the one hand, and regional influence on the other, which prompted Jordan to contain Iranian influence, especially in Syria, and to remove its militias near its borders, through a Russian-American agreement, and through the chairman of the Jordanian Joint Chiefs of Staff.[21]

The experience of plunging Hezbollah into the Syrian war has also revealed Jordan's concern as Iran's proxies in the region have maintained their presence so far, so the Assad regime in Syria has not fallen, as well as the ruling Shiite coalition in Iraq.

On the other hand, the issue of Jerusalem, the relocation of the embassy, the abolition of the Hashemite supervision of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy sites on the one hand, and the statement by the commander of the Israeli Third Division five years ago that the monarchy should leave is a coup against the Jordanian reality, which has been afflicted for the past decades.22

The decision to move the embassy and the threat of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Hezbollah, and Iranian militias linked to the Quds Force are two sides of the coin of the challenges Jordan faces, which may make Jordan's options very limited.

Jordan may be compelled to turn to Iran, and it did so perhaps when it adopted the Russian reading of the Syrian crisis, accepted the Astana invitation, or Jordan would change itself by itself, as Mohammed bin Salman does, because the contradictory interests of Iran and Israel could eventually lead to confrontation between them, and Jordan may be an arena of conflict between them.23

Saudi Arabia

The fierce competition for influence between Iran and Saudi Arabia will exacerbate tensions in the region, especially as the threats of this war have crossed borders and reached within Saudi cities.

This may prompt the Kingdom to take new steps to remove this danger, as Turkey has done in Syria, where the Moscow-Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus alliance is trying to use the vacuum of the Western sphere – militarily and security-wise – to impose isolation on some regional powers, especially Riyadh and Turkey.[24]

Russia's disengagement from Iran in Syria seems to be a very difficult process in light of Russia's need for Iran and vice versa, and the difficulty of crowding out Iranian influence in Iraq, one of the biggest challenges facing Saudi Arabia in the coming period.25

Adding to the Saudi leadership's concerns is that the possibility of such a thing comes in the wake of a possible U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East and the Gulf region, and at a time when Iran (the kingdom's rival adversary) is allied with Russia, Riyadh believes that in the event of a Russian military presence in Iran, it will face a direct Russian threat to its national security and vital interests (26).

The existence of such a strategic challenge has prompted Saudi Arabia to review its policy toward Moscow early, in order to serve the goals Putin seeks to achieve, including the possibility of reversing Bashar al-Assad's demand for Bashar al-Assad's immediate relinquishment of power, investing billions of dollars in projects inside Russia, or capping Saudi oil production in order to cause an energy market shock that will raise the price of a barrel of oil, which will inevitably increase Russian revenues from energy exports.27

James Dorsey warned in an article published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies that the escalation of Saudi-Iranian tensions does not bode well for the rest of the Middle East, saying: Not only is it dangerous to escalate in countries where Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting a proxy war, but it also threatens to fan the flames of sectarianism in a part of the world where minorities stand on the defensive, tensions between Sunnis and Shiites are being eroded, and expensive conflicts and wars are having a profound impact on the civilian population.28

In this case of weakness, ethnic, sectarian, and political tensions are likely to prolong the conflict in Iraq and possibly create openings that ISIS will exploit on the one hand and Iran's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) on the other, as well as the Houthis' ongoing threat to Saudi Arabia.

This state of weakness may have prompted Saudi Arabia to open up to Iraq to crowd out or compete with Iranian influence, not contain or end it, as Iran has filled the political vacuum, established armed militias, made sectarian demographic changes, and positioned itself politically and militarily in a way that has become difficult to get them out of Iraq, except by using the same military and political tools together, and for quite a while.

The end result of the recent developments after the failure of the Kurdistan referendum has favored Iran and increased its growing influence in Iraq, reducing the effectiveness of Saudi efforts and endeavors in Iraq.

Not only because of the failure of Kurdistan's independence, which could have had its consequences at home in Iran, but also because pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militias have come to control, along with federal government forces, additional geographical areas, particularly the strategic and oil-rich city of Kirkuk, as well as the decline in the popularity and influence of the pro-Saudi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which directly favors its rival, the pro-Iranian Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).29

Turkey

The challenges facing Turkey from the Popular Mobilization Forces are no less than those faced by Saudi Arabia and Jordan, except that Jordan is in a more difficult position than the two sides.

It can be said that the failure of the Kurdistan referendum and the end of ISIS in Iraq, have left Turkey and the region with it in their weakest state since the 1991 Gulf War, at a time when Iran has given Iran a major push forward. The large number of recent statements by the IRGC indicate the establishment of a Shiite army in the region that suggests a huge amount of geopolitical confidence for Iran, just as much as the geopolitical threat to Turkey.

