Research Professors

Dr. Omar Abd El , Sattar Dr , Abd El , Nasser Al , Mahdawi Dr , Zaid Abdel Wahab

Introduction

Theoretical framework

The Velayat-e Faqih regime represents a political model of governance that has not been pledged by the countries of the region and the Muslim world. The structure of discipline and balance has enabled the Velayat-e Faqih regime to withstand the challenges of home and abroad over the past four decades, and has given it a high adaptive capacity that has enabled it to absorb blows through a self-balancing in which bilateral institutions contribute to which to rein in each other in a clear intentional manner.

There are state institutions paralleled by revolutionary institutions, a state strategy and a revolution strategy. You have an army and a Revolutionary Guards, a Shura Council, a Guardian Council, an Assembly of Experts and a Expediency Council, and there is a Guide, a President—and a National Security Council and the government.Despite the apparent hit-and-run in its international and regional relations, the House of Imam—the House of Rahbari—leads them all.

Iran presents itself politically through this dual system as the center and the Muslim world. The world here is like an ocean that must be "drawn" by Iran's post-revolution experience. In short, this vision is an aggressive expansionist one based on an imperial nationalism and an extreme sectarian one, and seems close – as Mahjoub Zouiri says – to the Western capitalist idea that divides the world into a center and an ocean.

This vision is based on the draft Vision 2025 prepared by the Expediency Council, a document known as the "2005-2025 Iranian Strategy" or the 2025th Iranian Plan "Iran: 2025".

It is considered "the most important national document after the Iranian constitution and it sets out future visions of Iran's role in twenty years, and aims to transform the country into a central nucleus encompassing 25 countries, from the borders of China to the east, the Indian Ocean to the south, the Arabian Gulf to the west, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean Sea to the north.

Central Asia and the Caucasus are second only to the Persian Gulf and the Arab region according to Iran's twentieth strategy. It means that the Arabian Gulf occupies the brigades in this strategy. These are areas over which Iran has exercised its hegemony throughout a period that extends from the time of the Achaemenids through the Sassanids and others, also called the project of the "civilizational estate of Iran" or Greater Iran.

According to the Al Jazeera Center's study of Walid Abdul Hay's Iranian power structure and prospects, Iran is a country with a strategic vision that insists on achieving its central goal, which is to achieve the status of the central state in its multiple regional space.

The general trend of the Iranian strategy movement and the dual velayat-e faqih governance model indicates that it is proceeding, but faces major internal and external challenges, between state institutions and the institutions of the revolution, between them and Iranian society, and between the regime and the regional and international system.

The recent protests have been the latest episode of internal protest that the regime considers more serious than the external challenges it faces, which may distract it from doing its part beyond the borders, and thus may force it if it cannot confront them to change its behavior, if not cause the overthrow of the regime, under the White House's strategy against the regime of Iran.

This paper attempts to discuss the causes, contexts, finances, and repercussions of the recent Iranian protests on the regime of Iran and the region, and the extent to which Iran's dual regime is able to confront them. The paper assumes that the lack of a specific economic model that supports Iran's dual political system has caused the ability of the political system to withstand to be eroded, and the people's faith in the idea of velayat-e faqih has been shaken, causing the revolution of the human treasury of the revolution from the lower classes of people who have recently come out against the regime, angry at hunger and the regime's funding of wars.

If the regime's behavior continues along these lines without real economic reforms coupled with or without political reforms, the Iranian regime may find itself preoccupied with itself, even being forced to change its behavior in the region.

The paper assumed that the arms of the Iranian regime in the region are part of Iran's dual regime and affiliated with the revolution, and that the repercussions of the protests on its arms are part of their repercussions on the regime. A potential change in the behavior of the system outside the boundaries is part of the possible change in the behavior of the system at home. The paper concluded that the Iranian regime is still strong enough to prevent the repercussions of the protests on its regime's dual foundations, but at the same time it is no longer able not to change its behavior economically, politically, or at least economically.

The paper will discuss the structure of Iran's dual regime in the first section, while it will address the repercussions of the protests on Iran's dual regime in the second section.The paper will address in the third section the repercussions of the protests on Iran's nuclear and missile file, on Iran's arms and on other regional files.

Section I

The Iranian regime ... Political Structure

Dr. Abdul Nasser Al-Mahdaoui

Preface

The Iranian regime after the revolution carried out by Khomeini in 1979 is one of the most complex in the world, as we have not observed globally any country that has this entanglement between political and security institutions, nor this complexity in the tasks and duties between these institutions through their growth and temporal development, Dr. Walid Abdul Hay says in a summary of his article The structure and prospects of Iranian power; (1) The extrapolation of the development of the Iranian political system during the period from 1979 to 2012 refers to the structure of "check and balance" Balance) enabled the regime to have a high adaptive capability that enabled it to absorb the blows that hit its leadership in the early stages, to severely deplete its capabilities during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, and to control any imbalance in the structure of the regime through a self-balancing in which institutions contribute to restrain each other through a clearly intentional dichotomy: (Army-Revolutionary Guards, Shura Council-Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, Guide-President, National Security Council-Government).

Although this control seems theoretical at times, it is effective at other times, recognizing the Supreme Leader's central role, especially in higher strategic directions. The Islamic Republic of Iran has two dimensions in its system and its internal and foreign policy, it is one of the regional countries that acquires great importance because of its location, system and ideology between being a state in its first dimension and being a revolution in its second dimension, Iran does not draw its influence in the first dimension only, that is, within its geographical borders, but its philosophy is based on domination of the Islamic world, the Iranian Constitution includes a clear reference to the country's foreign policy within the first chapter devoted to "public assets"; Article III, paragraph 16, of Chapter I of the Constitution refers to this subject by saying: "The foreign policy of the country shall be regulated on the basis of Islamic standards, fraternal obligations towards all Muslims and the full protection of the world's vulnerable. Hence Iran proceeds according to its theory and vision as the nucleus of the Islamic world in all its countries as the texts show, and the focus here on its Shiite doctrine and the concept of exporting the revolution through this nucleus to the rest of the Islamic world, so Iran is today and after almost forty years has achieved its expansionist ambition only in four Arab capitals known through its proxies of followers of the doctrine and the ideology of Velayat-e Faqih, and the Iranian dream is much broader than its reality today, says the researcher Ali Hossein Bakir (2); The regional level is especially known in Iran as the "Civilizational Estate of Iran" project or "Greater Iran", which includes, according to Mohsen Rezaei, the region bordering China to the east, the Indian Ocean to the south, the Persian Gulf to the west, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean Sea to the north.

In this estate, Rezaei says, Persian culture is of particular importance because it is linked to the Iranian civilizational estate (meaning the history of the Persian Empire), and the scientific and strategic status that Iran enjoys in this region makes it a pivotal actor. Iran spends huge sums of money on cultural promotion to serve its national project.

Through the foregoing, we find that Iran as a country practices its policies in two dimensions, as we have already mentioned, the first dimension according to the international system known as a state with its own geography and known borders and has its own system regardless of our vision towards it, and a transnational dimension is represented in its vision of exporting the revolution and the formation of the Revolutionary Guards, the transnational institution, and gives itself the authority to intervene with peoples and countries and justifies this intervention with a religious, sectarian, narrow-minded dimension contrary to what it claims, and this dimension is contrary to the international system, and intersects with the group of countries that The IRGC intervenes with the intention of exporting the revolution, intersects regional and international visions and contradicts the axioms to which international relations are currently linked. Given that the IRGC and the rest of the security formations that are specialized in exporting the revolution are linked to the political orientation and the system of government in Iran, we find it necessary to focus in the first section on the basic structure of the system of government in Iran as follows;

First, Velayat-e Faqih

Khomeini, the godfather of the theory of the Wali al-Faqih, intended not only to overthrow a pro-Western monarchy, but also to establish a state, a political system based on a theocratic political theory, which witnessed paths of development throughout history until it reached its mature and practical form at his hands. For the first time in the history of Shiism, political and religious status were merged into one office, in the hands of one man. Hence the assumption that the modern Islamic Republic of Iran is an extension of the Safavid state can be reassured with the slight difference that the jurist was acting as the giver of legitimacy to the ruler in the Safavid state while becoming the same ruler in the Islamic Republic.3

The founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, is the first jurist in Shia history to succeed in establishing the state of Velayat-e Faqih. His own theory of Islamic government is based on four pillars, which Kadyor illustrates as follows: First, Islam needs statehood in order to apply a large part of its provisions. Second, the establishment of the Islamic government and the preparation of its premises, including public opposition to the oppressors, are the duties of the Adol jurists, and that the people's following and supporting them is a must. Thirdly, Islamic government means the exercise of their mandate by the Adol-appointed jurists appointed by the Holy Street in all aspects of government to which the mandate of the Prophet and the infallible Imam was applicable. Fourthly, the Islamic Government and the laws promulgated by it are considered to be primary judgements, enjoy priority and precedence over all subsidiary provisions, and that the maintenance of order is a legitimate duty.4

Hence, the concept of the state according to the theory of the Wali al-Faqih was not limited to the functional management of the legitimate state institutions, but went beyond imposing a state of emotional guardianship over the people, and controlling their perceptions and religious and personal premises, and therefore it was not surprising that it was stipulated in the constitution of the Islamic Republic that the Iranian president belongs to the official doctrine of the state and not its official religion, as the president must be a Twelver Shia and not only a Muslim. In the same vein, the wali faqih, to whom all powers revert, is considered to be the political ruler and religious guide at the same time, he is the deputy of the infallible imam who is absent according to the Twelver faith, and the prosecution, although it is a viceroy and not a maqam deputy, gives the wali faqih the authority of the imam in all fields, and therefore his position acquires a kind of holiness that makes his rulings divine.5

