The Gulf-Iran Conflict over Iraq from 1979 to 2017 Causes, Strategies, Stages and Possible Consequences

Summary

There is no conflict between two regimes without a change in the ruling elite, the standards of the regimes, or the balance of power between the two parties; there is no strategy without conflict; if there is change, there is conflict, and if there is conflict, there is strategy.

Because the change took place in Iran in 1979, there is a conflict between Iran and the Gulf.There is a strategy for the conflict between the revolutionary regime of Velayat-e Faqih and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that has appeared on Iraq since the first Gulf war and is still ongoing.

Iraq is a geographical cut between the two shores of the Gulf on the one hand and between them and Turkey on the other.It is also a demographic cut between Arabs, Turks and Persians on the one hand and between Sunnis and Shiites on the other.

Therefore, the security of Iraq has become part of the Gulf and the security of the Gulf on both sides.The conflict of the two parties in Iraq has not spiraled out of control despite the fact that it has gone through four Gulf wars.Because it is a conflict managed by the United States first and because it is a conflict between the two banks of the Gulf that owns two-thirds of the world's oil and gas and the largest checkpoint for the world oil trade (Hormuz), and passes through 1/3 of the world's oil and gas.

The conflict is American-run because the Gulf is the crossroads of land, sea and air lines in the world, as U.S. President Harry Truman says.

Iran believes that an Arab-Iranian system that is its center may achieve its strategic vision on the one hand and enable it to perhaps remove foreign forces from the region.Hence Iran may have announced in 2015 the Baghdad Pact with Russia, Syria and Iraq in light of its conflict over Iraq, as it was once with the race in the Baghdad Pact during the Cold War.

Mohammed bin Salman has said that the battle must be moved from Saudi Arabia to Iran.Hence, changing the system of velayat-e faqih may be considered a regional and international necessity before the possibility of meeting the north, east and west of the Gulf in a new alliance or regional system.

The conflict between the two banks over Iraq has shown that they are fighting with Iraq if they are separated from them politically and they are fighting for Iraq if their political system is separated.

Before Iraq left the Baghdad Pact in the 1958 coup and Iran in the 1979 revolution, Iraq was a member of the Baghdad Pact with Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Britain while Saudi Arabia remained opposed to it.

When Iraq emerged from the Baghdad Pact of 1955 with the 1958 coup, Iran and Saudi Arabia met with America against Iraq, which allied itself with the Soviets.When Velayat-e Faqih declared war on Iraq in 1979, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) supported Iraq.

When Saddam invaded Kuwait, the two sides converged against Iraq after the Second Gulf War.After the Third Gulf War, Iraq became an ally of Iran against the GCC countries.When the Fourth Gulf War broke out after the fall of Mosul, Iraq joined the international coalition against Daesh, and the GCC countries converged with Iraq.

Let us not go beyond reality when we say that the third international coalition against ISIS is a fourth Gulf war targeting Iran, not only ISIS.Although it began with an international sixtieth air alliance, it was joined by an Islamic military alliance of forty countries announced by the Saudi crown prince at the end of 2015.Then the international coalition flew with a successive US ground military position in Iraq and Syria.

U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis recently said that U.S. forces would remain in Iraq after ISIS to protect Kurdish achievements and influence in it and in Syria, to prevent coordination between the two countries and to sever their relationship with Iran.

Is this why the conflict between the two banks over Iraq after four Gulf wars has passed from the end? Or is there a fifth Gulf war on the way?

Perhaps the answer to this question lies in another question: why did the first Gulf War stop with an armistice of 8-8-88 without a peace agreement or surrender, and why did America withdraw after the third Gulf War without a peace agreement or surrender?

The content of the two questions may indicate that the (fourth) Gulf war, which broke out against ISIS after the return of America in 2014, that the end of the first and third wars without a peace agreement or surrender indicates the possibility of a fifth Gulf war to push Iran towards surrender rather than to conclude a peace agreement with Iran alone.

Although the Lausanne nuclear deal took place under the shadow of the fourth Gulf War, under which an international regional agreement could also be achieved by Iran abandoning support for terrorism, the Lausanne deal now faces the prospect of Iran or the United States withdrawing from it.

This means that Iran may return to the seventh item from which it exited.Iran is the only country in the world that has emerged from the seventh item without a war.Hence the possibility of a fifth Gulf war is likely.

It is possible that it is reinforced by the prospects of Iraq sliding into chaos and disintegration, as it faces the referendum of the Kurdistan Region on secession on the one hand and the incursion of the Popular Mobilization Forces on the state and the constitution on the other.

Iraq's accession to the international coalition may help open the way for international intervention that prevents the disintegration of Iraq on the one hand, and removes it from the mantle of Iran on the other hand and brings it closer to the tent of the Gulf Cooperation Council on the third hand, especially since Iraq is still under item VII.

Introduction

Since the dissipation of the partnership between the two shores of the Gulf against Iraq with Khomeini's accession to power in 1979, the Gulf and its surroundings have been militarized and entered into a historical comma that may resemble that of the Thirty Years' War of the seventeenth century that ended with the West Valea Agreement.

Interestingly, 2017 may resemble 1979 in the intensity of militarization witnessed by the Gulf.The years 2011-2017 may resemble the years of the second half of the seventies of the twentieth century.King Faisal, then Sadat, and then Saddam Hussein's assumption of power in Iraq was killed in a kind of coup.

So did Zia Haq in Pakistan and Canaan Evren in Turkey.It was Camp David and Velayat-e Faqih appeared and the Haram al-Makki was occupied by Juhayman and the Gulf Cooperation Council appeared.It was the Afghan War, the invasion of Lebanon and the First Gulf War.

The Cold War ended and three international alliances were formed, one to liberate Kuwait, another to occupy Iraq, a third against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and a fourth Islamic military.The Middle East was militarized again in 2017 and we were at the gates of 1979 again (1).

While states and regimes were absent, the heaviest and longest banks of the Gulf remained the heaviest and longest hands in the region.This may indicate that the two shores of the Gulf have absorbed the challenges and repercussions of chaos and devastation with a strategy of conflict that parallels each other inch by inch and arm by arm.2

An inch by inch and arm by arm, although the shortest distance between the two shores of the Gulf is 60 kilometers at the Strait of Hormuz. The two banks are far apart from each other after the Levantines and have been battling over Iraq since the advent of Wilayat al-Faqih.

The reasons for the conflict between the two banks over Iraq are due to the geography, which Bismarck says is the only and permanent thing in politics.

The Strait of Hormuz is the bottleneck between East and West.Hegemony over it threatens the Gulf and the world.Hence US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on 7-10-1980 "We will defend our interests in Hormuz and the Gulf, which must be immune from any interference and we will take action to prevent any interference".[6]

Hence NATO opened a headquarters in Kuwait in K2 2017."No naval arm has provided and will not provide a vital area as the waters of the Gulf have provided," said British expert Arnold Wilson.