If we add Turkey's war with the PKK, which has spread regionally, and Iran lurks in it after the possible withdrawal of Trump, with strong Turkish opposition to Erdogan's model, with Alawite minorities ready to overthrow Erdogan, especially since Turkey has survived with the ability of a capable from the July 2016 coup, Turkey is probably on the brink of a major economic crisis.[30]

Inflationary pressures are rising in an election race, with Turkey heading for what could be crashing economic waves, based on the belief that strong growth must be maintained in order for Erdogan and his party to win the November 2019 elections, but Erdogan's decision to present the elections could tip the equation in his favor.

The reversal of the equation in favor of Turkey by presenting elections may happen, if it is added to it regional and international geopolitical initiatives or developments, such as the non-withdrawal of Trump from Syria, and its withdrawal from nuclear, which may open the door to resolving the Gulf crisis and easing tension between the Gulf and Turkey in Syria and the region, and between Ankara and Washington, which may open the door to intensifying competition between Ankara and Tehran in the region, and may crack Turkey's relationship with Russia, a possibility that may curb Iran's continued drift to expand further and deeper at the expense of Turkey Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

American Role

This background raises an important question about the absent American position in the face of this absurdity created by Iran in the scene of the Middle East event.Trump uses a multiple system to achieve the internal and external goals of the United States.

It is a policy of constructive isolation and the principle of America First, which paves the way for a major shift in foreign policy so that it can be a major actor in the international system and not to indulge in regional conflicts as well as in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Syria.

Trump also uses the concept of a deal in dealing with foreign policy issues in order to achieve economic benefits as much as America's involvement in issues in Iraq and Syria.

President Trump will likely revisit all of his old alliances and hold bilateral political conferences to assess the other partner's adherence to his relationship with the United States, and although his relationship with Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia may potentially strengthen, this trend toward strategic disengagement from the Middle East may continue.

The same is true of the NATO alliance and the reduction of U.S. adherence to it; which is the closest general American conviction to that of President Trump alone, and Trump believes that the policy of extinguishing fires may be reduced towards leaving the fires to extinguish themselves from the large security, military, political and financial that has a significant impact on the design and implementation of strategic American policy.31

U.S. President Donald Trump's threat of an imminent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria has raised questions about the outcome of the move on the interests of Washington and its regional allies, as well as the vacuum it will undoubtedly fill as it did before after 2011, to establish themselves as a rising regional power. The sudden U.S. move to announce withdrawal from Syria could widen the gap between the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan.

Observers believe that the Trump administration is restoring the same strategy adopted by former President Barack Obama, which is based on giving way to adversaries, despite the amendments made by the US president to his administration and the inclusion of figures affiliated with hawks and does not hide its hostility to Iran, Turkey and North Korea, and believes in the restoration of the United States to its first leadership role in the world.32

The withdrawal from Syria could mean that the United States has conceded defeat (albeit temporarily) to Russia and Iran, the countries that formed a semblance of an alliance to hold the keys to a political solution in Syria in accordance with the interests of the countries concerned, while the hidden goal of this alliance is to force Washington to accept the fait accompli.

They warn that the withdrawal of the United States from its positions of influence in Syria will make Russia and Iran covet greater concessions, especially in Iraq, which is almost definitively going to be under Iranian influence, and this may open the door to questions from them, is the world living in an era between the First and Second World Wars.33

The United States withdrew from the League of Nations, and at that time the Nazi-German disturbances, Italian fascism and Japanese militarism escalated, the Spanish war-like war in Syria ignited today, the world turned to the right as it is heading today, and Great Britain dealt with Hitler's rising Germany, as Amirma today deals with Khamenei's rising Iran, until it was the second high war.

Even the concern may increase when we dig deeper into the words of Mohammed bin Salman, who is pressuring the West to amend the nuclear deal and pressuring Iran to prevent Iran from repeating Hitler's experience in the Middle East, after all that it has done in the past fifteen years.

Mohammed bin Salman adds that we must make painful decisions before we face a possible war with Iran in the next five or ten years. Will Trump withdraw from Syria and reverse its intention to cancel the nuclear, leaving the region as Hitler did in Germany, when Britain let him expand until he invaded Europe?

If this is true, it means that the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces and the regional extensions of Iran's erasure, which have become successful models of the Revolutionary Guards, may have in the next four years connections and rounds against Jordan, Turkey and Saadawiya.

Conclusion of the research

The balance of power and the change in the equation of power on the ground in Iraq and the region are crucial to keeping Sunnis and Kurds from targeting the Popular Mobilization Forces, and preserving regional security on the one hand, and the presumptive security of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, on the other.