The wali al-faqih can rule, in the light of the regime's interest, more broadly than the sharia circle, but within the objectives of religion. These provisions are not only obligatory to follow and obey, but are preceded by all sub-Sharia provisions, if they are crowded with them. The absolute wali faqih can repeal the law when he deems it in the interest of Islam and Muslims, especially in cases not provided for in the constitution, since the de facto law is the law of Islam that has not been vetoed by the wali jurist. Accordingly, the orders of the Wali al-Faqih are considered to be in the rule of law and are submitted to him in cases of apparent conflict with him. (6)

Shia jurists have divided the velayat-e faqih into two types; absolute and partial. The absolute guardianship of the jurist interferes in the religious and worldly affairs of the people, both private and public absolutely, and the guardian of the jurist has the right to absolute judgment over the people, which is at the level of the infallible imam, the prophet who is inspired by God. Disobedience to Him is a kind of apostasy, infidelity, and disobedience to obedience and God's rule. Partial guardianship is the guardianship of the jurist to guide worshippers only in religious affairs, not in state politics, i.e. it separates politics from religion. The velayat-e faqih Khomeini is absolute and boils down to the fact that Imam Khomeini or his successor in office, as the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, is the guardian of Muslims in all the world, and obedience to him is as obligatory as obedience to the awaited Mahdi because he is his deputy. (7)

What should be noted is that opposition to the general theory of velayat-e faqih does not mean not demanding the existence of a certain legitimate "Islamic" rule, as is the demand of all fundamentalist currents, whether Shiite or Sunni, but in the Shia case, it means disagreement over the competence of the jurist "the sultan" to apply this task only and the need to refer to it, as the guardianship of the ummah over itself and not of the jurist over the ummah, as is the butter of the objection of Shia scholars and intellectuals to the theory of velayat-e faqih. (8)

Second: Presidency of the Republic

The President of the Republic is the highest official in the country after the position of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. He is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution and the presidency of the executive branch, except with regard to the responsibilities of the Supreme Leader. The President of the Republic is elected for a term of four years by direct vote of the people, and has no right to hold office for more than two electoral terms. His powers lie in the presidency of the executive branch, meaning that he acts as prime minister and limits the powers of the executive to the president of the republic only. These include: appointing and dismissing ministers, subject to the approval of the Shura Council, supervising the Planning and Budget Authority, and leading the National Security Council.

Conditions for the assumption of the presidency of the Republic; Article 115 of the Constitution stipulates that the following conditions must be met in the office of President:

An Iranian national, with adequate management and skill, good behavior and honesty, he embraces the official doctrine of the country and believes in the basic principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (9)

With the presence of the President of the Republic and the absence of a Prime Minister, the Iranian regime is not a purely presidential system with a mixed system, i.e. half presidential half parliamentary for many reasons, the most important of which are:

The presidential system is based on the president's and ministers' political irresponsibility to parliament, but the Iranian parliament has the authority and ability to question the president and his ministers, and even remove them from office in accordance with the constitution. The appointment of ministers by the President only takes place with the ratification of them by Parliament. This is what we do not see in the foundations of the presidential system.

In the Iranian regime, the people elect the president of the republic through direct suffrage, and the parliament has no role in electing the head of state, as we see in parliamentary systems.

In the Iranian regime, the head of state has no right to dissolve parliament, nor can he revoke parliamentary decisions, as in other presidential systems.

The current political system and executive power in Iran are not in the hands of one person, as in other presidential systems, as stated in Article XIII after the Hundred of the Constitution: "The President of the Republic is considered the highest official authority in the country after the leader, and he is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution, and he also heads the executive authority except in areas that are directly related to the leadership." (10)

The Iranian arena has witnessed signs of changing the regime from presidential to parliamentary, but this has not left the position of vision of some parliamentarians only, and observers believe that changing the presidential system to parliamentary will not lead to a democratic transformation, as the powers of the head of government in Iran as the head of the executive branch constitutionally, are subject to direct supervision by the Supreme Leader, where Article 57 of the Iranian Constitution states that "The governing authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran are: The legislature, the executive branch and the judiciary shall exercise their powers under the supervision of the absolute ruler and the imam of the nation, in accordance with the subsequent articles of this Constitution, and these powers shall operate independently of each other. (11)

Third: Guardian Council

The Guardian Council, or Legislative Control Council (Shurai Neghban), is Iran's highest arbitral tribunal and consists of twelve members, six of whom are religious jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, and the remaining six are jurists, appointed by the Shura Council on the recommendation of the head of the judiciary, and subordinate to monitoring committees that oversee the implementation and implementation of its powers. The members of the Guardian Council are entrusted with a dual task, once when nominating for membership in the legislative councils, and once when the councils issue laws and regulations, it supervises all elections held in the country, whether related to municipalities, legislatures, presidential elections or the selection of members of the Council of Experts, and is entrusted with the task of evaluating candidates and declaring their opinion on their eligibility to run. The Guardian Council also has the right to interpret the Constitution and to determine the compatibility of laws passed by the Shura Council (Parliament) with the requirements of Islamic law, and it has the power of veto against those laws.

Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati has headed the Guardian Council since 1993, and has been a member of it since its founding in 1980, and is one of the jurists of the scientific seminary in Qom, and in addition to being a traditional reference for Shia Imams, he is also the Friday preacher in Tehran, a face of conservatives who support Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's line in order to preserve the survival and continuity of the velayat-e faqih regime in the face of the reformist current calling for the mitigation of the absolute dominance of the wali al-faqih. Observers believe that Ahmed Jannati has made the Guardian Council a fortress that controls and guards the regime's gaps, and a watchdog over laws and decisions, and his presidency has witnessed a severe crisis between the Guardian Council and the parliament. (12)

Iran's Guardian Council is a constitutional institution that exercises the role of constitutional courts in other countries to some extent, with varying composition and powers. (13)

According to Article 96 of the Constitution, the diagnosis of the non-conflict of the legislation of the Islamic Shura Council with Islamic rulings, falls on the shoulders of the jurists of the Guardian Council and must be approved by the majority of jurists to become law and the diagnosis of its non-conflict with the Constitution is the responsibility of all members of the Guardian Council (meaning jurists and lawyers) and must be approved by the vast majority of all members of the jurists and lawyers to become law. (14)

In the event that any law is rejected by the Guardian Council due to its conflict with Islamic governments or the Iranian Constitution, it will be returned back to the Islamic Shura Council for correction. If the Shura Council and the Guardian Council do not reach a solution to their dispute, the matter is delegated to the Expediency Council to make the final decision. (15)

Fourth, the Shura Council

A legislative institution, whose members are elected every four years in direct elections, do not enjoy immunity, while the constitution speaks of their right to expression without legal harassment. The Council's tasks include ratifying treaties, discussing and ratifying government action plans, as well as voting in favour of withdrawing confidence or granting them to governments.

The 290 members of the Shura Council are elected by direct ballot every four years. The constitution stipulates that the members of the council must be Muslims of deep Islam. However, religious minorities are represented in the Shura Council according to their numerical density, with one representative of the Zoroastrian, Jewish and Assyrian Christian religions, while the number of representatives of Armenian Christians has become two due to the increase in their population.

The first council was elected after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1980, and its re-election continued every 4 years.There is no legal immunity from the judiciary for the members of the Council except what is excluded in Article (89) of the Constitution in terms of the freedom of the deputy to express his opinion on every issue raised in the Council without being subjected to legal accountability from the judiciary or any other party.

According to Article 58 of the Iranian Constitution, legislative power shall be exercised through the Islamic Consultative Assembly, which shall be composed of deputies elected by the people, and the regulations ratified in the Assembly shall be communicated to the executive and judicial branches for implementation after passing through the stages set forth in subsequent articles.

Saying that this power may be exercised by holding a public referendum and referring to the views of the people immediately after the ratification of one third of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, on very important economic, political, social and cultural issues.

– Discuss the plans and agendas of the government for approval, and discuss any agenda submitted by at least 15 members.

– Discussion and accountability in all national affairs.

– Ratification of all treaties, protocols, contracts and conventions.

– Making minor changes in the country's border line provided that national interests are considered and four-fifths of the members agree.

– Approve or reject the government's request to declare emergency provisions for a period not exceeding 30 days.

– Vote on granting or withdrawing confidence from ministers or any government employee, and vote on the withdrawal of confidence from the president, provided that the highest authority in the country decides on the matter. (16)

The powers of Parliament are to ratify treaties in their entirety, declare a state of emergency and withdraw confidence from ministers and the President. However, parliament has very limited powers to shape the country's foreign and security policies. It is under the control of the so-called "Guardian Council", which is empowered to consider laws passed by parliament to consider their compliance with the constitution and Islamic law, as well as to examine, approve or exclude applicants to parliament or even the presidency. (17)

خامسا؛ مجلس الخبراء “مجلس خبراء القيادة”

The Assembly of Experts was established in 1979, and Ayatollah Khomeini had proposed that it be formed to review the draft constitution for presentation in a public referendum. According to Article 107 of the 1979 Constitution, the Council elects the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, and according to Article 111 of the same Constitution, the Council has the right to depose him if it is proved that he is unable to perform his duties or loses a qualification for his selection. No constitutional amendment may be voted on in Parliament until a recommendation is made by the Assembly of Experts to that effect, and its recommendations and decisions bind all organs of the State.The first Assembly of Experts in 1979 was appointed from 70 members who reviewed the drafts of the Constitution and put it to a popular referendum on December 2, 1979.