U.S. President Harry Truman said on 7.4.1947 that "the Gulf is a great strategic region in which global land, sea and air lines meet," and another American scientist added that "the Gulf is the center of the world and a region where global interests meet."[6]

If Alexander of Macedon said in his council of leaders in Egypt that "I cannot secure my position in Egypt under the control of Persia over the Gulf," then America also under the control of Wilayat al-Faqih on the eastern bank of the Gulf and Iraq up to the Mediterranean can secure its position in the Middle East or Central Asia.

At the gates of Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf, and to realize that America was overwhelmed by the Gulf, America signed an oil-for-security agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1945.Khomeini's revolution worried Saudi Arabia for fear that America would take its hand off if it faced a similar revolution.The American newspaper Newsweek reported on March 3, 1980 that Saudi Arabia felt more of a revolution in Iran than any country in the Middle East.[3]

Saudi Arabia's concern also lies in the fact that Iran also considers the Gulf part of its national security. But America pulled the Gulf out of the international conflict with Carter's doctrine in 1981 (4) and then militarized it after the invasion of Kuwait.

America has taken the Gulf out of the circle of international conflict because of the seriousness of its geopolitical position on the international system on the one hand, and on the other hand the velayat-e faqih is a mandate hostile to the international order that the United States requires.[5]

Although the international order has changed five times since the West Valley Agreement of 1648, the concept of West Valea (nation-state) remains constant and resists anyone who tries to destroy it, from Napoleon to Hitler and the Soviets to Wilayat al-Faqih.7

Hence America may have supported Iraq against Iran with the Gulf states in the first Gulf War. The three international alliances came from 1991 to 2003 to 2014 to protect Gulf security from Wilayat al-Faqih on the one hand and to veto and build a new Middle East.8

Egypt's exit from the 1978 Camp David Accords from the Middle East's 20th-century triangle of power composed of Egypt, Iran, and Turkey on the one hand, and the replacement of Egypt's position in Saudi Arabia's regional power triangle after 1980,9 on the other, was perhaps the first step in reversing and building a peer regional system.

But the accession of Wilayat al-Faqih to power in Iran has put the region in front of a new security threat with a revolutionary regime that does not believe in the nation-state.Instead of maintaining its role and regional duty as a medium-power state, Iran exported the revolution and destabilized regional security as Egypt has done before.

Destabilizing regional security is a threat to spiral out of control in the Middle East.This is not allowed by the international system.Hence the United States may have sided with the Gulf and Iraq against Iran in the first Gulf War.Then the three international alliances came one after the other.

These three alliances have been accompanied by a shift in U.S. strategy from a policy of double poles between Saudi Arabia and Iran to a strategy of containing Iraq and Iran.

The U.S. containment strategy with Iraq and Iran has probably succeeded in making Iraq a member of the third international coalition formed after the fall of Mosul, as well as in achieving the Lausanne nuclear agreement with Iran under the third international coalition.

Iran has another international agreement on its regional file.An agreement in which Iran may lose its regional role as well as its nuclear file.International and regional alliances on Iran today may be a deterrent if Iran refuses to obey the will of the international system.10

The White House has indicated that the region needs an international agreement similar to the Camp David Accords, although the White House's signal came in the context of resolving the recent Gulf-Gulf crisis.[11] The reference to Camp David is a reference to Egypt, which has lost its regional role, and it could mean that Iran could lose its regional role for the same reason.

Iran's potential loss of its regional role could end the parties' conflict over Iraq with one of three possibilities, one of which is the rebalancing lost in Iraq in favor of Wilayat al-Faqih since America's withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011 and before the outbreak of the Arab Spring.

This confirms America's return after 2014 and the end of the spring waves that began in 2011 second, and Egypt's alliance with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain third, all of which are countries opposed to the Arab Spring.

The second possibility may be to recover Iraq from Wilayat al-Faqih, which has made it an arena for instability in the region.This possibility is confirmed by the accession of ethnicity to the international coalition and the rapprochement of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain from it.This may mean the possibility of Iraq joining the Islamic Military Alliance as well as its possible accession to the Gulf Cooperation Council.

As for the possibility of changing the regime of velayat-e faqih, it may be confirmed by Mohammed bin Salman's talk of taking the battle to Tehran, where he said that "dialogue with Iran is impossible because of its belief in the Wali al-Faqih and the Mahdi in waiting, and that Iran wants to seize the holy places, and we should not wait for them and move the conflict to its depth" (12).

Chapter One

Theoretical framework of research

The problem of research

The research problem in this paper is first in studying the causes of the conflict between Wilayat al-Faqih and the Gulf Cooperation Council over Iraq since 1980-2017, secondly in the search for the strategy of the conflict of the two parties, third in studying the stages of their conflict and fourth in the search for the possible results of their conflict by answering the following questions:

First

Is there a conflict between the two shores of the Gulf over Iraq?

Do the parties to the bibank conflict have a specific strategy?

Is the conflict between the two banks American-managed?

Were the three Gulf wars milestones in the bibank conflict over Iraq?

Was America's return after the fall of Mosul in 2014 the beginning of a fourth Gulf war?

Is there a possibility of an end to this conflict or is a fifth Gulf war possible?

Could the conflict end with Iraq emerging from Iran's mantle and joining the Gulf Cooperation Council?

When can the banks of the Gulf and Iraq meet in an alliance or regional system?

Research Hypothesis

The research hypothesis attempts to answer the above questions by saying that there is a conflict between the eastern and western banks of the Gulf over Iraq due to the change of the regime in Iran in 1979.The hypothesis adds that the conflict between the two parties requires a long-term conflict strategy.The conflict between the two parties has gone through three stages since 1980 and has entered a fourth stage and may wait for a fifth stage.

The three phases were the first, second and third Gulf wars, which ended with the withdrawal of America at the end of 2011 from Iraq.The fourth began with the return of America with a sixtieth international alliance after the fall of Mosul.It may be heading towards a fifth Gulf war related to Iran's nuclear and regional file.

The hypothesis confirms that the conflict between the two banks that has been going on since 1980 over Iraq could lead to an end to the conflict between the two parties over Iraq by joining the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Islamic Military Alliance and getting rid of Iran's mantle after Iraq became a member of the international coalition.

But resolving the conflict between the two sides over Iraq may not end the conflict between the two banks before the velayat-e faqih regime disappears from power in Iran.Because the hypothesis suggests that the conflict between the two shores of the Gulf is not only a bilateral conflict between the two shores of the Gulf over Iraq, but a conflict between the Westphalia international system led by the United States and a centralized, cross-border religious international order led by Velayat-e Faqih whose constitution and system do not believe in the international system.

Chapter Two

Research hypothesis testing

Section I

The Gulf's Conflict Between Theory and Practice

Change = Conflict

Conflict is an interactive process manifested in incompatibility between the parties (disagreement or disharmony). (13) This process of interaction involves paying, pulling, taking and giving to create a balance between the parties that takes into account the factors inside and outside.

The main reason for the conflict is a change in the ruling elite, the standards of the regimes, or the balance of power between the two parties, and this happened in Iran in 1979.