Any armed assault by the Shiite crowd against Saudi, Jordanian or Turkish territory and property must be retaliated directly and outside the territory of the three countries, where Iran's interests and bases and centers of finance and leadership, as well as work to take the battle into Iran, as Mohammed bin Salman said.

Otherwise, letting the events take place according to Iran's equation, which pushed Turkey to spring relations with Tehran, was represented in the appointment of an Alawite ambassador in Baghdad who had the closest relations with the leaders of the Shiite Hashd and was able to link Turkish cultural, social and economic interests with them.

It was also represented by a Turkish recognition of Iran's achievements in Syria and Iraq, an agreement to fight Kurdish extremists and Sunni Arabs, and Turkey's payment of a cash ransom to Turkish workers kidnapped in Baghdad two years ago at no political price.

Iran's successful neutralization of Turkey could pose a strategic danger not only to Turkey but also to Saudi Arabia and Jordan.Iran's role is to neutralize Turkey and Saudi Arabia from Iraq, and if it succeeds in neutralizing one of them, Iran has accomplished half the task.

However, this calm in relations between Turkey and Iran may not last long, especially if a new and serious challenge emerges next summer, as Turkey may cut off the water of the Tigris River in the summer and the rivers of the south will dry up and then the Shiites will not silence and mobilize them.

As for Jordan, a country poor in its resources and the Shiite crowd that is stationed separately, may take advantage of this, supporting the street disgruntled with its economic situation, and chaos will occur that may be difficult to control, with the presence of a Salafi current active in poor areas such as Zarqa, Irbid and others, which will allow Shiite money to control Hula as it appeared in previous years.

The geographical proximity to Palestine may also make Jordan a geopolitical target for the Shiite mobilization in influence but with different tools than in Syria, Iraq or Yemen, and the Anbar and Mosul model may be closer to application in Jordan, especially after the transfer of Washington's embassy to Jerusalem in mid-May.

In Saudi Arabia, all the factors of conflict combine in the relationship of the Shiite crowd with Saudi Arabia and at all levels, but the question is where and when?In the religious dimension, Saudi Arabia and until the last notice can not apply the Turkish model with the Shiites, except that Vision 2030 leads Saudi Arabia to political pluralism, hence bin Salman may have said that there is no Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia.

In the diplomatic dimension, Saudi Arabia's openness to Iraq and the prospect of its military intervention in Syria could lead to a Shia-Shia conflict in traditional Shia spheres of influence over power-sharing and control of Karbala and Najaf.

The transformation of the conflict into Shia Shia is the one that should be a priority for the Saudi decision-maker, because there is a historical fact that when nations defend themselves in times of danger they lose, and that nations that benefit from the conflicts around them, manage and control them remain and win, and it remains that the regional balance of power and the kingdom's internal strength is the sure guarantee to judge the developments of events.

Sources

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In the first half of November 2017

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12- Iraq.. Integration of sectarian Popular Mobilization Militias into the army

13- Commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces: I am proud to be a soldier for Soleimani

14- Similar to Iran.. Iraq Moves to Turn Popular Mobilization Forces into Revolutionary Guard Forces

15- Iran's Future Vision for the Popular Mobilization Forces - Al-Rawabet Center for Studies

16- Fayez Sara- The Revolutionary Guards are Iran's tool in the destruction of the neighborhood

17- Iran's Future Vision for the Popular Mobilization - Al-Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies

18- The Iraqi Revolutionary Guards... The Iranian regime's dream of exporting its "revolution"

19- Iran's Future Vision for the Popular Mobilization Forces - Al-Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies

21.20 Jordan's role in establishing a safe zone in southern Syria

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

22. Has the King of Jordan lost his image as the protector of the Holy Places?

23. Ehud Yaari - The Washington Institute - How Iran Plans to Destroy Israel

24- Dr. Bashirzine Al-Abedin - The Russian intervention in Syria: the risks and opportunities inherent

25- Tarek Diab - The Regional Confrontation of Iran: Roles and Effectiveness

26- Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud-Iran's Strategy: Our presence outside our borders is an internal Iranian affair

27- The Russian-Iranian partnership in Syria has an impact on the geostrategic situation in the Middle East

28- The Middle East through the eyes of foreign research centers.. First Half of November 2017

29- The Regional Confrontation with Iran: Roles and Effectiveness – Egyptian Institute for Studies

30- National Interest: An impending economic crisis. It is the biggest threat to national security in Turkey

31- Luqman Abdul Rahim Al-Faili - Regional Allies - 15-12-2016

32- Kirsten Kneipp – a journalist at the DW Foundation, an expert on the Middle East – is the U.S. withdrawal from Syria a valid idea?

33- Marwan Kabalan - Trump, Putin and the Future of the Liberal Order

Author Dr.Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud

الكاتب د.عمر عبدالستار محمود