In 1982, the Council of Experts rose to 83 because of the direct proportionality between Iran's population and the council's membership, and the Assembly of Experts now consists of 86 members, the majority of whom are not women, the majority of whom are clergy. Each of Iran's 28 provinces selects a representative in the Assembly of Experts, and if its population exceeds one million, it is entitled to elect an additional representative for every 500,000 people. They are elected by universal popular suffrage and meet in regular session each year, and the seat of the annual meetings of the Council of Experts is the city of Qom, but all meetings of the Council are held in the capital Tehran. The term of the Council of Experts is eight years.

Its members are not barred from holding various government positions.

According to the law establishing the Assembly of Experts of 1980, it is imperative that the member be sincere, honest and well-mannered, familiar with jurisprudence to know the conditions to be met to assume the position of Supreme Leader, possessing social and political skills, familiar with general conditions, and known for his loyalty to the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The council is dominated by conservatism and has been headed since 1990 by Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, Imam and Friday preacher in the holy city of Qom, a traditional authority close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He remained in office until his death in 2007, when he was succeeded by former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani until 2011, when Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi was elected to replace him. On March 5, 2013, the Council renewed the election of Kenny as President of the Council for a two-year term and is currently composed of 86 members elected by direct popular suffrage for a single eight-year term. (18)

Tehran's Assembly of Experts on 5/2016 elected hardline conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati to his presidency, Iranian television announced. These elections strengthen the position of Jannati, who also chairs the Guardian Council, which is tasked with overseeing elections and verifying that laws passed by parliament conform to the constitution and the teachings of Islam. Jannati's election suggests that conservatives largely dominate the new Assembly of Experts despite the defeats of Yazdi and Mesbah Yazdi, and Khamenei had asserted the same year that the Assembly of Experts should "remain a revolutionary council, thinking in a revolutionary way and moving in a revolutionary way. (19)

VI. Expediency Diagnostic Council

He is one of the arms of Iranian rule and its supreme advisory body, among his main tasks is to advise and advise the Supreme Leader of the Revolution in the event of an intractable problem related to the general policies of the state. The first appearance of the Expediency Diagnostic Council or Expediency Diagnostic Council was in 1984, four years after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War that lasted until 1988, when it was formed from the competent authorities to advise the then Khomeini leader. The codification of the Council was carried out in 1989 within the framework of the amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Iran, which necessitated the establishment of a specific definition of the Council through which it takes its legal image within the legal and political system in Iran.

This council is subordinate as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader, as stipulated in Article 110, Clause I, of the country's Constitution, which stipulates that the formulation of the general policies of the regime is the property of the Supreme Leader after consulting the Council, which means that the decisions of the latter are not binding on the Leader. It is true that the latter consults that advisory body, but it can take decisions different from those recommended by the Council. (20)

As for the consultative status of this complex, it is necessary to refer to article 110, paragraph VIII, which states that solving the problems of the system that have not been solved by normal methods is one of the functions of the leader, but it may entrust it to the complex, as the function of this complex involves offering assistance and opinion with its experience to the leader. As well as determining the general policies of the regime and the task of presenting strategies and solutions to the problems of the system and supervising the progress of those policies are all the primary responsibilities of the leader and the complex has nothing to do with making decisions in this way but is only an advisory body, but on the other hand, the last paragraph of article 110 of the Constitution also indicates that the leader can delegate a person or entity (the Expediency of the System Diagnostic Council) to follow up part of his powers. It should be noted on this issue of delegation and the rules related to it, that the delegation of authority, especially strategic powers such as the task of determining public policies and solving problems facing the system, has general legal rules as follows:

1- The delegation of authority here does not take away the authority and powers of the primary delegate as the authority remains with the leader as well.

2- The delegation of authority does not take away the responsibilities of the delegate before the higher political institutions, especially the Council of Experts and others, since the delegation of authority to the Assembly for the Diagnosis of Interest does not exempt him from accountability to the people and the Council of Experts.

3- Also, delegation of authority does not mean taking the decision in all fields, as the commissioner's completion of all the powers of the commissioner does not mean the end of the role of the leader - as if all his rights were taken away from him - with evidence that the delegation involved carrying out part of the tasks entrusted to the leader - determining policies and solving dilemmas - and not all tasks.

4- According to public rights, the process of delegation and consultation comes at a later stage and in non-vital matters due to the negatives and dangers that may affect all areas in the event of the opposite, so that delegation in simple matters may be under the supervision and control of the commissioner and in his direct capacity, especially since the delegation of full powers, setting policies and solving problems is contrary to legal and customary rules. Determine the personality traits of who holds this political power. (21)

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei also issued a ruling in August 2017 appointing the Shia authority close to him, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, as head of the Expediency Council instead of its late president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the rest of the council for a five-year term.According to the official Iranian News Agency, the ruling text states, the Iranian leader recommended "changes in structure and content" in the Expediency Council, the most important of which are the following:

– Organizing the set of public policies and reviewing the titles and their consequences.

Organize the subject of supervision of the implementation of policies. –

Assess the effectiveness and impact of policies. –

Finding complete harmony in the construction of formation and management, and the concentration of programs on the basis of the established rules of procedure. –

Sifting through forms and deleting unnecessary sections. –

In addition, it is possible to find reform changes during the work and under the precise vision of the workers and the flexibility of the forms.

The ruling included the appointment of General Mohsen Rezaei, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, as the general secretary of the council, for another five years. (22)

Seventh: Supreme National Security Council of Iran

A council whose mission is to defend the interests of the country and its territorial integrity as well as its revolution, chaired by the President of the Republic, and includes the membership of senior military, political and judicial leaders. According to Article 176 of the Iranian Constitution, the President of the Republic leads the Council, which was established in 1989 for the purpose of securing national interests and guarding the revolution, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

Functions: The Council, constitutionally called the Supreme National Security Council, is responsible for achieving security and independence for the country, and its decisions are mandatory and effective after being ratified by the Supreme Guide.

The Supreme National Security Council is competent to determine the country's defense and security policies within the framework of the general policies determined by the Supreme Leader of the Republic, and coordinates political, security, social, cultural and economic activities related to security and defense plans. The Council works to take advantage of the material and moral potential of the country to confront internal and external threats. The Council is composed of the heads of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, the Chief of Staff of the General Command of the Armed Forces, the Planning and Budget Officer, as well as two delegates appointed by the Guide, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Security and the Supreme Officials of the Revolutionary Guards and the Army. The National Security Council appoints sub-councils such as the Defence Council and the National Security Council, with the President of the Republic leading them or appointing those on his behalf. (23)

The philosophy of the structure and complexities of the Iranian regime came to preserve the complex structure between the state and the revolution, so we observe through the Iranian political movement there is a competition between the conservative current, which seeks to preserve the vision adopted by the revolution at the expense of the state, and between the reformist orientation that seeks to reduce the exaggeration of the revolution on the state despite being from the same political system. Politicians on both sides did not know that the street might move to protest against this system together and might work to overthrow the state and the revolution in this framework to a state with a system consistent with the new international order because it achieves for the Iranian street what they aspire to in terms of calm, stability and decent living like human beings.

The second section

Popular protests in Iran

Dr. Zaid Abdel Wahab

The history of protest movements in modern-day Iran stretches back to the late nineteenth century, when hardly a decade passes in this country without periodic protest movements and popular uprisings, prompting a mass clash with the government. These protests or uprisings are often based on backgrounds related to economic backgrounds and demanding motives related to high prices and social problems, or major economic issues such as the nationalization of oil in 1952, or the review of land ownership as happened in the so-called "White Revolution" in 1963.

The 1999 protests arose for political reasons related to the freedoms of the "press and assemblies", while the 2009 protests were launched for political reasons related to electoral fraud, and on both occasions the impact of Iran's regional interventions on the demonstrations was not highlighted, they were dissolved for living and economic reasons and then turned into political demands against the regime of velayat-e faqih itself1.

The repetition of protest phenomena can be understood in the context of the history of the authoritarian state in Iran based on a complex dual system of composition in favor of the head of the regime and the achievement of the export of its revolution as explained in the first section on the one hand, and the Iranians' non-acceptance of this phenomenon and resistance on the other. There are rarely protests in which there have been no fatalities regardless of the government in power in Iran.

Drivers of Popular Protests in Iran

In the last days of 2017, Iran witnessed protest demonstrations that began in the city of Mashhad, when demonstrators demanded the return of money lost in fake projects or financial companies that might revive the economic situation after the nuclear deal. Protests soon escalated to a number of cities, including the capital Tehran.

These protests were characterized by their economic nature with the participation of sectors of the poor groups, and despite the relatively small number of participants, they took a regional and international media response, and the escalation of the ceiling of their demands from economic reforms to demands for the overthrow of the regime at times and constitutional reforms at other times, and revealed the severity of divisions in the nature of the political system, which seemed confused in its statements and political positions towards the wave of popular protests.