The system of government in Iran changed from a traditional monarchy to a revolutionary religious one, and the conflict over Iraq with the West Bank of the Gulf began.Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council became like a relationship of two unequal twins and two neighboring countries in geography, close in resources, different in model, interests, and in the nature of their relationship with the international community.

The process of conflict between the two banks has begun in the space of values, governance model, norms and attitudes. It was latent for the first time and then turned to the field of interests and was declared. The conflict situation continued in the First Gulf War until some sort of balance of interests, capabilities and wills was achieved on 8-8-88.

Then the equation changed after the Second Gulf War, as the international order changed, Iraq invaded Kuwait, Khomeini died, and the Gulf militarized the United States. Iraq has become a source of concern for both banks.

The conflict between the two banks returned after the occupation of Iraq in the third Gulf War, and increased further after the withdrawal of America from it at the end of 2011. Until Mosul fell, America returned with a sixty-something alliance that foreshadowed a fourth Gulf war on Iraq between the two banks.

The common elements14 in the conflict between the two banks over Iraq were

1- Different and conflicting criteria, values and interests between the two banks in a game (zero).

2- The belief of each party that the other party is acting against it

3- The belief in an act of hostility between the two parties is manifested

4- Confirms the belief that cases of past hostility occurred between the two parties

As for the common ideas in the process of conflict between the two banks, they are

1- Feeling of superiority in one of the parties

2- An injustice that falls from one side in the direction of the other - Sunnis and Shiites -

3- Feeling weak - Lack of confidence - Lack of resourcefulness

3. Rejection of subordination from one party to another party

When the life cycle of a conflict (15) between two parties begins with these elements and ideas, the conflict takes several stages:

The first stage: (we-them).

Conflict increases at least in the circle of consciousness when there is ambiguity between the two parties in the perception of each other. At this stage of the conflict there is no violence.Then the conflict moves on to its second stage.

Second Stage:

It is characterized by violence and both sides are looking for allies and each side seeks to break the will of the other side - the first Gulf War

The conflict then enters its third phase:

Third Stage:

And it is the stage of the impasse and this may lead to

1- The escalation of the war unilaterally and leads to changing the equation to his favor – Bahrain 2011. Or an impasse as the conflict between the two perpetrators continues – the first Gulf War, the Syrian crisis and the Yemen war.

2- The attrition of the two parties - the Iraqi-Iranian war - and the Syrian revolution - and this leads to the fourth stage:

Fourth Stage:

It is the stage of searching for settlements by a third party.

Then it is the last stage.

Fifth and final stage:

It is the stage of reaching an agreement or treaty – the agreement took place at the end of the 1988 Iraq-Iran war, and it may be repeated again in Iraq as well, as Rouhani pointed out in his Washington Post article before the signing of the 2015 Lausanne agreement.

If we move the conflict between Iran and the Gulf States from the orbit of theory to the orbit of application, we find that it applies perfectly to each other.The conflict did not begin before the change that took place in Iran in 1979, and the two sides were before that in an international regional alignment as mentioned above and this is in the causes of the conflict.

In his ideas, Iran, for example, feels cultural superiority on the ground, and at the same time feels isolated in language and doctrine, rejects subordination, all of which pushes it to regional influence.

Iran views the Sunni and Shiite Arabs through the prism of Persian heritage.16 The Arabs view Iran through a Western lens.So we and they are strongly present between the two sides, and when the GCC was formed, for example, Iran saw this as a Western conspiracy to besiege its revolution.

When Iran's revolution took place, the Gulf states saw this as an existential threat. This was embodied in Khomeini's call for Arabs to revolt to overthrow non-Islamic monarchies. The Gulf states formed the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The conflict then moved from the circle of consciousness between the two parties to the indirect conflict in the Iraqi-Iranian war. Thus, we find that the Gulf countries realized the dangers, and so did Iran, so Wilayat al-Faqih formed a system of alliance with non-state actors locally and regionally.The institutions of the velayat-e faqih are parallel to the system of the state and the non-state and regionally.It began with the establishment of the Badr Corps in Iraq and ended with the Popular Mobilization.

The Gulf states formed the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 as a regional alliance in the face of regional changes.The conflict began in several rounds that began in the first Gulf War.After the Second Gulf War, relations remained tense, although slightly released.After the Third Gulf War and the occupation of Iraq, Saudi Arabia rejected the occupation as a state responsible for maintaining regional security, and Iran destabilized the security of Iraq and the region.

After the withdrawal of America from Iraq, Mosul fell, and America returned and began what we might call the Gulf War (Rabaa).With it, Saudi Arabia returned to play its regional role as a medium-power state and began to move towards Iraq gradually since 2015.It opened in 2017 in a way that has not happened since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.[17]

The nature of the conflict between the two banks confirms that the GCC countries see the regimes of Iran and Iraq as a political threat on the one hand and on the other hand see themselves as responsible for maintaining regional security and are addressed in alliance with the international system.

Although the identification of risks is unified among the GCC system, its countries differ in the way risks are addressed at each stage of the conflict, as we will see later.

While Iran's policy, which sees the Attoun's system and alliances as a threat to its role and order, relies in confronting it first on a dual system of revolution and the state that maneuvers them at every stage of the conflict, which has gone through three wars and has entered the scope of a fourth Gulf war since 2014. Second, it also relies on a cross-border regional alliance composed of armed non-state religious agent systems of the Revolutionary Guards.18

Section II

Strategy of the Gulf-Banks Conflict over Iraq

Between theory and practice

Change = Conflict = Strategy

Without a competitor there is no value to any strategy.Competition is what justifies strategy.It means searching for the right rules of conduct to win the competition. The Greek word strategy continues to consist of two syllables -1-Stratus: meaning army and -2-aj meaning leading(19).

What is meant here is that the strategy is developed to achieve victory by focusing on the interdependence between the decisions of opponents and your decisions on the one hand, and on the other hand focusing on expectations about the behavior of each party towards the other.Thus, the strategy is a policy of survival, success and betting on the future.It also means that your struggle with an opponent does not prevent the existence of common interests under conflicting values, interests and goals.20

The questions of the grand strategy are centered as follows:

Where are you now?

Where is the direction going?

How do we get there?

Where do we compete?

How to compete?

What is our situation now?

What are our resources?

If we move from the theoretical concept of strategy to its practical reality between the two parties to the conflict, we find that both parties have had strategic elements for long-term survival and success. This means that the two sides succeeded in developing a strategy that made them overcome three Gulf wars on Iraq and entered the atmosphere of a fourth war, perhaps while states, regimes and armies have been removed since 1980.

A Strategy of Iran

A state strategy and a revolution strategy

It was included in the draft Vision 2025 prepared by the Expediency Council, a document known as the "2005-2025 Iranian Strategy" or the 2025th Iranian Plan "Iran 2025".[21]

It is considered "the most important national national document after the Iranian constitution, as it sets out the future visions of the Iranian role in twenty years, and aims to transform the country into a central nucleus that includes 25 countries and includes the region from the borders of China to the east, the Indian Ocean to the south, the Arabian Gulf to the west, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean Sea to the north.

Central Asia and the Caucasus are second only to the Gulf according to Iran's twentieth strategy. It means that the Gulf and Iraq to the north occupy the brigades in this strategy.These are areas over which Iran has exercised its hegemony throughout a period that extends from the time of the Achaemenids through the Sassanids and others and is also called the project of "Iran's civilizational estate" or Greater Iran.

According to the Al Jazeera Center's study of the Iranian power structure and prospects, Iran is a country with a strategic vision that insists on achieving its central goal, which is to achieve the status of the central state in its multiple regional space.22 Those who said that Iran is the capital of their great empire.23

The general direction of this Iranian strategy movement indicates that it is proceeding, but it faces major challenges, especially after the challenges of the Lausanne Agreement and the arrival of Trump with the agenda of the Olybright Hadley report, describing the challenges of the Iranian interior in light of the international escalation against it.

Despite this, the structure of "restraint and balance" enabled the velayat-e faqih system to withstand and gave it a high adaptive capacity that enabled it to absorb the blows through a self-balancing in which bilateral institutions contribute to restrain each other in a clear deliberate manner - the army - the Revolutionary Guards, the Shura Council - the Guardian Council - the Council of Experts - the Expediency Council - the Leader - the President - the National Security Council - the government.

There are state institutions paralleled by revolutionary institutions, and there is a state strategy and a revolution strategy, and despite the apparent hit-and-run in their international and regional relations, the House of Imam – the house of Rahbari – leads them all.

The revolution alternated with the state during the four Gulf Wars.It was the first war that advanced the revolution over the state and then retreated in favor of the state in the second war. The revolution then advanced in the Third Gulf War and then retreated in the Fourth Gulf War.

This may have enabled it, as Mahjoub al-Zuwayri argues in his paper, to the Western capitalist idea that divides the world into a center and an ocean. Iran presents itself politically or as a village and center of the Islamic world, more like an ocean that should be "drawn" by Iran's experience after the revolution.24 This vision, in short, is an expansionist, revolutionary and offensive vision based on imperial nationalism and an extreme sectarian one that differs from that of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Sectionsfor GCC Strategy

First

Maintaining the balance of power and regional security

He was behind the Council's establishment in 1981 of the strategy for achieving collective security to counter an existential threat. The GCC is a regional security system according to the theory of regional security in international relations. It is a system that respects the foundations of the nation-state on which the international system is based and is supported by a transnational security system allied with the international community.The strategy of the Gulf Cooperation Council is based on maintaining the balance of power, regional security and defense alliance with international parties.25

The Council's vision is to establish solid military, security and economic institutions.The alliance with the United States, which considers the Gulf part of its national security.This led to the complete internationalization of Gulf security through a series of defense agreements between its countries and Western countries.The Desert Storm Alliance was the first to liberate Kuwait, the second to occupy Iraq and the third after the fall of Mosul in 2014.

secondly

Comprehensive Development Strategy(26) Long-term 2000 to 2025

thirdly

Istanbul28+1 Initiative (27) to strengthen NATO's security partnership with the Gulf States

fourthly

Vision of the Council in 2015

King Salman turned to Aberan in 2015 and launched Decisive Storm on 26-302015 and said Jamal Khashoggi for all time a state, men and foreign policy.[28]

Comparing the strategy of the two shores of the Gulf, it appears that the strategy of the West Bank is different, albeit parallel to it. Iran's offensive strategy is a transnational religious non-state offensive that is hostile to the foundations of the international order, while the West Bank strategy focuses on maintaining the current situation in defensive ways and maintaining regional security in alliance with the international system.

C. U.S. Strategy Managing the Two-Character Conflict

The strategy of the United States is represented by a pocket wave between an ascent represented by the policy of direct intervention, i.e. leadership from the front, followed by a decline in the policy of indirect intervention and leadership from behind.The wave of America has passed since Wodrolson until Trump.With this enclave strategy, the United States has been able to hold the reins of world politics since the two world wars until now, toppling Hitler and the Soviets, leading the international system, laying its first foundation stone in the European Union and the arm of the international military system in NATO, and is at the gates of toppling Wilayat al-Faqih perhaps.

It allied itself with Iran and Saudi Arabia against Iraq in the seventies. It then allied itself with Saudi Arabia and Iraq against Iran in the first Gulf War.Then it left the policy of double poles to the policy of containing Iraq and Iran after the Second Gulf War.It militarized the Gulf with a three-dimensional plan.

The first axis was represented by bilateral military relations with all the GCC countries, another axis represented by a collective military relationship and multiple periodic exercises with the GCC system, and a third axis represented by the increase of America's military presence in the Gulf. This has alarmed Iran and the policy of containing Iraq and Iran by the United States has continued to exist ever since, considering that Iran and Iraq cannot be guarantors of the stability of the region.29

The strategy of the GCC countries was similar to that of America during the four Gulf wars on Iraq.Saudi Arabia and Kuwait converged from Iraq in the first war while the two sides rapprochement with Iran after the second Gulf War.

Although the UAE and Qatar had rapprochement with Iran in the first Gulf War, they had rapprochement with Iraq in the Second Gulf War.It seems that the recent Gulf crisis in which Qatar converged with Iran has led to a Saudi-Emirati-Bahraini rapprochement with Iraq.

Section III

Stages of the conflict over Iraq between the two shores of the Gulf

Introduction

First Gulf War

Second Gulf War

Third Gulf War

Fourth Gulf War

Introduction

Iraq is north of the Gulf, east of Iran, and west of the Gulf states that have been framed since 1981 in the Gulf Cooperation Council.Thus, Iraq is a geopolitical extension of the Gulf and its geographical gateway to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe.30

Hence Iraq's political geography, geopolitical location, sectarian, national and religious demographics have been the cause of the conflict between the two shores of the Gulf over it.Not only that, but Iraq is the heart of the Islamic world and the heart of the Middle East and its key to Europe.Iraq is surrounded by Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.31

Hence, Iran wanted to make it part of its national security, the capital of its regional empire and an arena where it fights beyond its borders: it fought four Gulf wars for this.

Because Iraq's security is from the security of the Gulf and the security of the western Gulf bank from the security of its eastern bank, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called at the Manama dialogue in 2008 for the inclusion of Iraq in the Gulf Cooperation Council, in the framework of talking about the security challenges facing the Arab Gulf states that Gates linked to what he calls Iranian threats to the Gulf neighborhood.

Gates' perception that Iraq's involvement in the Gulf system and the establishment of full diplomatic relations with it would wrest it from Iranian grip on the one hand and on the other hand intensify pressure on Iran to comply with the wishes of the international community.32

Gates' call in 2008 moved forward when the United States after 2014 linked Iraq to the international coalition system after linking the Gulf Cooperation Council to the Istanbul Initiative since 2004.This means that Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council have become closer than ever to each other.

First Khaij War

After Khomeini came to power and the GCC after his appearance in 1981, Iran realized that the other side posed a strategic threat against him.Iran demonized the GCC, viewing it as an American conspiracy to besiege its revolution and calling for the overthrow of its (Islamic) kingdoms, and the Gulf states founded the Gulf Cooperation Council.