Protesters began to spectacle chants of death to Rouhani and death to the dictator, and soon things developed and death to the dictator and death to Khamenei became the first chant throughout Iran. From other chants we can refer to the Agha (Khamenei) working like a Lord and the Ummah begging, you used Islam as a peace to humiliate the nation, the economic spoiler must be executed, be ashamed clerics, the haramiya steals and the government supports, the release of the political prisoner, let's leave Syria and Lebanon, think about our situation, neither for reformists nor for fundamentalists, Mubarak, Ben Ali, your role, Mr. Ali, death to Hezbollah, death to the Islamic Republic, bread, work, freedom, independence, freedom, Iranian Republic, we are Arion, we do not worship Arabs, Reza Shah on you rest and peace, Iran Without the Shah she has no account and no book.

Interestingly, the popular uprising went beyond the reformist-fundamentalist dichotomy in its slogans, targeting the entire two ruling wings, and some even targeting the entire regime, namely the death chant of the Islamic Republic, which was chanted by the masses in Qom, the spiritual capital of the Islamic regime. We also heard chants praising the symbols of the defunct monarchy, including Shah Reza Pahlavi, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Most dangerous of all is the slogan We Are Aryon to worship the Arabs, which includes a racist anti-Arab psyche and disgusts the Azerbaijani Arabs and Turks, who do not consider themselves to be of the Aryan race as well as the masses of non-Persian peoples. Royal and racist chants have negatively affected the participation of these peoples with all their weight in the uprising.

Economic Drivers

There is no doubt that the economic conditions play the biggest role in these protests, the economy is the pulse of the Iranian street, especially the working class, which does not see an improvement in its living reality, and the young job seekers who do not find many job opportunities in front of them, so workers and youth are the most participating people in the demonstrations.

Since 2016, Iran has seen 1,700 social protests, according to the Fedayeen al-Thawra Association, a conservative party of which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was a founding member. Over the course of 2017, workers, retirees, professors and students staged hundreds of protests. Labor protests continued over non-payment of wages, neoliberal economic policies, and resistance to the organization of trade union work, but were severely suppressed by security forces and punished through a series of arbitrary dismissals2.

The ongoing social misery and the authoritarian and repressive nature of the political system formed the dual and interconnected essence of a regime that monopolized economic and political forces. Today, about half of the Iranian population lives next to the poverty line above the official minimum wage, which in itself explains a lot. Officially, unemployment generally stands at 12.5 percent and rises to 25 percent among young people. But in reality the actual numbers are supposed to be much higher. It was precisely this twentieth generation of poor youth who led the revolution. It is estimated that 40 percent of young people are unemployed.

The non-governmental organization "Burgen", which deals with the fight against poverty around the world, revealed in a statistic last September, that the increase in poverty in Iran has reached record levels in light of the prevalence of government corruption and the dominance of the ruling junta over the wealth of the country.

Iran's GNP has fallen according to a U.S. think tank from $700 billion to $380 billion over the past years. Iran's semi-official Tasnim news agency, quoting the International Monetary Fund, confirmed this: The IMF reported a decline in gross national product during the first period of Hassan Rouhani's government by $268 billion, and this decline may continue in the current Iranian year (March 21, 2017 – March 20, 2018) by another $8 billion compared to last year.

A number of important events in 2017 brought popular disillusionment with the regime as a whole to a new level. In May, after a devastating mine explosion in northern Iran, miners poured their anger on President Rouhani, with angry workers attacking his armored car when he tried to visit the blast site. In mid-November, the earthquakes that shook the country showed all Iranians the severity of the regime's neglect of their most vital needs, from social housing built in corrupt conditions during Ahmadinejad's tenure that collapsed abruptly, burying countless people under the rubble of their homes to the reluctance of the Rouhani administration to provide assistance to victims, leaving many in the open prey to the cold.

The first calls for protest began since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani introduced the draft budget in mid-December, which showed that a large part of it was spent on the Revolutionary Guards and religious institutions linked to the Supreme Leader, and did not care about the deteriorating living situation, the wave of high prices and high prices, which explains the protesters' slogan "Death to Rouhani, death to Khamenei."

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei oversees about 50 percent of Iran's economy and is outside the framework of government supervision, including the institution of the vulnerable, the Razavi threshold (and its revenues from vows, institutions and companies affiliated with the Razavi shrine affiliated with the administration of the shrine of Imam Reza, the eighth imam of the Shiites buried in the city of Mashhad), the revenues of other shrines, shrines and religious shrines, as well as what is described as the office of implementation of Imam Khomeini's Farman (Procedural Stadium Farman Imam) and oversees funds and companies affiliated with the Supreme Leader active in the Banking, Finance, Oil, Communications, Livestock Farming and Pharmaceutical Production

The 2018 budget showed in part the burden that the Rouhani government will impose on the citizen, foremost among which is the rise in prices such as gasoline, which rose by 50%, diesel by 33%, and the lifting of monetary subsidies by 34 million Iranians to address the budget deficit. It is worth mentioning that the number of Iranians living in absolute poverty ranges between 10 and 12 million, or about 15% of the people, and if subsidies are lifted, the number of poor Iranians in Iran is expected to reach 54 million Iranians, or more than 67% of the people, so unemployment levels have tended to increase even after the implementation of the nuclear agreement in 2016, especially in the university category3

The largest Iranian companies and economic institutions declared bankruptcy and failure to manage their projects and the loss of all their funds and investments, which led to the loss of the funds of thousands of investors and the dismissal of 27,000 people from work, which increased the economic suffering of the Iranian peoples, the deterioration of their economic conditions and the spread of unemployment4.

Various Iranians, including the wings of the ruling regime, agree on the difficulty of the situation of the Iranian economy, which suffers from the spread of corruption, bribery and nepotism, and the waste of money in spending it on militias, the media system and institutions for the dissemination of Shiism in the world, in addition to the control of the Revolutionary Guards over many economic fields that have harmed the economy and investors, and then an implicit acknowledgement of the failure of the theory of the resistance economy, where the Iranian economy suffers from sanctions imposed on it for years. Talk of it has occupied the most prominent attention during the propaganda campaigns in the presidential elections, and its improvement was the main objective behind the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany), President Hassan Rouhani acknowledges the prevalence of corruption, and induces the Revolutionary Guards' acquisition of economic and service projects5.

There are no official sources on the amount of money spent by the Iranian government on militias in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, nor on the cost of spending on Shia publishing institutions and the empire of media channels, but it is certainly huge amounts that have cost the Iranian economy, and may not be less than a billion dollars a month, other than those related to Syria, which is estimated at tens of billions since its intervention, according to the Italian newspaper (La Stampa), noting that Iran reaps financially from its influence in Iraq.

There is a consensus that economic decline is the main reason behind the recent protests, and that this factor is linked to the outcome of the nuclear deal Iran signed with the major powers (P5+1) in the summer of 2015. With the signing of the nuclear deal, expectations have risen and Iran has been optimistic that the economic situation will improve. Before that, from the Nejad stage, financial institutions began to make promises and offer temptations to encourage citizens to invest their money in projects they supervise. Some of these institutions appear to have been fictitious and intended to exploit citizens' dreams of quick profits. On the other hand, in the face of delays in implementing the lifting of sanctions linked to the nuclear deal, and the obstacles put in place by the Trump administration, the financial sector in Iran has been affected, and this effect seems to have spread to companies and institutions that have become unable to return the funds of depositors who demanded their recovery. With the government failing to play a role to protect citizens and refusing to compensate for the bulk of the loss, those depositors were outraged and it was the spark that drove the demonstrators out in the city of Mashhad.

Political Drivers

The security system and the complex policy of Wali al-Faqih were the drivers of demonstrations in Iran, and the first section revealed the duality of the regime through its deep institutions how it protects itself from any loophole that may occur in the event of a vacancy or rebellion of a president or parliament against the orientations of the Supreme Leader, and how it established a security system independent of the official military institution whose primary concern is to protect the Supreme Leader and his narrow political circles, and to manage the principle of exporting the Iranian Revolution through many arms he invented in the region. The Iranian people, having tasted this complex regime that refuses to reform itself, and raised slogans that may be historic in which they demand a general popular vote in the form of the political system, revolted in an attempt to remove the political, security and economic power of the Supreme Leader from the decision in the country.

For years, the regime's wings, with their conservative and reformist currents, and those that are subordinate to them, have been living through numerous struggles over the tools of power and wealth, the most severe of which is the succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who insisted despite his ill health to visit the earthquake-hit areas of Kermanshah province on November 12, 2017, in reference to his adherence to his position.

Iran has witnessed public conflicts between the heads of the regime's three authorities, especially between the judiciary and the executive; the head of the judiciary, Sadeq Larijani, and his brother Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Shura Council, i.e. the parliament, who are considered close to the Iranian leader, and arrests of relatives of political figures on corruption charges, involving the brother of President Hassan Rouhani and relatives of the late President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who hinted that his death was not natural, in an indirect accusation of the authorities, which feared that he would be the most fortunate to succeed the Supreme Leader, the same motives that She is believed to be behind the targeting of President Hassan Rouhani, and had a presence during the presidential election, where conservatives pushed Ebrahim Raisi to win the presidency and repeat Khamenei's succession to the founding leader.

The victory of reformist President Hassan Rouhani created a gap between the institutions of the Iranian regime, which surfaced with his re-election for a second term, especially since President Rouhani adopted a policy of openness to the outside, especially Western countries, a policy that contributed to the signing of the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 and Iran's economic openness to foreign investments, especially in the sectors of infrastructure and oil investments, which are two areas dominated economically by the Revolutionary Guards. Signs of this conflict, especially from the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards, have appeared more than once, not least the objection to the appointment of some officials and ministers, and the disagreement over the missile and nuclear program, its economic consequences and its impact on economic property and the economic investments of the Supreme Leader and Guard Foundation6.