In the spring of the first of 1979, the inaugural meeting of the Arab Gulf states was held at the Saudi air base Khamis Mushait.When the GCC was established, nine months had passed since the Iran-Iraq War.

The Gulf's move towards the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) came from two main factors: First, the political and economic transformations that took place on the Gulf Arab states and transformed them from marginal parties to actors, with what their wealth made available to them after the use of the oil weapon during the October War of 1973.

The second factor is the realization by these countries of the need to join a single regional organization to stand in the face of Iranian hegemony as the Gulf theater became a fertile field for the Iranian revolution, which came to power on April 1, 1979 and the subsequent outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war (33).

One of the policies of the United States of America since the emergence of Wilayat al-Faqih has been to keep Russia away from the region and to contain and encircle Iran to protect America's interests in the Gulf in particular.Hence the United States has worked to strengthen Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Gulf States in conjunction with the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has become a significant bloc (34).

Thus, it can be said that the Iraqi-Iranian war is the result of Gulf-Iraqi-American cooperation, on the one hand, and on the other hand, Saudi-Iranian relations have turned into conflict relations after it was a policy of mastery at the time of the Shah.

After Saddam came to power instead of al-Bakr, Saddam in 1980 issued what was known as the National Declaration which affirmed two things: First, the illegality of any interference by any Arab state in the internal affairs of any other Arab state.

Second, Arab unity is a strategic goal, i.e., a distant goal that may or may not happen, and these were all reassuring signals to Saudi Arabia that led to the rapprochement between Saddam Hussein and Prince Fahd (King Fahd) at the time.35

Although the position of the GCC states was characterized by official neutrality and practical bias towards Iraq, Iran, which was seeking to neutralize the Gulf states from the war and pressure them by all means to give up its support for Iraq materially, believed that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were aligned with Iraq.

The capitals of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have witnessed intense diplomatic activity, extraordinary meetings of the GCC Ministerial Council, and frequent visits to Baghdad and Tehran to end the war.Iran has not been satisfied with the Gulf mediator being both an adversary and a referee.Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Council, has warned Gulf states against helping Iraq and that Iran can resort to measures against these countries in defense of itself.

Until Iran began to be exposed in the spring of 1984 to neutral and non-neutral ships in the Gulf.It threatened that it would not leave safe shipping routes in the Gulf if the road to its oil port on Kharj Island remained threatened.It bombed the Kuwaiti oil tankers um al-Kasbah and Bahra on May 13-14, 1984 and the Saudi oil tanker (Yanbu Pride) in the Saudi port of Ras Tanura loaded with about 210,000 tons on May 16, 1984.

Kuwait has officially accused Iran of bombing the tankers, and the Security Council has adopted Resolution 552, which imposed effective measures if the threat to international peace and security continues. King Fahd drew his imaginary red line along the Khaij for the first time and prevented any Iranian plane or barge from penetrating it.

Saudi aviation shot down two planes that crossed the line and Iran did not do so again.U.S. forces mobilized their pieces in the Gulf to counter harassment by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards against international oil shipments when the Guards, with the help of some elements of the regular navy, began to mine international shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf.36

It became even more dangerous when Iran occupied the Faw Peninsula in 1986.Iranian officials threatened that if the GCC states did not stop supporting Iraq, they would endanger themselves. The GCC coordinated a joint defense and security coordination, the impact of which was concentrated in an area near Kuwait after the occupation of FAO.

Iran then bombed the um al-Bakhoush oil field in the UAE in December 1986, and in August 1987, Iranian pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca, resulting in hundreds of casualties.

The major powers even agreed to put an end to this conflict after the United States shot down an Iranian passenger plane over the Gulf that killed all 290 passengers.

The ceasefire was declared and Security Council Resolution No. (598) of 1987 was accepted on 8/ August 1988, after Iran failed to reach the goals it declared in the so-called "years of decisiveness", Iraq succeeded in liberating the Faw Peninsula on April 17, 1988.

These factors combined prompted Iran on July 17, 1988, to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations Javier Perez of the text "We solemnly declare that the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on the great importance it attaches to saving human lives, establishing justice and maintaining regional and international peace and security, accepts Security Council Resolution 598.

Rafsanjani persuaded the speaker of Iran's Shura Council Khomeini to unconditionally accept Resolution 598 and said in a text that "time is no longer in Iran's favor because the arrogant anti-Islamic forces have decided to do their utmost to handcuff our hands."

During the war, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) demonstrated its ability to integrate the common interests of member states through its relations with warring parties Iraq and Iran and its repeated attempts to contain the effects of the war and not to expand its territory.

If we compare the policies of the GCC countries that are ostensibly contradictory with Iran during the Iraq-Iran war, through the three successive Gulf wars and up to the Gulf crisis, with his policies, we find them similar.

The Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saif bin Hashel Al-Maskari, has tried to justify the similarity and contradiction of the relations of the different GCC countries during the Iraq-Iran war by saying that the visits between Iran and some member states do not deviate from the direction of ending the Iraqi-Iranian war first and easing tension in the region and keeping it away from international conflicts.

He added that the divergence of views of the GCC states is not in identifying risks, but in how to address those risks.He added that the GCC states are of a cooperative nature and joint coordination in political positions, and that each state has its own jurisprudence and views on how to address things in order to end this war."[37]

Second Gulf War

As soon as the Iraq-Iran war ended in favor of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States, the Soviets collapsed, America led the international order and Iraq invaded Kuwait, it was Desert Storm and it was the 1991 alliance.

With Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries implemented one of their most important decisions in support of Kuwait. The decision to establish the Council stipulates that aggression against a Member State is considered aggression against all GCC States.

This principle was embodied in practice during the Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991, when all GCC States participated in the liberation of the territory of a member country of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

It was also later exemplified by the subsequent transfer of 1,500 soldiers of the Peninsula Shield forces on March 14, 2011 from Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Emirati units to Bahrain as well as later Omani symbolic units (38).

The idea of Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait was born not with Saddam but with every president who ruled Iraq.The threatening and unfriendly policy towards Kuwait has continued unabated since the exchange of letters between the two countries in 1932 to obtain a sea entrance to the waterways of the Gulf by annexing the island of Warba and part of the island of Bubiyan within its territory.

Despite British pressure, Kuwait rejected this request for fear that Iraq would occupy the islands.

Iraq announced in 1961 its desire to annex Kuwait under its Prime Minister Abdul Karim al-Qasim.Despite the 1963 agreement to form a joint delimitation committee, the border was not demarcated due to the ongoing Iraqi procrastination.

After a ceasefire with Iran in 1988, contrary to expectations, Iraq began acquiring new weapons and equipment. He did not lay off any of his large army or convert any of it into productive civilian sectors.39

With Saddam's regime's invasion of Kuwait, the entire international and regional circumstances changed, and with it changed a pattern of cooperation – a conflict between Iran and the Gulf states that continued to govern the relations of the two sides until the war of liberation of Kuwait.