Iran has intensified its regional interventions, becoming a major player on more than one scene, most notably the Iraqi arena, the Syrian arena, the right square, next to the Lebanese arena, and other external activities, under high revolutionary slogans that have become criticized at home the most accepted, especially since the Iranian budget has borne exorbitant amounts as a result of these interventions, and in turn deprived the Iranian citizen of the proceeds of the lifting of sanctions and funds frozen in the country. Abroad, which was released under the nuclear deal.

Voices have risen against Iran's foreign practices in sending militias and supporting their intervention in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, as a result of the human and material cost of the intervention on the Iranian economy, despite the approval of the majority of Persian elites on foreign policy, but demand its rationalization, while the public and other ethnicities oppose it7.

Many Iranian opposition movements of various Sunni and secular orientations live outside Iran, as a result of the repressive behavior of the regime and the objectives of the opposition abroad to change the regime and its limited influence inside Iran, but they have strong media and some of these movements receive material support from countries hostile to the Iranian regime, the most famous of which is the People's Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, which in recent years has been able to organize large conferences in the French capital demanding the fall of the regime and has been attended by many Western and Arab political leaders, including the head of Saudi intelligence. Former Prince Turki al-Faisal, she has actively covered and incited protests.

Ethnic and social drivers

Iran is a country like others that suffers from a great diversity of nationalities that inhabit it; throughout Iran, different peoples have settled with diverse languages, customs, cultures, and values, as is the case for Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, as well as different sects. The basic composition of the Iranian people according to nationalities is as follows: Turkish nationalism by 24%, Kurdish nationalism by 7%, Arab nationalism by 3%, and Baloch nationalism by 2%. As is clear, these nationalities differ among themselves in language, culture and doctrine, which the State must take into account, especially with the increasing population of these nationalities8.

In most cases, multi-ethnicity is the source of the richness of societies and a key component of the power of states, socially, economically, and politically. But there are cases of deviation from the norm, in which heterogeneous pluralism becomes a source of curse, especially if it is accompanied by an extended geographical distribution and a system of government that does not recognize the rights of ethnicities, nationalities and areas far from the center.

Among these cases stands out the social and geographical map of Iran, which has made most of its nationalities and internal components "enemies". A careful look at Iran's complex component will show that behind the Iranian regime's attempts to portray the country as a disparate fabric of ethnic groups and their different geographical distribution lies a mosaic of nationalities, ethnicities and peoples that, in parallel with the geographical specificity of the region, place Iran in the eye of the storm.

Four decades after the revolution in 1978, changes in the balances of social elites to the detriment of religious authorities that have taken over the joints of economics and politics, and whose families have become obscenely rich, in exchange for the widening circle of poverty among the peoples of Iran have caused much frustration and repressed conflict, so the protests were not limited to the poor only, or a specific geographical area, but included various regions and ethnicities, and the middle class, some of which lost social advantage, and money in housing projects, bank shares, and companies that I went bankrupt.

The protests, with their slogans that touched the Supreme Leader and burned his images, were able to bring down the sanctity of the Velayat-e Faqih regime, and express the state of disapproval of the model of the Iranian (theocratic) regime, and its desire for a democratic system. The change in the culture and aspirations of the present generation from that of the revolutionary generation may have doubled the diminished legitimacy of the regime's policy, especially with regard to its management of internal affairs.

The ideology of governance in Iran is no longer as inspiring the broad popular bases as it was in the Khomeini era, but the current regime now depends on it and imposes it by force of law and weapons, Khamenei is not Khomeini with his charisma, jurisprudence and popularity, nor has that ideology achieved the hopes and promises that were attached to it, in addition to the voices of references contrary to the idea of velayat-e faqih by reading Khomeinist have risen from Qom inside Iran, in addition to the fact that the project of this theory lost its popular legitimacy in Its regional surroundings because of the negative role played by Iran in the region, the responsibility for spreading chaos and instability and the destruction of states, and the actual lack of humanitarian and moral consciousness, rather than its resistance and the lack of ground for its application outside Iran9.

External motors

Despite Iran's success in concluding the nuclear agreement with the P5+1, which gave it an opportunity to open new relations with neighboring countries and the world and engage in normal relations with all parties of the international community, the Iranian regime, as a result of its need to export an external crisis to address its internal predicament, did not adhere to the spirit of the agreement and create a positive atmosphere for understanding and engagement, and then continued to complete the ballistic missile program, and did not abandon its hostility to neighboring countries or to the United States and its allies, and nevertheless expanded. The scope of its regional interventions has contributed to the escalation of instability in the region, rather than practicing terrorism and supporting militias and armed groups, and this policy of the Iranian regime has been prevented from reaping the fruits of the agreement. It became clear that Obama's bet on absorbing and integrating Iran had failed, and Trump came to restore the situation to what it was before the agreement, and to deny Iran the opportunity to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the agreement on the political and economic aspects10.

The legitimacy of the Iranian regime has declined considerably, and it has been unable to benefit from the atmosphere of openness that followed the nuclear agreement, and from the economic savings that were made available to it, but on the contrary there appeared to be signs of conflict between its wings over economic interests, preferably intensifying regional interventions, not paying attention to the deteriorating internal conditions, nor paying attention to achieving development and improving the living conditions of citizens, and the December 2017 protests were a reflection of those conditions11.

The most prominent American position was among the international positions in support of the right of protesters to demonstrate, and the American has adopted the demands of the demonstrators, and vowed to impose new sanctions on the Iranian regime in response to the repression of protesters, and the American position has reflected negatively on the momentum of the protests, and has been in the interest of the regime. The State Department called on the countries of the world to support the Iranian people in their demand for their fundamental rights and an end to corruption, and the ministry's spokeswoman, Heather Nauert, said in a statement: "Iranian leaders have turned a prosperous country with a rich history and culture into a rogue state that mainly exports violence, bloodshed and chaos."

US President Donald Trump has said it is "time for change" and expressed his belief that the Iranian people are "hungry" and looking for freedom. "There are many reports of peaceful protests by Iranian citizens who are tired of the regime's corruption and waste of the nation's wealth in order to finance terrorism abroad," he wrote on his Twitter account, adding: "The Iranian government should respect the rights of its people, including the right to express themselves. The world is watching."

On the other hand, the Russian position came in contrast to the American position, if the Russian Foreign Ministry announced its position by saying that "external intervention to provoke instability in Iran is unacceptable," while surprising the positions of European countries that remained silent about the events in Iran.

Britain described the demands made by protesters in Iran as legitimate and important, called on the Iranian authorities for a "serious discussion" about them, and Boris Johnson, Britain's foreign secretary, said his country was "watching events in Iran closely".

As for the position of the European Union, it was made clear by the statements of the spokeswoman for the European Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini, saying, "We have followed the demonstrations carried out by Iranian citizens and we will continue to monitor developments." British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson also lamented the loss of life caused by the protests in Iran and appealed for the need to respect international human rights obligations12.

As for the Arab world, with the exception of the statement of the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash that "the protests witnessed in Iran are an opportunity to prevail over the interest of the interior and bring about development in Iran," a state of caution continues to dominate official positions.

The protests hit the mental image with which the Iranian regime was keen to present itself as a stable and strong model in a volatile region, the regime possesses the permanence of survival and the potential for influence in the region, and the specificity of its political system (velayat-e faqih), which is under its banner a quarter of a billion Shiites in the world, enabling it to play a central role at the regional and international levels.

A conclusion can be drawn about the scene of the protests as follows:

The 2017 protests came about due to living and economic conditions, and then turned into political demands against the velayat-e faqih regime itself.

These protests clearly demonstrated the protesters' awareness of the impact of Iranian interference in the Arab region.

– The protest movement does not have sectarian and political leaders and its slogan has exceeded the reformists and does not express any party or current in Iran, it is a spontaneous popular movement, and then turned into political demands against the regime of velayat-e faqih itself.

These protests are the most widespread, and this reflects the widespread scale of popular anger and resentment of economic policies and awareness of the repercussions of regional interventions in Arab countries on living conditions.

The poor, lower, most needy and needy classes started the movement and later joined the other classes.

The Iranian political system is suffering from a real crisis not only for reasons related to the conflict between its wings and political blocs over power-sharing, but mainly for reasons related to the expansion of poverty, the deterioration of living conditions, the regime's failure to achieve development and improve the conditions of citizens even after the success of reaching the nuclear agreement, as well as the awareness of the simple Iranian citizen of the seriousness of the regime's foreign policies represented by its interventions and expansionist projects in the Arab countries, in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, which was crystallized in the protesters' slogan "No Gaza, no Gaza." Lebanon is the soul of Iran's redemption" and "Leave Syria and think about our situation," in a clear criticism of the Iranian government's focus and spending money on regional files and issues at the expense of improving the economic and living conditions of citizens.

For example, not only the reports of international organizations on economic conditions and corruption, but also the Iranian agencies themselves, official and unofficial in their latest reports, have pointed to the expansion of the umbrella of the poor class to include large numbers suffering from catastrophic economic conditions despite the lifting of international sanctions after the signing of the nuclear agreement, manifested in the growing phenomenon of tin housing, and the circulation by the Iranian media of images of Iranians living in graves and others filling their stomachs from street garbage, in addition to the expansion of the umbrella of those living below the poverty line. Extreme to range between 10 and 12 million Iranians, or about 15 percent of the population, and if subsidies are lifted, the number of poor people in Iran is expected to reach 54 million Iranians out of a total of 80 million citizens, or more than 67 percent of the people. Unemployment levels have also tended to increase even after the implementation of the nuclear deal in early 2016, especially among university groups, bank bankruptcy, and high rates of corruption.