The United States reversed its balance-of-power policy in the seventies (where it allied itself with Iran and Saudi Arabia against Iraq) and in the eighties (where it allied itself with Iraq and Saudi Arabia against Iran).

Washington decided to defend its interests directly in the Gulf and to double its military forces, which had entered the waters of the Gulf beginning in 1987 at the invitation of Kuwait to raise American flags on Kuwaiti oil tankers to protect them from what was known as the tanker war launched by Iran in the waters of the Persian Gulf in response to Iraq's urban war against Iranian cities.

The strategy of America for the tomorrow of the invasion of Kuwait focused on three axes, the first of which was to strengthen the capabilities of each country in the GCC, strengthen the collective capabilities of the Council and strengthen America's military capabilities in the Gulf.40

By abandoning the policy of balance of power and its strong emergence in the Gulf beginning in 1991, the United States was able to abort the link between Gulf security and the so-called "Arab security" through what was then called the Damascus Declaration between the six GCC countries, Egypt and Syria.

It began to conclude bilateral security and defense agreements with each of the GCC countries separately.The interactions of the Gulf regional order turned into a so-called rectangle of tension after the United States became the most prominent and important regional power in the Gulf.

This development made the conflict on both sides of the Gulf an American from the intensity of American militarization in the waters of the Gulf and in the American bases deployed on its shores.The number of military exercises of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries with the United States in 1991 alone amounted to 100 exercises attended by more than 100,000 soldiers from the forces of the two sides.41

After the Third Gulf War, relations became a conflict between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran and Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation Council and Iraq, Iraq and the United States, and finally between the United States and Iran.42

If America's strategy in the Second Gulf War shifts as it turns out, Iran announced its new strategy for the region on August 9, 1990, which began its rejection of Iraq's decision to annex Kuwait.

The Iranian statement said Iran would not allow a change in the geographies of the political region. Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister, stated that "Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait may be the beginning of the withdrawal of all foreign forces".43

Rafsanjani stated that "Iran's crude policy has created unnecessary enemies for it".The two shores of the Gulf after the Second Gulf War considered Iraq a common concern for both sides.The demise of the Soviets removed the two shores of the Gulf from a common concern.44 Saudi Arabia converged with Iran.44

It is certain that this rapprochement also came after the decline of the revolutionary system in Iran in favor of the state system after Khomeini's departure and because of the attrition it suffered during the first Gulf War with Iraq.45

However, it benefited from the change in the international situation after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and perhaps began to adopt a policy of advancing the revolution at times and in the other country, as it did in the eighties when the system of revolution advanced, and as it did in the nineties when the system of revolution was delayed in exchange for the progress of the state system.

Like the progress of the revolution in the eighties, it happened in the first decade of the twenty-first century after Nejad's election in 2005.Rouhani's election in 2013 at the gates of the Gulf War (IV) may be similar to Rafsanjani's election at the gates of the Second Gulf War.

As a result of Iran's policy of neutrality in the Second Gulf War, prospects for qualitative cooperation with some GCC countries have been opened. After several reciprocal visits, it culminated in the signing of a Saudi-Iranian security agreement in May 2001 under Ahmed Khatami, the first Iranian president to visit Saudi Arabia.

Perhaps Saudi Arabia's goal in preventing this agreement was to encourage Khatami to open up away from exporting the revolution pursued in the first Gulf War.

Iran may also want the agreement to be the nucleus of Iranian-Arab security cooperation as an alternative to GCC cooperation with America.46 Hassan Rouhani, a guessmaker in Iran's National Council after the first Gulf War, called for the establishment of a joint security system that includes Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria and the six GCC countries, but it was conditional on the exit of all foreign forces from the region.47

But Iran's strategy would not have succeeded in the face of the imbalance of power in favor of America in the region and the world after the collapse of the Soviets on the one hand, and on the other hand America resolved the conflict in the Gulf in its favor and militarized the Gulf and changed its policy from double poles to containing Iraq and Iran.

The new geopolitical reality after the Second Gulf War has put any countries aspiring to play a greater role in their regional surroundings such as Iran in an awkward position on the one hand, and on the other hand has made the possibility of the United States abandoning its military engagement with the Gulf unlikely.

Iraq and Iran are no longer the guarantors of stability in the region due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, nor as political allies of Western powers either.Unless Iran shows good faith, reduces tensions in the region and ceases to threaten and stabilize Gulf security, the United States is not in a position to withdraw and disengage from the Gulf (48).

This is what worried Iran and made it feel that it had become a target like the Soviets who collapsed.While before Velayat-e Faqih Iran had met with Saudi Arabia and America against them, how could it have become a source of concern for them and the GCC countries during the first and second Gulf Wars? (49).

Despite the signing of the security agreement between Iran and before the outbreak of the third Gulf War and Saudi Arabia, the tension in Saudi Arabia's relationship with Iran was further entrenched after the bombing of residential towers in Khobar by Hezbollah Hejaz in 1996, which Iran provided protection to its perpetrators, including Saudi citizen Ahmed al-Mughassil, who carried out the bombing that killed 120 people, including 19 of them American citizens.

Hence, the GCC countries considered the presence of foreign forces as a cornerstone in achieving their national security, while Iran sees this presence as a real threat to its national security to its security.50 Therefore, there remained key points of contention in the conflict between the two shores of the Gulf, which would have continued tension on the relations of the two parties until the outbreak of the Fourth Khaij War on Iraq despite the rapprochement that occurred between the two banks after the Second Gulf War.

Third Gulf War

After the attacks of 11-9-2001, tension continued to haunt the relationship between the two banks until the invasion of Iraq, which increased the tension even more.Iran employed the creative chaos of the occupation and spread under its smoke and expanded its influence until it worried Saudi Arabia, which considered its expansion a threat to the security of the Gulf and knew to contain and besiege it.51

Remarkably, Iran benefited from the Iraqi opposition in Iraq after the third Gulf War, embracing it since the first and second Gulf Wars.Conversely, Saudi Arabia did so until a Saudi official said in 2007, "The Iranians had a plan before the 2003 invasion and they worked to accomplish it and they deserve the influence they got in Iraq."[52]

The conflict between the two banks over Iraq after the Third Gulf War shifted from a pattern of tension that prevailed after the Second Gulf War to a struggle for dominance over the Middle East region after the invasion of Iraq.

It is no longer possible to isolate the relations of the two sides from the totality of the interactions of the struggle over hegemony over the Middle East region in light of American strategic projects aimed at establishing a global empire starting with the control of this region that took the name of the Greater Middle East.53

While Iran justified that its influence in Iraq was due to the U.S. presence targeting it, and that the removal of the Americans was ahead of any other policy, Saudi Arabia saw an Iraqi government that represented everyone as the solution.

In light of the struggle for hegemony, Saudi Arabia found that Iran had managed to enter Iraq after disbanding its army until Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said that "America has handed Iraq over on a plate of gold to Iran."

This comes at a time when Khatami left and Nejad was elected in 2005, who turned the page on the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement under Khatami into a conflict page.55

Iran has accused Saudi Arabia of destabilizing Iraq's security through its alliance with the United States, with which Iran is locked in a nuclear crisis, in Iraq after the 2005 elections in Iraq and Iran and after the 2006 Samarra bombings that later led to America's withdrawal in 2011.

Larijani said, "If America wants a democratic Iraq, it should withdraw after the Iraqis have chosen their parliament" (56).

Saudi Arabia has found Iran's singularity in the Iraq file that America's withdrawal will make Iraq a second Iran on its northern border.It converged with Iraq and Iran after the bombing of Samarra and Saudi Arabia supported the Iraqi List in 2010.

But Iran was able to reinstate Maliki for a second term, which caused an increase in bibank conflict over Iraq and the region where the winds of the Arab Spring were blown away.

The spread of sectarian conflict and terrorism across the border has raised fears of the new nature with which the region will be reshaped after the start of the Arab Spring.When the Bahrain movement broke out, the GCC states felt that the fire was inside the house and intervened and settled the matter.

The Arab Spring exposed Iran's strategy to the peoples of the region, who were alienated from it as the policies of its cross-border religious militias left the worst impact on the Arab periphery, which it extended to under the pretext of fighting terrorism.

While the Arab Spring's overthrow of a number of dictatorial regimes was an unexpected test of America's relations with the GCC, it was a dramatic shift of political power in the Arab world.

Despite this, the overthrow of a number of centers of political and economic power was in the interest of the Gulf states and not the other way around, winning the Gulf twice, once because of the exposure of Iran's strategy to the peoples of the region and once because of the absence of Arab competitors for the role of the Regional Cooperation Council.

On the other hand, political turmoil has affected Iraq and Iran, weakened them politically and economically, and allowed the GCC states to emerge as a center of economic power in the Gulf and in the Middle East.

This is due to oil revenues that have made it the only stable ally of the United States, and the shift in the balance of power from Iran and Iraq to the Gulf states that entered their golden age at the gates of the fall of Mosul in 2014.[5]

Fourth Gulf War

The fall of Mosul in 2014 opened the door to the Fourth Gulf War in Iraq and formed the No. 3 international coalition in August 2014.

Iran may have gambled with all its regional assets when Sanaa and Mosul fell in 2014 at the gates of the nuclear deal, the signing of which alarmed Gulf states on the one hand, and on the other hand at the gates of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries entering their golden age.

The Iranian goal with the fall of Mosul and Sana'a may have been to besiege the GCC on the one hand and negotiate from a position of power with the international community by ceding nuclear in exchange for regional influence on the other.

Iran has given up its nuclear sovereignty to the international community on the one hand and has not been given a green light to be a partner in the scheduled coalition to combat terrorism as it had hoped.Nor has it received a green light or an international guarantee that it will not change its regime.It may also mean that the Iranian revolutionary rhetoric has come to an end, and Iran has been forced to drink the cup of poison of political realism again in the age of its revolution.57

Although Iran succeeded in neutralizing Saudi Arabia away from Iraq after the 2001 attacks by accusing Saudi Arabia of supporting terrorism and positioning itself as an ally of the international community in the fight against terrorism, it has not succeeded in repeating the same game with ISIS against Turkey after the fall of Mosul.

Hence Turkey and Saudi Arabia may have converged after the fall of Mosul.Turkey sent its forces to Bashiqa at the end of 2014 and Saudi Arabia sent its ambassador to Baghdad in K2 2015.Then the Badan gradually opened up to Baghdad after the Fourth Gulf War linked Baghdad to the international coalition.

This would bring Iraq closer than ever to America's allies in the region and perhaps at the same time to Iran.At a time when the regional balance of power seemed to shift from Iran and Iraq to the Gulf states due to the US policy of dual containment that began after Kuwait's invasion against Iran and Iraq (58).

Iraq's accession to the international coalition may open the door for Iraq to join the Islamic Military Alliance and the Gulf Cooperation Council as well.Hence the visit of the chiefs of staff of Jordan and Saudi Arabia to Baghdad to fulfill the desire of Robert Gates, former US Secretary of Defense, when he announced it at the Manama Dialogue to link Iraq with the GCC countries as a step to distance Iraq from Iran.59

Although developments in the bibank conflict over Iraq remain thorny, they are still of interest to the U.S. decision-maker.The Gulf is one of the vital areas that cannot be abandoned, as conflicts within it may lead to cross-border threats to U.S. interests.The Lausanne nuclear agreement in July 2014 pushes the P5+1 to a deal that brings the two banks together face-to-face.60

There is controversy that a regional security forum within the Gulf region or a broader Gulf regional forum involving non-GCC member states such as the Helsinki Security Forum would contribute to the development and reduction of mechanisms for resolving and reducing regional disputes.

Given the existing animosities between Iran and the Gulf states, the realistic proposal is to create a regional security entity that brings together the Gulf states and their Western partners that will help arrange regular meetings to discuss regional security issues and enhance cooperative efforts between them.61

Although Iraq is still at the heart of an international-regional battle looking to protect its own interests on a historic east-west crossing, Iran appeared to have no place in Iraq after the outbreak of the Fourth Gulf War.

Through numerous reforms limiting Iran's role in the country, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has pushed them forward and created opportunities for other countries in the region to offer roles that allow for more influence in Iraq.

Iran will not retreat without a fight, and will use every means of its own, including proxy forces, to guard and protect its interests in Iraq.62 This means that the path to a fifth Gulf war is a possibility and whether or not it will probably depend on Iran's behavior.

Chapter VII

Challenges and Finances

Conflict of the two banks

On Iraq

In light of the conflict between the two banks over Iraq, Velayat-e Faqih has failed since 1979 to provide an economic or political model, but the gap between the revolutionary regime and society in Iran on the one hand and the revolutionary regime and its Arab and international surroundings began to widen due to the bad impact left by the behavior of its militias on the one hand and their use of the sacred against the values of national states on the other.

This is confirmed by the Iranian researcher and deputy director of the Tehran Institute for Research and International Studies, Dr. Mahmoud Reza, when he says, "It must be recognized that there is still a long way to go to restore the 'Iranian carpet' to its historical precedent and to make 'Made in Iran' a source of trust."

The result of the evaluation by the Iranian researcher Jahangrammuzgar of the results of the fourth five-year plan, which ended in 2010, was to assess the path of the Iranian government and the path towards 2025, saying: "It is retreating from bad to worse".64

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has set two basic needs, namely the economy and security, as its priorities since its establishment. Today, despite the emergency Gulf crisis, we find that it has a free trade area, a Cameroonian union, a monetary one at the doors, a common market, intra-regional trade and accession to the World Trade Organization.

The GCC also has the security side of the Island Shield, rapid intervention forces, missile shield, joint defense agreement, defense strategy and Istanbul Initiative with NATO countries, NATO has opened its center in Kuwait in January 2017. The most recent of these was the Arab Alliance of Firmness and the Islamic Military Alliance, in addition to the fact that the GCC countries are members of the international coalition in Iraq and Syria.

The events could prompt the two shores of the Gulf under international auspices to strike a regional, not just bilateral, deal under which Iran would abandon support for terrorism and abandon nuclear weapons in the Lausanne deal.