It was not surprising during the current protests that the slogans of the demonstrators shed light on three main issues: the deterioration of the living conditions of citizens, the fall of the regime represented at the top of the political pyramid, Khamenei, and the rejection of the external role, which is the project issued by the regime to the people to cover up its internal failure, and then the awareness of the Iranian citizen of the seriousness of the repercussions of the Iranian expansionist project on the internal economic conditions is the most prominent result ever revealed by those ongoing protests, although there are other results, as Iran pushes Its militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen have billions of dollars to buy weapons and attract and train fighters to serve its expansionist project and historical dreams at the expense of the Iranian citizen.

Section III

Repercussions of Iran's Uprising on the Region

Dr. Omar Abdel Sattar

Introduction

When people's faith in the idea of velayat-e faqih dies, the cost of expanding the velayat-e faqih is costly, and the human strategic velayat-e faqih reservoir revolts against the poor classes, and these three come together, you can confirm that the days of velayat-e faqih are numbered.1

However, these three conditions have not yet been met to begin the countdown to Wilayat al-Faqih, although the treasury of the velayat-e faqih al-Faqih al-Humane exploded in anger at hunger, unemployment and its financing of wars in Arab countries, and Iranian citizens rose up in more than 79 of Iran's 97 cities.

From Mashhad, Iran's most important religious city, where the Tomb of Reza, the seventh Shia imam, and Khamenei's birthplace, the protests began and chanted the fall of Khamenei, to Qom and Khimin, where Khamenei's pictures were burned and people chanted, "Assassin of your regime is false", to Kerman, where demonstrators chanted "People live like beggars, and the leader behaves like God", to Khuzestan, where they chanted "Death to Khamenei", to Tehran if they said, neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my soul is Iran's ransom.

The message the protesters wanted to convey to the regime is that they are not interested in belonging to a regional superpower, that the cost of regime expansion is harmful and costly, and that they want a country that addresses their needs and does not suppress their freedoms. They want Iran to give up its dreams of reviving the ancient Persian Empire.2

The protests came at a time when the Lausanne nuclear deal failed to have positive repercussions on the Iranian citizen, while the Iranian regime has been fleeing abroad from its internal problems, from the Iraq-Iran war to the Syria war, in search of external legitimacy, for which billions of dollars are spent annually in support of the establishment of a Shiite crescent.

Although what happened in Iran since 28-12-2017, it is not worth describing the revolution against the regime of velayat-e faqih yet, especially after the regime's success in suppressing it, but its surprising context, may have expressed an explosion of the accumulation of division between society and the system of velayat-e faqih on the one hand, and the accumulated and continuous preparation of Iranian opposition movements at home and abroad on the other, and the availability of international and regional alliances preparing to face the influence and regime of Iran after the end of ISIS on the third hand, in addition to the firm convictions of the peoples of the region that ISIS is an Iranian influence game.

Observers have noted that the regime, may have set a trap for the expected protests, and managed them, or their first wave, and this may be supported by the fact that they started from Mashhad, Iran's most important religious center, and in the order of the conservative wing of the regime against Rouhani, and also supports it, that the regime did not face it harshly for the first time, and supports it thirdly, that the dual regime was able to do it later.

Or that the regime has been confused in the face of the people's revolt against it, and the confusion of the regime has manifested itself in its threats that have affected all the enemies of the Iranian regime, until it entered into the planning of the protests, the family of Saddam, Masoud Barzani, Saudi Arabia, America and Israel, despite admitting in a pragmatic step, that there is a problem that it must deal with.

The protests are unlikely to change who is in power, but they will provoke a change in the regime, led by the regime. Velayat-e Faqih has proven its skill in staying in power, and now realizes that it needs to adapt more carefully than ever.3

Alex Vatanka (senior fellow at the Middle East Institute) also says he expects that President Hassan Rouhani's political rivals may have sparked the protests, but the protests may also be spontaneous.

He said that the theory of the conflict of the regime's wings gains credibility, when one looks at the sudden end of the protests (as they began suddenly), which indicates the existence of a monitoring center for the protests that began in Mashhad and quickly spread to other cities in Iran.

Alex Fatenka adds that the protests may also be spontaneous, based on Iranians' anger over economic conditions, the doubling of the price of gasoline and the increase in the cost of basic commodities are all sources of popular discontent.

Vatanka noted that many of the demonstrators are part of a new generation of dissidents born in the nineties who care little about Iran's regional mission and "ideological adventures" and hope for political and economic change.

Alex Fatenka's description may mean that the protests do not deserve to be described as the revolution yet, because the revolution is a societal movement characterized by a continuous momentum accompanied by violence that leads to change or reform in the regime, especially after the regime was able to suppress its first wave, assuming that after the first wave other waves, but the time of any revolution remains open with violence, fear, hope and chaos until the change or reform of the system from within, the regime's suppression of the first wave and the supremacy of fear does not bring out events In Iran about describing the revolution, and not proving it.

The definition of a revolution is the removal by the oppressed (overwhelming) majority of the ruling minority and the control of force accompanied by violence on the other hand, chaos, blood, progress, delay, hope, fear, open time and negotiations, until the desired change in the regime and its existing security, political, economic and social system occurs after a long suffering.

1. The feeling of the oppressed majority of the exploitation, control, tyranny and injustice of the ruling minority

2. Formation and creation of organized work capable of bringing about the desired change

3. Agree on an alternative after the collapse of the regime before the collapse of the regime

Did the events result in the completion of the first phase and moved to the second stage of the revolution? Will the chants of the peoples of Iran against Iran's interference in the Arab countries have repercussions? Will the protests lead to a change in the regime's behavior? And can Iran's strong financial and military support for its militias in the region be shifted inwards?

The answer to these questions may result in the coming events, especially after an Iranian opposition movement appeared to be trying to bring together the various elites of Iranian nationalities on joint action, after the regime was able to suppress the protests.

Repercussions of the uprising on Iran's nuclear and missile file

Whether the uprising was a trap made by the regime or vice versa, its international repercussions were more prominent than its regional repercussions, and the regional repercussions were clearer than the local ones. The regime believes that internal rebellion is more dangerous to the regime than any external challenges or pressures.

Since 1979, Velayat-e Faqih has been keen on the stability of Iran and the transfer of instability abroad, but for the scene to turn upside down, and the outside to approach stability, and the instability to move inward with the uprising of the peoples of Iran, demanding Iran's exit from the era of 1979, is the straw that may detract from the appearance of Velayat-e Faqih.

Iran's return to the UN Security Council, for the first time since 2015, is one of the first and fastest repercussions of the Iranian protests. The 120-day deadline for modifying or withdrawing from nuclear weapons may be one of the most important international repercussions of these protests.

Two weeks after the uprising, US Vice President Mike Pence said that America will not be silent this time, and US Secretary of State Tic Tillerson added that they are arranging a peaceful transition, and a statement to the State Department, said that they are considering forming an international coalition against the Iranian regime.

After Khamenei threatened America that it would pay for the losses it inflicted on Iran during the protests, Rouhani arrived in Brussels, met Mogherini, the EU's foreign policy commissioner, and then Trump announced the punishment of 40 Iranian figures, headed by the head of Iran's judiciary, and gave the European Union a deadline of 120 days to amend the nuclear program.

Tehran and European ministers will later arrive to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear modification and the missile file, and Brussels has also arrived with a US diplomatic delegation for the same purpose, in addition to Iran's destabilizing activities in the region.

The indirect negotiation between America and Iran through the European Union is an important fallout from the repercussions of the Iranian protests on the Iranian nuclear file on the one hand, and on the other hand may cause oil to be poured on the fire of Iranian protests, as the European Union countries seem reluctant to make any new trade investments with Iran because of the American position on the Lausanne nuclear agreement, which is the same reason that sparked the recent protests.

Under indirect negotiations between Iran and America through the European Union, the international community will wait for Iran to change its behavior, sign an international agreement, give up its destabilization, or flee forward again as it did in 2005, when Hariri was killed, Samarra exploded, Hamas seized Gaza and ignited the July 2006 war.

Something happened to the regime that it may not be able to address, after it had escaped from it in 2005, especially since the position of Iran and America in 2018 has been completely different from 2005, Iran is on the defensive in 2018, after it was in 2005 in a position to attack, and America today is in a position to attack in 2018, after it was in 2005, in a defensive position.

America, France and Britain have shared in the Security Council the roles in increasing the internal rift, America has talked about the regime's terrorism of its people, France has talked about the need to abandon ballistic missiles and Britain talks about the need to abandon its arms / and gave an example in the Houthis.

In the Iranian protests, the Iranian protests force the regime to sign a modified nuclear agreement, or at least on the ballistic missile file, but without guaranteeing perhaps that America will not target its regime and its regional system, but to ensure that America does not exit potentially from nuclear.

The Repercussions of Iran's Uprising on Iran's Arms in the Region

Iran's axis or arms is part of Iran's dual regime, specifically an integral part of the no-state system (the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards) that governs the state of Iran. The repercussions of the Iranian protests on Iran's arm are part of the repercussions of the protests on the regime itself.

Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran's Quds Force, a reconnaissance unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) division, is on the front lines across the Arab world, Ali Khamenei has spoken of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq as part of Iran's defense, and his close adviser Ali Kabir Velayati in Lebanon announced last November that Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon fall within the framework of the Iranian-led zone of resistance.4

The message of Iran's protests to the arms of its dual regime is that the Velayat-e Faqih regime, which leaves half of its people below the poverty line and provides you with its money, kills us twice, once by robbing us of our money, and another by holding us responsible for its international terrorism.

The leaders of Iran's proxies were silent about the revolt of Iran's peoples, until the regime was able to suppress the protests. And that may be the case, that any statement they may make may be considered a play with fire. Their support for the regime could further ignite Iran's revolution, shouting "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon is a spiritual ransom for Iran," and it could put the leaders of Iran's arms on the other hand in the barrel of an international and regional cannon. Will Iran's protests have repercussions on Iran's arm?

Ariane M. Tabatabay, a curriculum director and visitor assistant professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Affairs in the Security Studies Program and a fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center at Harvard Kennedy School, says America and its allies want the protests to lead to a radical shift in Iranian politics, but it is unlikely that the Iranian government will change course.

Tabatay adds that Iran's relations with terrorist groups and other non-state actors in its neighborhood are not just an ideological or even economic issue, but about security from revolutionary doctrine, which is why decades of sanctions and isolation have not reduced Iran's support for nongovernmental groups.5

But Daniel Bayman, a senior fellow in foreign policy, the center for Middle East policy, says that even if protesters in Iran fail to topple the regime, the United States and its allies must admit that Iran has few friends, and the United States can work to get rid of Iran's few allies.

Although Iran has strengthened ties with Russia, cooperation is limited, and Iran has been frustrated with Russia's approach once again to arms sales, which have often been disrupted in response to U.S. pressure.

Bayman's biggest problems stem from the dual regime, and the Supreme Leader exercises veto power over Iranian decision-making, heading the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the judicial system, and state television.

An Iraqi journalist named Amer Ibrahim even told Al-Monitor, "It is only natural that the escalation of protests in Iran weakens the argument of the pro-Iranian camp in promoting the model of velayat-e faqih in Iraq, which is portrayed as a divine and bright example."

These weaknesses will reduce Iran's influence, encourage infighting, make it harder for the regime to increase its influence abroad, and may also cause additional internal unrest if not managed properly.6

Repercussions of the Uprising on Iraq

For more than one reason, Iraq is perhaps one of Iran's most important lines of defense for its regime outside Iran. Hence, Iran has become the influential player in Iraq, making it a battlefield where it fights outside its territory to escape its problems with its peoples, a platform for reaching the Mediterranean, and a negotiating card with the international community about its influence in the region.

A militarily strong Iraq is a real threat to Iran, an economically strong Iraq is a rival to Iran and a politically strong Iraq is a geopolitical obstacle to Iran's ambition in the region.

Therefore, Iran made sure that Iraq was weak and dominated by the chaos of non-state factors, and a loyal government achieved communication with Damascus and Beirut, thus establishing a Shiite crescent that King Abdullah II had warned against since 2004.

Apart from the government and its loyalist parties in Iraq, there are more than 55 militias affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards. The Voltaire Center says that the Iranian protests may threaten to change Iran's strategy, either by supporting its proxies in the region or vice versa.

Observers have confirmed that Iran's demonstrations could threaten US interests and bases in Iraq.

But U.S. Secretary of State Tech Tillerson said at a symposium at Stanford University in January 2018 that Iran's ambition for a Shiite crescent had faded.

For the first time since 2005, the Shia House has been dominated by unprecedented political fragmentation, represented by the absence of the Dawa Party from the political conflict, the reversal of the Hashd's alliance with Abadi, and the division of the Shiites into four sections.

Today, there is a fundamental difference between the alliances of the 201 elections, and what preceded them since 2005, which is that the previous alliances were dominated by a Shiite and Kurdish trench, offset by Sunni fragmentation.The alliances of 2018 were characterized by the end of the trenching, the sovereignty of Shiite fragmentation, and this may mean breaking Iran's monopoly on Iraqi political decision for the first time since 2005, and this may be one of the repercussions of Iran's events on the proxies of the Iranian regime in Iraq.

The inability of the Dawa Party to lead the Shiite house, and the reversal of the Hashd alliance: Abadi may be considered in international relations an irrational and unexpected crisis.The irrational crisis may reflect the instability of the ruling regime on the one hand, and may lead to rationalization of the political scene with rational choices resorted to by the actors. The unexpected crisis also proves that the unconstitutional form of governance in Iraq is no longer valid and must be reformulated.

Repercussions of Iran's Uprising on the Bashar and Hezbollah Regimes

Before the Iranian website Tabanak launched its harsh attack on Russia, accusing it of deceiving Iran, and talking about the possibility of Iran signing an agreement with the West because of their disappointment with the Russians, the Hmeymim base had been subjected to an unprecedented attack by a number of drones that took off from an area near Hmeymim controlled by the regime and were most likely launched by Iranian militias, and MiGs and Sakhoifi planes blew up the territory of the base.

Coinciding with this potential rift between Russia and Iran in Syria, Tillerson's aide Satterfield, was addressed to the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee, and Tillerson's speech at Stanford University, who confirmed the existence of a kind of American-Russian harmony, reinforced by 30,000 fighters and a joint coordination center between the SDF and the Iraqi Army to protect the Iraqi-Syrian border.

This comes amid an indirect: Iranian: American: Iranian negotiation to abandon the Shiite crescent, a term first coined by Abdullah II in the Washington Post, when he visited America in December 2004, in which he feared an Iran-affiliated government in Baghdad cooperating with Bashar to create a Shiite crescent, which was, and then repeated by the Jordanian king in April 2017, also in the Washington Post. But it seems that the end of ISIS, which coincided with the events in Iran, prompted Tillerson at Stanford K2:2018, to declare, saying that Iran's ambition for a Shiite crescent has faded.

Repercussions of the Uprising on Lebanon

The most expensive investment of the Iranian regime is in Hezbollah, and the cost of maintaining its militias, channels and networks is 800 million to one billion dollars a year, and as long as Iran has money, Hezbollah has money, Nasrallah says, but what if there is no more money in Iran?

Hezbollah will lose its role if the flow of Iranian criticism to it dries up, and Iran's protests preceded protests like them in southern Beirut by a few weeks, and demonstrators chanted against Nasrallah and protested the party's corruption and participation in the war in Syria, and in the current climate, the orchestra of the political scene in Lebanon may turn to a different tone, says Bassam Ajmi.7

There are many indications in Beirut that Hezbollah is eager to limit sectarian escalation in its favor, whether with the popular Arab environment, with Islamist movements or with some Arab regimes, and this measure will not be far from its association with Iran and the developments in the situation in it and will only be possible by changing its position in Syria.8

Repercussions of the uprising on the Shiites of the region

Just as the repercussions of the uprising on Iran's arms and proxies are the region's Shiites, its repercussions on the region's patriotic Shiites may resemble those on Iran's rebellious peoples.

This could mean that isolating Iran from the region's Shiites, and the possibility that the region's Shiites will carry out an uprising of Iran's proxies in the region, such as the uprising of Iran's peoples against the Iranian regime, is one of the most important possible repercussions of the protests of the peoples of Iran against the regime.

Just as the end of ISIS may reveal the Iranian regime's deception in combating terrorism on the one hand, and the fact that the Iranian regime is the world's number one sponsor of terrorism on the other, isolating the Iranian regime from the region's Shiites may be the second episode in the series of besieging the Iranian regime in the region.

The uprising of the region's Shiites against Iran's proxies may help the international coalition to be formed against Iran's militias in the region, and not harm the Iranian regime, after the uprising of the peoples of Iran, from the uprising of the region's Shiites against its proxies.

Repercussions of the Uprising on the Gulf Cooperation Council

Charles W. Dunn (a non-resident analyst, at the Arab Center Washington, D.C.) says the Gulf states are largely pleased with the Iranian opposition.

Charles added that it gives them the opportunity to gain a strategic advantage over Iran, as domestic pressures, they hope, will push the government to shift inward and limit its regional intervention, and in doing so Charles hints that the Iranian protests will have repercussions on outside Iran and not just inside it.

Gulf governments have remained formally calm on the protests to avoid any blame on Iran and avoid feeling that they support the demand for civil liberties, which could spark domestic protest. Charles concluded that "while Iran's turmoil has raised some — some hope and some concern — in the Gulf, appears to be another stage in a long-running conflict between the GCC and Iran.

Kenneth Katzman, a senior analyst at the Congressional Research Service, comes close to calling the protests a revolution, and talks about their local, regional, and international dimensions: The protests have shattered the idea that Iran can maintain multiple fronts as a regional superpower. Iranians no longer care about Iran's regional message, he said, but instead focus on long-term economic well-being.

"Poor Iranians are angry that their subsidies are falling," adds Kenneth Katzman, especially as they see the money going to support the Fatemiyoun Brigades, a fighting force of Afghan Shiites deployed in Syria to keep Bashar al-Assad in power. This resentment has made Iran weak on the international stage.

Moreover, Katzman points to the international dimension of the protests: "Iran's problems have undermined President Trump's dispute over Iran's system and U.S. national security; if Iran explodes on its own, it does not pose a major threat to the United States," Katzman said. Katzman said a weak and threatened Iran could pave the way for long-term negotiations on various issues, such as Syria and Yemen.9

Mark Fitzpatrick, executive director of the Americas office at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said in response to Iranian officials' accusation that Saudi Arabia, the United States and Britain were behind the protests, "This is a ridiculous demand that has no basis in reality."