However, the two shores of the Gulf face three major challenges after four Gulf wars, the first of which is to contain the repercussions of the historical interval on the political, economic and security structure of the Velayat-e Faqih regime and the GCC system.

The second of these challenges lies in how to look for the possibility of moving from a situation of indirect conflict managed by the United States to a state of bargaining (cooperation + competition) economic security.A bargaining situation that could move them from patriarchal rentier states to constitutional producing countries, could allow the two banks to meet face to face with a new regional security and cooperation system.

The third of these challenges is how to get out the conflict of the two shores of the Gulf over Iraq, which moves them, Iraq and the region from the system of the world of non-state to the world of the state in formulas that respond to the aspirations of the peoples.

There is no doubt that the exit from the world of statelessness to the year of state depends on Tehran's behavior. Is it ready to sign a peace agreement and abandon terrorism? Or will a cross-border military-religious mentality run forward away from surrender and collision?

Until the seriousness of the international community in changing the Velayat-e Faqih regime becomes clear or not, and pending Tehran's behavior, the alliances, resources, values and goals of the international system may push Iran to sign a regional agreement similar to the Lausanne nuclear agreement or the Camp David agreement in which it loses its regional role.

Conclusion

The paper tried to answer the research questions and test the validity of the hypothesis through the chapters of the paper starting from the separation of conflict and strategy through the stages of conflict between the two banks since the first Gulf War.

It has been shown that the conflict between the two banks is not only a bilateral conflict but a US-managed conflict on the one hand, and on the other hand it is a conflict between the international system and the system of velayat-e faqih.

The stages of the conflict have been associated with the names of many American presidents, such as: the Nixon Doctrine of Indirect Intervention, then the Carter Principle of Direct Intervention, the Principle of Strategic Conflict under Reagan, the Principle of Dual Containment under Clinton, the Bush Principle of Preemptiveness, Obama's Withdrawal and then Direct Intervention at Trump.

As the relationship between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) over Iraq intensifies under the Fourth Khaij War, the United States, which is managing this conflict, could move the Gulf landscape from the 1945 oil-for-security deal with Saudi Arabia to a regional international deal in which Iran and the region could move from revolution to state.

But the possibility of the Fourth Gulf War turning into a fifth Gulf War remains similar to the storm of the desert of Kuwait's liberation.The likelihood of war has increased since the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 on June 9, 2010.

This war may be sparked by a clash at sea, against the backdrop of the inspection of an Iranian ship,63 which is based on Article XV of the resolution, which is a resolution under item VII against Iran's nuclear file.

It may be reinstated in accordance with Resolution 2231 of 2015, especially in light of the escalation of the administration of Trump against Iran and the possibility of the withdrawal of America from it or Iran.

This may mean that the conflict that began in Iraq with the first, then the second and third Gulf Wars, may also end with it.Especially since the first Gulf War ended with a ceasefire on 8-8-88 and did not end with a surrender or peace agreement.

The instability of Iraq and the prospects of its going to partition also reinforce this possibility.It is also reinforced by the presence of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps empire that crosses the borders of armed religious borders and rejects the borders of national states on the one hand, and on the other hand there are international and regional alliances under the administration of Trump that has positioned Iran as the largest sponsor of terrorism in the world.65

Whether a fifth Gulf war takes place or Iran signs an international agreement similar to the Camp David Accords or the Lausanne nuclear deal, the coming years will not be Iranian years of rest.

It moved from revolution to state after the first Gulf War. Then it moved from state to revolution during the third Gulf War, and then moved from revolution to state at the gates of the Fourth Gulf War.

With this strategy, it has been able to face the challenges and extend from Tehran to Baghdad, Damascus, Peron and Yemen, but the continuation of this game in light of international and regional trends and alliances may no longer be available to Iran.

Today, Iran is perhaps facing a phase it has not pledged since 1980.Its transition from revolution to state under Rouhani will probably not help it face unprecedented challenges.Challenges that would retake Iraq and cut off the extension of its axis from Tehran to Beirut.

As well as having to return perhaps within its borders, to face an unprecedented escalation and an international and regional threat to take the battle for the first time into it, as stated by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Perhaps the two shores of the Gulf will not meet Iraq in one alliance until the departure of Wilayat al-Faqih.A province that has spread instability in Iraq and made it an arena of chaos with which to fight outside its territory and to escape its internal problems, a bridge to the Mediterranean Sea and a platform for negotiation with the other Gulf bank and the international community.

Today there are international and regional alliances, statements and agendas moving against Iran, Wilayat al-Faqih. But the question is, is there a serious international and regional will to remove the regime of velayat-e faqih to achieve stability in the Gulf and build a new Gulf-regional and international security and cooperation system without velayat-e faqih?

A question that we leave to the acceleration of events in the Gulf, the latest of which was the Riyadh summits held last May and brought together the countries of the Islamic world except Iran, and announced a Middle East alliance to be announced in 2018 (66).

*********************************

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34- Jamal Sanad Al Suwaidi - The Future of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf - Abu Dhabi - Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research

35- Dr. Mohammad Al-Saeed Idris-Iran's Regional Role in the Middle East is a Cooperation Project.. Or domination?

36- Mohammed Al-Saeed Idris-The Gulf Regional System from 1971-1992-PhD thesis-Cairo-Faculty of Economics and Political Science-

37- Abdul Razzaq Khalaf Mohammed Al-Taie - A reading of the position of the GCC countries on the Iraqi-Iranian war 1980-1988

38- Prof. Gregory Kosache-Prof. Elena Malkomian-Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: Regional Organization and Regional Security, Moscow, Russian Federation.

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40. Source 29 – pp. 598-603

41- Dr. Mustafa Al-Shammari - Militarization of the Gulf: The U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf - p. 132

42.Source 35

43- Source 36-

44- Dr. Mohammad Salim Al-Kawaz - Saudi-Iranian Relations 1979-2011 - Historical Political Study - Amman - Dar Ghaid - 2013 - Page 40

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51.Source 44 p. 100

52- Frederick Weary and Karim Sajjadpour - A Distant Balance - America, Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Changing Middle East - 28 May 2014

53.Source 35

54.Source 5

55. Source 44, p. 103

56. Source 44, p. 106

57- Nadim Qutaish - The impact of the nuclear agreement on the tools of Iran - the Arabs

58.Source 5

59. Source 32

60- Bassem Rashid - Brief presentation of a study entitled: Iran and the Gulf States: Unnecessary Turmoil, issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs "Chatham House", July 2015

61.Source 5

62- Stratfor: Iraq is the center of the struggle for regional influence between Iran and the Gulf - Translation and editing by Osama Mohammed - The New Gulf

63. Source 25, p. 56

64.Source 21

65-Trump: Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism - Al Jazeera Net - 2017

66- Riyadh Summit: Establishment of the "Middle East Strategic Alliance" and a force of 34,000 against "terrorism"

http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/middleeast/210520179

Author Dr.Omar Abdul Sattar Mahmoud

الكاتب د.عمر عبدالستار محمود