Khalid al-Mu'ina, a Jeddah-based Saudi political and media analyst, said for Saudi Arabia, the protests could mean a shift in regional power toward Riyadh as Iran's influence and ability to fight regional conflicts wane.

Josefa Ivanka Weissels, a senior researcher at Lund University in Sweden, said that "violence on Iranian streets may also increase the risk of clashes in other parts of the region," adding, "The prospect of significant bloodshed at the hands of the Iranian regime looms, and if that happens, the domino effect could create another volatile and explosive situation in an already stormy and dangerous region."10

Waiting for the Iranian protests to result in the birth of an organized work of the revolutionary movement in Iran, he moves to the third stage of the theory of revolutionary movement and agrees on the alternative to the dual regime.

Repercussions of Iran's Intifada on Palestine

As for the repercussions of Iran's protests on the issue of Jerusalem and Palestine, Iran's protests came after Trump's decision to move his country's embassy to Jerusalem, which is also similar protests throughout the region.

Although the repercussions of the protests of the peoples and countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference against Trump's decision, or the protests of the peoples of Iran against Iran, which followed the protests of Trump's decision to move the embassy, on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remain unclear, but it is clear that the protests of Trump's decision and those of Iran have coincided with a fundamental question that has become strongly raised, whether the Palestinian-Israeli disarmament will be better through a complete state, not two states.

The Iranian protests may force the Iranian regime, which trades in the mother of its people and Jerusalem, to change its behavior, before turning into a "bloodbath" inside Iran. Hence we may understand Israel's role in destroying Hezbollah facilities and Iranian military camps in Syria.11

The end

Recent demonstrations in Iran are unlikely to lead to the overthrow of Tehran's velayat-e faqih regime, but they will almost certainly force the ruling regime to change course, both internally and externally.

The recent protests, and those that preceded them, not only foreshadow the erosion of the regime's legitimacy and the exacerbation of internal structural crises – political, security, economic, and social, but also demonstrate the failure of the "Iranian model," a failure that many Iranians seek to emigrate abroad.

Although Iran's 1979 revolution was carried out to address accumulated crises, the religious current (Beit Rahbari) monopolized the power and depth of those crises, adding new dimensions to them. To this day, Iran has been suffering from complex and overlapping crises: the most important of which is the nation-state model.

The nation-state crisis afflicting Iran's dual regime will continue to keep Iran and its people suffering from frustration and despair, from the decline of the social value system, and from the decline of social trust, both among the components of society itself, and between the different classes of society and the ruling regime.

The crisis of the dual regime in Iran has shown the error of all bets that the solution to the crisis of the nuclear file will necessarily entail solutions to Iran's internal crises, and that it will contribute to redrawing the internal landscape towards moderation and constructive engagement with the international system, because the crisis of the Iranian regime is structural and lies in its perspective of itself and the world.

Because the regime's crisis is structural, the regime is unlikely to change its approach given its high sense of external threat, likely to remain able to break the international consensus on its pro-terrorism and destabilizing activities.

But the lack of a specific economic model for Iran's dual political system may remain a critical factor in the continued turmoil of its economic policies and the collapse of its banking system, and this may prompt the regime in the future to choose between two things: either painful neoliberal economic reforms, with political openness (Turkish model) or painful economic reforms with a tightening of the security and political grip (Chinese model).12

Sources

Section I

Dr. Walid Abdel Hay, Iranian Power Structure and Prospects, Al Jazeera Studies, 16/4/2013, http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/iranandstrengthfactors/2013/04/201343112429798680.html.

Ali Hossein Bakir, The Discovery of Iranian Soft Power, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 17/4/2013, http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/iranandstrengthfactors/2013/04/2013411102151266414.html.

Introduction to the Political System in Iran, Advice website, 3/11/2016,

http://www.nusuh.org/42

Fakhir al-Sultan, Mahi Wilayat al-Faqih, Elaf website, 22/6/2008.http://elaph.com/Web/AsdaElaph/2009/6/449012.htm

An Introduction to Iran's Political System, a site of advice. Previous source.

Velayat-e Faqih in the Founding of the Republic of Iran, Middle East Online,

2017-12-25, http://middle-east-online.com/?id=263644

Abd al-Khaliq Hussein, On the Theory of Velayat-e Faqih, His Personal Position http://www.abdulkhaliqhussein.nl/index.php?news=428

Mishari al-Thaidi, Who is Wali al-Faqih, Middle East website, 5/6/2005, http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=45&article=522008&issueno=11147#.Wl8EKKiWaUk.

Introduction to Iran's Political System, Shabakat Sham, http://www.shaam.org/articles/studies-and-research/.

Mohammad Mazhadi, The Future of Iran: The Republican System or the Parliamentarian, News Site, http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/26851.

Panda Youssef, Once again conservatives are required to change the political system in Iran, Vision website, 3/10/2017,

http://www.roayahnews.com/articles .

Guardian Council, Al Jazeera Net website, 18/5/2015, http://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/organizationsandstructures.

Tasks of the Guardian Council of Iran in the Elections, Al-Alam TV, 18/5/2013, http://www.alalam.ir/news/1475632.

Kadkhadai: The Guardian Council has not yet announced its position on the concept of "politician" in the constitution, Mehr News Agency, 18/5/2017, https://ar.mehrnews.com/news/.

Ibid.

Iranian Shura Council, Al Jazeera Net, 9/4/2015, http://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/organizationsandstructures/2015/4/7/.

See; Islamic Consultative Assembly, Knowledge Site, https://marefa.org.

What do we need to know about the Shura Council elections? , Politicians Post website, 10/2/2016, https://www.sasapost.com/elections-in-iran-2/.

See; Iranian Assembly of Experts, Al Jazeera Net, 27/5/2013, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2013/5/27/.

The Assembly of Experts elects Ayatollah the hardline governor Ahmed Jannati as its president, Asharq Al-Awsat, 26/5/2016, http://www.france24.com/ar/20160524.

Moataz Billah Muhammad, Expediency Council ... The Arm of the Guide is an Opponent and a Referee, Al-Rased Website, 30/4/2014, http://alrased.net/main/articles.aspx?selected_article_no=6612.

See; the location of the evidence, http://www.albainah.net/index.aspx?function=Item&id=7238

Khamenei appoints his man Shahroudi as chairman of the Expediency Council, Al-Arabiya TV website, 14/8/2017, https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/iran/2017/08/14.

Seen http://www.albasalh.com/vb/showthread.php?t=5446 .

The second section

1- Protest Movements and Crises of the Political System in Iran, Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, p. 27.

2- Causes of Protests in Iran: Preliminary Justifications, Brookings Institution.

3- Arab Gulf Center for Iranian Studies: Persian Winter. Angry Iranians and Stifling Economic Conditions, December 13

http://cutt.us/mSfyc.7102

4- Iranian Demonstrations Causes and Motives, Rawabet Research Center

http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/59145

5- Iranian protests causes and consequences, estimating the position of the Center for Strategic Thought for Studies.

6- Mohammed al-Salami: Rouhani's conflict with the Revolutionary Guards, economic with a political façade, Al-Watan Olayan August 1

http://cutt.us/edkwM.7102

7- Iranian Protests Causes and Consequences, Estimating a Position of the Center for Strategic Thought for Studies

8. Hamid Ahmadi, Race and Ethnic Nationalism in Iran from Myth to Reality, (Tehran, Ni, 1381).

9- Sadiq Haqqat, Hussein Safi (translation): The Distribution of Power in Shia Political Thought.. A Comparative Philosophical Fiqh Study, Beirut: Center of Civilization for the Development of Sami Thought, First Edition, 4102, p. 592, p. 503.

10. Mahmoud Hamdi Abu al-Qasim, Tactics Beyond Trump's Strategy, November 9, 7102 http://cutt.us/sqNPX

11. Protest Movements and Crises of the Political System in Iran, Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, p. 21.

12- The website of the European Union, the European Union expresses its hope that the EA will guarantee the right to demonstrate to its citizens."

Section III

1http://dailysignal.com/2018/01/05/whats-next-for-iran-afterprotests-4-elements-to-watch

2https://thearabweekly.com/iranian-protests-are-likely-affect-lebanons-hezbollah

3https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/01/18/iran-after-the-protests-what-comes-next/?utm_term=.50b25f984f6b

4http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-iran-mideast-comment-9cae5000-eff9-11e7-97bf-bba379b809ab-20180102-story.html

5 Why the Protests Won’t Change Iran’s Foreign Policy

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2018-01-05/why-protests-wont-change-irans-foreign-policy

6Iran’s foreign policy weaknesses, and opportunities to exploit them

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2018/01/03/irans-foreign-policy-weaknesses-and-opportunities-to-exploit-them/

7https://thearabweekly.com/iranian-protests-are-likely-affect-lebanons-hezbollah

8http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2018/01/180117110920994.html

9 Beyond Iran’s Protests: Domestic, Regional, and International Implications

http://arabcenterdc.org/events/irans-protests-and-their-impact-on-the-arab-region/

10 How Iran Protests Play into Middle East Power Struggles

https://www.voanews.com/a/how-iran-protests-play-into-middle-east-power-struggles/4190570.html

11 Iranian Protests, Israeli-Palestinian Consequences

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2018/01/06/iranian_protests_israeli-palestinian_consequences_112674.html

12

https://aawsat.com/home/article/1159076/ Experts-Expecting-Return-Protests-in-Iran-Lack of Fulfillment-Demands-

Author Dr.Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud

الكاتب د.عمر عبدالستار محمود